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Abstract
The complexity of international drug trafficking is not only derived from its 
inherent nature as a transnational illicit enterprise, but also from the themes and 
perceptions used to characterize, understand and explain it. The knot of 
perceptions and themes that comprise the drug trade are well evidenced in the 
discipline of International Relations and in the international policymaking arena. 
The following work primarily examines how both International Relations and the 
international policymaking arena treat the drug issue and also includes discussions 
involving other illicit activities. This research seeks to answer the following 
question: How have drugs predominantly been presented in both IR and in the 
arena of international policy making? In order to address this, several sub­
questions will be explored: 1) What themes have been associated with drugs in 
International Relations literature? 2) How are drugs viewed in the international 
arena? 3) What is the historical background to contemporary perceptions of the 
drug issue? 4) What are alternative themes and approaches to understanding and 
explaining drugs? 5) What are the consequences from the answers to the 
preceding questions for IR and for the world of illicit drugs?
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Preface: Manas Airport
The plane descended an icy runway at Manas airport and my 22 hour journey had 
come to an end. The distinctly oversized Russian guard with piecing blue eyes 
checked my passport attentively and then handed it back while making a series of 
deep guttural chuckles and wishing me a cynical “good luck”. In 1997, long 
before 9/11 would put Kyrgyzstan and Manas Airport on the headline news clips 
around the globe, Central Asia was still associated, for most people, with 
romanticized images of the Silk Road and the Great Game. My initial research 
plan in Kyrgyzstan had been to study post-Soviet identity and to bring back much 
needed primary source information on the region as a whole. However it soon 
became clear that no such research was possible. Aside from a myriad of social 
and cultural barriers, there was no one in Kyrgyzstan occupying themselves with 
such thoughts. The intelligentsia has long fled “abroad” and those who remained 
were tired, dejected and out of touch. Looking around the streets of Bishkek, 
poverty and hopelessness arose from every impression from the dilapidated streets 
and buildings, the broken down cars, the faces of those I met.
One day the local newspaper reported that a new road was being built to connect 
northern and southern Kyrgyzstan with funding from foreign sources. In the 
context of the time nothing could have seemed more curious. I began to ask 
around why in light of so many more urgent needs, there should be expenditure on 
such an arbitrary and expensive project. The secular north and Muslim south lived 
mostly as independent regions. There was little commerce, little travel and little 
exchange of any kind. As my curiosity grew about the mysterious road, I began to 
conduct interviews which led me to discover that there was in fact an urgent 
commerce that was being held up by poor roads connecting the north and south: 
Afghan opium on its way to Moscow. I never did resolve the mystery of the road, 
nor did I manage to verify that the drug trade was the reason for its construction; 
however the process had left me with a number of pressing questions: for all the 
research and analysis in International Relations (IR), why were drugs not taken 
into account as a daily, ever-present and determining factor in politics and 
economics across the world? Why were my own views that drugs are a “criminal 
issue” best left to law enforcement? How is it that a trade, which seemed to be
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sustaining the economies of at least five nations in the east, was completely 
ignored aside from some sensationalized stories in America and Europe about 
opium fields in far-off places?
At the time, drugs were not considered important to IR and many of my 
colleagues looked at me quizzically when I mentioned that I was researching the 
drug trade. They would ask me, “Why, are you working for the DEA? What do 
drugs have to do with IR?” Research into illicit drugs was often confined to Latin 
American studies or the Italian Mafia, the former used to highlight corruption or 
north-south dynamics while the latter perpetuated Godfather-style intrigue about 
the role of the Mafia in mid-20th Century politics. So began what would become a 
Master’s Thesis on narcopolitics and narcoeconomics in Central Asia.1 The drug 
trade was everywhere and no comer of the region was untouched by it. My 
research took me to the southern city of Osh where the great “ethnic” riots had 
broken out in early 1990. These riots had remained a point of curiosity in the new 
nation’s brief history. Scholars and analysts had pegged this as manifestation of 
ethnic conflict between Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz who all lived in the region. At 
the time, ethnicity seemed to have become the de facto explanation for conflict in 
any region where the population was not homogeneous. The story of the riots was 
long and complex. However there is just enough information to question why a 
group of people that had lived together in peace for over half a century would 
suddenly take up arms. Furthermore where would they, mostly poverty stricken 
peasants and unemployed workers of the previous government, have procured 
arms and trained themselves to use them in the first place? Questions like this lead 
to another discovery which was that perhaps in IR we look at certain situations 
and say that they happened because of ethnicity or scarce resources or what have 
you as an expedient resolution to social problems in obscure locations. Yet these 
explanations arise exactly because we cut out half of the world in which we live, 
the illicit half. It did not take too much effort to see that the Osh riots could have 
been as much a result of turf wars for trafficking routes (thereby explaining the 
well-armed and trained participants) as they were of ethnic conflict (of course 
there are many details regarding the Osh riots and the drug trade which I have
1 Padideh Tosti (1999)
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omitted here). My Masters Thesis focused on demonstrating that drugs have a 
place in IR, a central place, and that when we ignore the illicit sectors we end up 
with a false idea of what is happening around us. Osh was just one example. It 
turned out that many regions with “ethnic conflict” also had a strong presence of 
the drug trade, the implications of which I never followed and therefore cannot 
comment on further. However when I hear of conflict, there is a cliche which 
always inevitably comes to mind: things are not always what they seem.
Then came 9/11. After that, people stopped asking me why drugs were important 
to IR. The primary connection made in the media was that terrorists were all drug 
funded and therefore drugs became an even greater security concern. As it turned 
out, most terrorists had plenty of legitimate funding support without needing to 
resort to drug trafficking. By this time I had already spent several years in 
Washington, DC attempting to demonstrate the extent to which much the drug 
trade was a part of our daily lives and that no blanket policy could possibly 
address or engage it in any meaningful way. My work and my new firm had led 
me to a variety of new issues and questions. Drugs were far more than a legal 
issue and the law was the least interesting aspect of the drug trade. Traffickers 
were some of the most intelligent and forward thinking businessmen we had. The 
trade sustained several large and key regions around the world (as the US military 
discovered when it entered Afghanistan in 2001). At the same time, drugs had 
arguably produced for us some of the greatest thinkers and revered poets, the very 
same ones nations were apt to present as testaments to the nation’s creativity, 
intelligence and success—yet violence and devastation also followed the trade 
and, by 9/11, addiction rates along with HIV had exploded not only in my former 
host-city of Bishkek but also region wide.
As I watched the policy machine chum in DC between Capitol Hill, an array of 
universities such as Georgetown and Harvard, and a myriad of policy institutes 
and government contractors, it became clear that something was not working. The 
nature of this “not working” lay in the perception of policy makers. There was the
2 Illicit sectors are simply defined as areas of activity formally considered against domestic or 
international law. See for example Charles Goredema (2002). As we shall see in later sections 
such definition are not without their problems.
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global illicit sector of the world economy and then there was the perception of it. 
This perception permeated policymaking circles as much as within the halls of 
academia. This perception had a very particular composition: they were telling a 
story without history. Gangsters and thugs were the makings for good films and 
the stories of the drug escapades of Hunter S. Thompson in Fear and Loathing in 
Las Vegas3 spoke to the secret hippie that resided in the business-suited and 
mortgage-enslaved man on the street. Along with a lack of history was the 
nagging sense that, whatever policy was doing and whatever academia was 
writing, it never seemed to capture the full weight of the trade as I had 
experienced it in the Central Asian States (CAS). Dialogues and recommendations 
always struck me as thin, one-dimensional and uninformed even if, in many cases, 
quite well-intentioned. Thus was bom the current work. To take IR and the 
international arena as a starting point for examining drugs and how we view 
drugs, then to add history as a way to inform these views and finally to offer some 
lines of thought from other disciplines in order to further enhance and enrich this 
view, to capture the ‘weight’ of drugs without entering into debates on morality, 
while taking into account these ethical and moral debates as a part of a larger 
system which we simply call the drug trade.
The fieldwork experience and subsequent work in Washington, DC (1997-2001) 
served to highlight the contradiction between drug research, analysis and policies, 
and drug realities witnessed on the ground. With the passing of each day, it 
became increasingly evident that those who studied and made policy 
recommendations on the chug trade did not understand something, even if at the 
time what that ‘something’ was exactly remained unclear. As the drug trade 
seemed to permeate every level of local society in producing regions, it also 
clearly had the same effect along the drug chain all the way to the Western 
markets. The details of how this permeation worked and why it existed were 
intricate, changing at every point on the chug chain: from cultivation sites to 
production sites where raw opium was transformed into heroin, to trafficking 
routes and finally destination markets. The contrast of this system with facile 
characterizations of drug lords and mafia bosses, and simplistic calls to eradicate
3 Hunter S. Thompson (2005).
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drugs forever was stark. The drug realities seemed completely removed from 
anything being said or written in the West.
At the same time it seemed odd that IR should be willing to address the role of 
multinational and transnational corporations (TNCs) in the world economy while 
simultaneously ignoring the illicit businesses.4 Today it is common for journalists 
to enter into the once forbidden zones of Afghanistan and venture into once 
remote countries such as Kyrgyzstan. Observations on drug realities and the 
intricate social and political connections along the drug trade are becoming more 
commonplace. Yet while IR appears to still be struggling with the drug issue, 
policy making has demonstrated that it does not have the capacity to address the 
drug issue as it would like to in order to solve the problem. As Professor Simon 
Commander of the London Business School simply and succinctly put it once, 
“The whole thing seems like a big mess.”5 This background narrative serves to 
establish the point of departure for this research project.
4 A point of caution should be added here. This work does not support the idea that licit and illicit 
businesses are analogous though they certainly can have many aspects in common. Making such 
an analogy risks excluding important details that pertain to illicit activities and the environments 
which give rise to them. For example, instability and uncertainty in a region can be a plus for illicit 
businesses while for licit businesses such an environment can be detrimental.
5 Simon Commander (2002).
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Chapter I. Castles in the Sky: World of Illicit Drugs and 
the World of IR
Introduction 
Core Questions
The complexity of international drug trafficking is not only derived from its 
inherent nature as a transnational illicit enterprise, but also from the themes and 
perceptions used to characterize, understand and explain it. The knot of 
perceptions and themes that comprise the drug trade are well evidenced in the 
discipline of IR and in the international arena (what Chris Brown has called big 
‘IR’ and little ‘ir’ respectively, where the big ‘IR’ was tasked with explaining 
little ‘ir’). 6 The following work primarily examines how IR and ir treat the drug 
issue and also includes discussions involving other illicit activities. This research 
seeks to answer the following question: How have drugs predominantly been 
presented in both IR and in the arena of international policy making? In 
order to address this, several sub-questions will be explored: 1) What themes 
have been associated with drugs in International Relations literature? 2) How 
are drugs viewed in the international arena? 3) What is the historical 
background to contemporary perceptions of the drug issue? 4) What are 
alternative themes and approaches to understanding and explaining drugs? 
5) What are the consequences from the answers to the preceding questions 
for IR and for the world of illicit drugs?
Referring to criminal networks, the international sociologist Manuel Castells 
writes that although there is a “general acknowledgement of the importance and 
reality of this phenomenon”, it has been “largely ignored by social scientists.” 
The underconceptualization and weak empirical recognition of the drug problem 
is also prevalent, even if it is acknowledged as an important phenomenon, in the 
public and policy making domain, both domestically and in the international 
arena. The condition of underconceptualization has several components which 
can be addressed, at least in large part, by undertaking the core questions above,
6 Chris Brown (2001) 1-2.
7 Manuel Castells (2000) 167-168.
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thus allowing us to move from the current impoverished IR view of this subject to 
a more “thick” conception of drugs. First, IR itself usually addresses drugs in 
terms of dangerous or delinquent non-state actors. This literature, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, is itself sparse and lacks a deep engagement with what we 
could call the world of illicit drugs as a whole. References here usually involve 
illicit actors as a threat to the state or how they compromise political systems 
through corruption. Then IR also addresses drugs when discussing north-south 
relations in the Americas. Here relations between Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia and 
the US tend to include a drug angle. In the next chapter we discuss this in terms of 
the IPE of drugs in Latin America and subsequently in terms of the US anti-drug 
certification processes.
Second, IR does not engage with the policy making arena since it does not provide 
any extensive views regarding the nature and characteristics of national drug 
policies. This is not to say that IR does not have an understanding of the 
bureaucratic processes and inter-agency/state connections that lead to drug policy 
formation (which it does not), but that drug policy itself can be seen as oscillating 
between questions of legalization and criminalization, more laws, less laws, and 
so forth. Furthermore this oscillating debate lives on the arc of history, dating 
back at least to early American alcohol prohibition, even if its roots could 
probably be traced to the earliest discourses on religion. The former takes as given 
an assumption that drugs are unequivocally bad whether from a health, religious, 
economic or moral point of view. The latter sees drugs as neutral to good with 
some negative effects which are caused more by criminalization than anything 
inherent in the use of drugs themselves. History reveals a far more dynamic and 
complex situation, exposing the legalize-criminalize debate as only a portion of a 
more extensive set of events. This is the third point; that IR ignores the history of 
drugs and where history is mentioned it is usually made as an introductory remark 
to say that drugs have long existed in human societies. This exclusion of history in 
IR and ir, leads to a lack of understanding as to where current attitudes and 
perceptions of the drug trade are derived from.
Fourth, IR could draw from other disciplines in order to engage with the drug 
issue in a more substantial way. Here criminology serves to bring in new ideas
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and points of view particularly through the foundations and concepts associated 
with “enterprise”. The focus here is absolutely not to cut and paste a model from 
criminology into IR. In fact enterprise as a formal model is highly problematic. 
However, criminology’s attempts to make sense of crime over decades of debate 
can add to IR’s current views on drugs. Therefore we will use the term 
“enterprise” to refer to some early foundations and concepts that have risen out of 
this debate. Furthermore enterprise could be viewed as having some points of 
connection with IR concepts of non-state actors, so that it is not too alien to 
discuss ideas from it in IR. Again the goal is not to defend any formal conceptions 
of enterprise models or debunk them; the aim is to move IR’s conception of drugs 
closer to the world of illicit drugs.
At its core, this thesis argues that the drug ‘problem’, understood as the 
production and consumption of illegal narcotics in many countries, and the 
international trade that accompanies it, has not been adequately addressed in IR. 
Furthermore, it argues that IR has neglected a serious engagement with the topic. 
This neglect has at least three dimensions: a lack of empirical information on an 
illegal and ever changing subject; a general failure across IR and ir to tackle this 
issue in depth or at least an adequate manner; and the specific failure on the part 
of IR to recognize drugs as a major feature of global trade with its many 
implications for an understanding of the transnational or non-state dimensions of 
the contemporary world. Finally, taken together, the preceding points create a 
debate that is intellectually poor, lacking historical depth and a sound basis for 
analysis.
The following research addresses this unexamined perception of drugs and tries to 
elaborate a general framework which may encompass the character, both complex 
and unseen, of the drug problem. Such an analysis is not easy since the manner in 
which the drug problem manifests itself is dynamic rather than static. Indeed 
production, processing, transport and consumption can occur with amazing speed. 
This difficulty is compounded if we take into account the origins of the drug 
question as well. Here the focus of work is loosely demarcated by the last decade 
of the twentieth century, i.e. from the end of the Cold War in 1991 to September 
11 2001. The former marked the beginning of a period in which state controls
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over the movement of commodities, including drugs, money and people, were 
greatly reduced, while the latter brought to world prominence transnational forces 
involving drugs, money laundering and security, and marked the start of a distinct 
chapter in the history of this subject. This last chapter is still unfolding, and, 
though some preliminary observations can be made, it is too early to make long­
term assertions about drugs post 9/11.
The 1990s
There 1990s were not just one defined by changes in world politics and in the role 
and power of states. Throughout the 1990s, the world experienced changes that 
can be broadly arranged into at least three major categories: technological, social 
and economic. Though there have been overstatements as to the extent and 
significance of these changes, e.g., with regard to the impact of new conceptions 
of time and space, these changes have certainly had an impact, to varying degrees, 
on all societies, businesses and individuals and, with considerable relevance for 
the drugs question, on leisure and consumption as well as on institutions and the 
economy. It is, therefore, reasonable to consider that illicit sectors have also been 
affected by the changes of this period. Most obviously, drug traffickers, as much 
as anyone else, seem to have benefited from the increased travel, liberalized trade 
policies and new technologies such as Internet gaming and Internet based 
banking. The 1990s were also a period of major responses to the drugs trade by 
states, in the formed of increased counter-narcotic efforts.
Primarily it has been the United States, and secondarily the United Kingdom, 
United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD) who have either advocated or directly led drug interdiction 
measures. For example, CIRUS, the Combined Interdiction Unified Strategy for 
Iran, is one of four elements in the United Nations’ counter drug measures in Iran. 
The program aims to reduce supply and demand while providing community 
education and legal assistance. The US Coast Guard, as part of a long term 
partnership with Caribbean governments in maritime patrolling, implemented 
Operation New Frontier in 1999 to secure coastal borders from drug traffickers 
through the use of armed helicopters and high-speed small boats. The US$10
19
million project was aimed at traffickers coming in from the Caribbean and eastern 
shores of Central America.
To counter these policies there have been a range of individuals and organizations 
that view the “war on drugs” as a failure. Their goal, in varying forms, is drug 
policy reform, at national and/or international levels. DrugSense, for example, a 
leading forum for policy reform, states clearly, “We exist to provide accurate 
information relevant to drug policy in order to heighten awareness of the extreme 
damage being caused to our nation and the world by our current flawed and failed 
‘War on Drugs.’”8 Such statements are backed not only by moral sentiment, but 
also by some of the most prominent individuals in the United States such as Peter 
Lewis, chairman and CEO of Progressive Corporation (the fourth-largest U.S. 
personal automobile insurer), financier George Soros and Laurance Rockefeller.
The triad of the changed global context, increased interdiction and movements for 
reform represent only the most superficial aspects of the drugs debate. Yet even 
from these brief statements begin to emerge several areas generally felt to fall 
under the purview of International Relations (IR): elements of globalization, new 
security challenges, the role of international organizations, transnational and non­
state actors, and the political economy of drugs to name a few. As will be 
discussed in later sections, the drug problem reaches into nearly every aspect of 
IR, though illicit drugs remain under-conceptualized in the discipline. The 
remainder of this chapter addresses why drug research is required and why it is 
relevant to IR as a discipline. It begins with a synopsis of the role of illicit drugs 
in the IR discipline and an extended sketch of the ways in which the drug issue 
manifests itself in society both domestically and internationally. Next is a brief 
overview of drugs in relation to various IR theories. The latter sections deal with 
the historical aspects of illicit drugs and how history bears upon the central 
research questions. The final section outlines the structures of this research project 
and addresses questions related to the time frame chosen and the methods 
employed. Included here are also discussions on the uses of the terms directly and 
indirectly related to drugs within the literature.
8 DrugSense, ‘Mission Statement’.
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Importance o f  Illicit Drug Research in International Relations
Castells pointed to the two reasons why there is a barrier to the study of drugs 
within any academic discipline. First is that data is not reliable and therefore 
difficult to build any analysis upon, and second is that sensationalism alters or 
clouds interpretation, conclusions and recommendations.9 This fact, however, 
does not justify excluding drugs completely from academic research. He 
concludes that,
If a phenomenon is acknowledged as a fundamental dimension of 
our societies, indeed of the new, globalized system, we must use 
whatever evidence is available to explore the connection between 
criminal activities, societies, and economies at large.10
The first reason justifying why such an exploration is the need is to uncover any 
concepts or frameworks in which drug research is conducted. Speaking in general 
terms, Stephen Walt addressed this point by stating:
Why should policymakers and practitioners care about the 
scholarly study of international affairs?... Even policymakers who 
are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often 
unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what 
to do. It is hard to make good policy if one’s basic organizing 
principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories 
without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses 
theories—whether he or she knows it or not—and disagreements 
about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about 
the basic forces that shape international outcomes.11
In the international arena, conceptualizations of drugs are used to make 
determinations about policy action. As Walt notes, such theories can be unstated 
or unrecognized. Theory may be a strong word in this case. More concisely, there 
are general frameworks or principles embedded within the assumption and
9 Manuel Castells (2000) 168.
10 Ibid.
11 Stephen M. Walt (1998).
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particular modes of thought that must be gleaned from statements and publications 
by major international organizations.
The second reason to justify an interrogation of any anti-drug policy relates to the 
effectiveness of the policies themselves. Deeper exploration in the debate on illicit 
drugs may reveal inconsistencies and contradictions in current policies that would 
otherwise remain hidden. Efforts have been made in this direction, primarily by 
criminologists. One example is the idea that current countermeasures are 
inherently positioned against democratic structures and civil society. Farrell’s 
study on the success of the Taleban regime in implementing UN anti-drug policy 
using draconian methods showed a need to deeply question such policies.12 
Predominately, why do countermeasures only seem to be successful under non- 
democratic governments?
Ironically, while the discussion herein centers on why drugs need to be brought in 
to IR as an analytical subject, there are some criminologists who state that the 
very problem of drug policy today is due to the preference given to IR (or 
Government/Politics) departments as the source for governmental policy advice 
on illicit sectors, including drugs, terrorism and trafficking of arms:
The intense policy activity around this threat is indicative of a key 
trend in post-Cold War international relations, that is the 
reorientation of western security, intelligence and defence agencies 
toward crime control. Risk assessments and research evidence 
provided by international relations departments in higher learning 
institutions, especially in the USA, have been particularly 
influential in providing the rationale for this reorientation.13
The implication is that the over-emphasis on security and threats allows IR to 
provide, conveniently, the justification of an existing trend towards control the 
control of illicit sectors. At the same time, and for some of the brief reasons 
already sketched here, IR is not yet ready to provide meaningful analysis of illicit 
activities. It is understandable that criminology, with its long standing and rich
12 John Thome and Graham Farrell (2003).
13 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill (2002) 245.
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debate on most illicit factors would find IR unsuitable for such a task. 
Criminology has historically included factors far beyond mere threat concerns and 
much of the bases for countermeasures rest on traditional notions from 
criminology. However, it is also true that crime has moved more and more into 
the international political arena and criminology may not have the deep 
understanding of political relations between states, and the nuances of policy 
implementation that can be provided by IR. Therefore, the two disciplines have 
much to offer each other.
The Drug Problem and Areas o f Impact
The following section outlines a number of areas where drugs have a direct impact 
in order to demonstrate the extensive reach of drugs into the subject areas under 
the purview of IR. IR here extends beyond the strict scholarship on security. For 
simplicity, crime, drugs, drug trafficking, drug production and organized crime 
are taken as a whole in this section. The definitional concerns are addressed 
below.
Politics
In 2003 Bolivian President Gonzala Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign 
under the pressure by Evo Morales. Morales has been called the head “narco-trade 
unionist” and, along with the farmers, many of whom are Aymara Indians, links 
the right to grow coca with Aymara autonomy. The Aymara nation is an “ethnic 
group of two-and-a-half million people that inhabits the heart of the Andes (in 
Bolivia and some southern regions of Peru)”14. The Indians had taken advantage 
of their democratic vote, and had become a political force not easily dismissed. 
Victor Hugo Cardenas, Bolivia’s former Vice-President (1993-1997) said, “In 
building democracy it is no longer possible to ignore Indians, that is what the 
mobilisations tell us”.15 The Indians opposed what they perceived as the laws of 
the colonials and maintain that coca leaves are a natural part of their culture and 
history. Felipe Quispe, a leading Aymara figure, argues that it was in fact the
14 Luis G6mez and A1 Giordano (2002).
15 Diego Cevallos (2003).
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greedy Spanish colonials who were responsible for the mass cultivation of coca.16 
These sentiments could be dismissed were the farmers in Chapare not represented 
by six federations of coca growers, having organized resistance to counter drug 
operations thorough armed conflict if needed. As it turned out Cardenas was right 
and in 2006 Morales became the first person from amongst the indigenous peoples 
to be elected President of Bolivia and he is currently making a strong case for the 
legalization of drug production in Bolivia, a measure that, against many barriers 
and outrage from the US, may pass.
In the US, drugs are connected to a controversial policy process called state 
certification program. Every year the US President is required to certify whether a 
country has been cooperative with US anti-drug efforts. If a country is decertified, 
it faces the suspension of all US aid except for counter narcotics and humanitarian 
programs. In addition, the country can be prevented from receiving loans from 
organizations such as the IMF and face full economic sanctions as was the case of 
Afghanistan. In terms of Bolivia’s pending legalization of cocaine production, 
decertification is one of the main ‘threats’ that the US can issue against Morales. 
However, Morales is more likely betting on coca industry money to replace and 
repay the lost income that decertification would bring and while at the same time 
ending the cycle of dependence on and debt generated by foreign aid.
The decertification program itself has had many critics and whether actual 
relations between the US and countries under scrutiny has any real basis in the
17drug issue is under debate. In an unusual letter to the US Congress, the National 
Narcotic Officers Associations Coalition (NNOAC) expressed its concern over the 
certification of Mexico as a ‘cooperative’ state:
Our National Drug Control Strategy tells us the certification 
process is a way to pressure foreign governments to stand up 
against drug traffickers. The United States has certified Mexico 
each of the last ten years. Each year, about two weeks before the 
certification vote, the President of the United States meets with the
16 Luis G6mez and A1 Giordano (2002).
17 See for the debate on certification see Sewall H. Menzel (1997); Ivelaw L. Griffith (1997) and 
Council on Foreign Relations (1997).
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President of Mexico and makes a major announcement about what 
they are doing to cooperate in the drug war.. .It seems to us that the 
only time you hear from the administration on what the two 
countries are doing about the drug problems on the border is when
1 XMexico is up for certification.
This statement reflects one common concern over the state certification process 
conducted by the US government: that it is more about inter-state politics and 
foreign policy than any actual concern over counter narcotic efforts within a given 
state. The bargaining involved over this process is based on several factors 
including national security issues related to certification where states can be 
certified even if they are not cooperative because they are seen as critical in a 
larger national security context.
In Burma drugs and politics take on a different dynamic. Kean and Bernstein 
argue that the SPDC ruling regime of Burma (formerly SLORC: State Law and 
Order Restoration Council)
depends on the resources of Burma’s drug barons for its financial 
survival. Since it seized power in 1988, opium production has 
doubled, equalling all legal exports...[and it has] become a major 
regional producer of methamphetamines. With 50 percent of the 
economy unaccounted for, drug traffickers, businessmen and 
government officials are able to integrate spectacular profits 
throughout Burma’s permanent economy.19 
In the case of Burma drugs are inseparable from the formal government. While 
most government involvement in Burma, as under the former Taleban of 
Afghanistan, occurs in the form of tax collection, it is difficult to discern in such 
cases the location of the divide between criminality and complicity. Taking a 
narrow view, the presence of drug production does bring minimal stability, even if 
repressive, by the fact that the drug money allows a single government to stay in 
power. Both cocaine and opium, as labor intensive crops, also provide work, even 
if at poverty levels. While, by Western standards, such arguments are
18 National Narcotic Officers Associations Coalition (1999).
19 Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein (1998).
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unacceptable, drug cultivation does in certain cases prevent the instability caused 
by large scale unemployment and frequent changes of government.
A final point regarding politics and drugs refers to the softer issues of prestige and 
image. Countries with high drug production or trafficking have an image of being 
dangerous and risky locations for business investments or as travel destinations. 
While in some cases these perceptions are valid, it is also clear that anxiety and 
media tendencies to report violence do give an uncommonly grave view of such 
situations. Conscious of the ‘shame factor’, as it could be termed, Thailand turned 
its opium history into a tourist attraction with the opening of the Opium Museum 
in Chiang Saen, the center of the Golden Triangle.20 Visitors are able to visit the 
museum in what was once supposed to be a lawless region, taking a journey 
through thousands of years of opium history using high tech multi-media 
presentation and viewing the hundreds of artifacts on display.
Militarization
The relationship between militarization and drugs manifests itself in two ways. 
The first is in the increasing movement towards military solutions for drug 
interdiction. This movement is attributed to the post Cold War context in which 
military activities had to be transitioned into other sectors. In 1986, in the midst of 
the Cold War and in the general context regarding insurgent movements in 
Afghanistan and Nicaragua, Ronald Reagan gave the responsibility of combating 
drug trafficking to US military and intelligence agencies.21 That this transition has 
now actually occurred is undisputed and military personnel openly state their 
transition, as one officer called it, “from a post Cold War soldier to a War on 
Drugs soldier”.22
The second form of militarization is related to the profits of drug production and 
trafficking. The revenues from drug trafficking are said to serve as a funding 
source for Columbia’s FARC, Al-Qaeda, and for smaller groups such as the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Drug trafficking, in this way, is a means
20 ‘Thailand Opium Museum Opens’ (2002)
21 Ted Galen Carpenter (1999).
22 LCDR Kent A Stewart, ‘Navy Veterans of the United States of America member’s page’.
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to an end and not and end in itself. It is important to distinguish here that not all 
drug money generates a tendency towards militarization and much depends on 
where and when the drugs are moving. The intense trafficking of drugs in the 
Caribbean specifically during the 1980s and 1990s did not create support for 
armed movements in that region but rather created a nouveau riche class of 
consumers who flooded stores in Miami purchasing luxury goods from Cartier 
and Gucci.
Finance and Economics
Beyond questions of money laundering, the sale and consumption of illicit drugs 
effect financial relations between states and financial activities within states. 
Afghanistan’s involvement in opium cultivation and production has been widely 
commented upon. However one element, often overlooked, was where exactly the 
large profits from the trade were being held. Statements accusing the Taleban of 
using opium to fund their regime did not address the larger implications. The 
Taleban government admitted that the opium trade brought in over $US10 billion 
per year, other estimates placed the sum even higher. At the same time, 
however, there was no indication within the country itself of a large availability of 
tangible cash, either through physical construction, unusual financial activity in 
localized areas or through the more formal financial structures as was witnessed 
with the Latin American cocaine trade during the 1980s. Raman posited through 
some provocative, even if circumstantial, evidence that, in fact, the Taleban’s 
monies were exported to Pakistan. He argued that:
■ There are no reports of large amounts in US dollars circulating in private 
hands in Taleban-controlled Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan is awash with 
them.
■ There are no large-scale developments or other activities in Afghanistan 
that indicate the availability of large quantities of cash. In fact, there is so 
much poverty due to lack of development that thousands of Afghans have 
been migrating to Pakistan.
23 For example see Raphael F Perl (2001).
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■ Since its capture of Kabul in September 1996, the Taleban had not been 
publishing its budget figures. Some details are now available for the first 
time. According to these figures, during 2001-02, the Taleban had an 
estimated expenditure of $82.53 million, of which $43.53 million is shown 
as the Discretionary Fund of Mulla Mohammad Omer, the Amir.24
Raman sets annual heroin income at $US12 billion and argues, considering the 
Taleban’s expenditures above, that about 80% of that income was placed in 
Pakistani banks. Using the reported figures of the State Bank of Pakistan on bank 
deposits and discussing the lack of other potential income sources such as foreign 
investment and aid, Raman concludes that the money had to have its origin in the 
heroin trade.
Raman’s argument is not without its problematic points, the main one being the 
validity of the figures used. A simple example is what his $US12 billion actually 
refers to. If this figure represents estimated street value in western markets, then it 
significantly exaggerates the total income for the Taleban. This said the questions 
raised by Raman remain suggestive. The Taleban did earn money from the trade 
and the presence of this money did not manifest in any known way within 
Afghanistan. If Taleban money was placed in Pakistani banks, then the next 
implication is on the value that money created within the Pakistani economy. 
Raman argues, somewhat extremely, that this money was used to prop up 
Pakistan’s otherwise failing economy since the 1990s, a claim larger than the data 
can presently bear. However, the presence of this money in Pakistan would 
certainly have created areas of wealth and would have also distorted the figures 
related to GDP and economic growth. The details of this would depend on the 
specifics of the economic situation in Pakistan though indicative patterns could be 
derived from other drug producing regions such as Latin America, Mexico and 
Burma.
Environment
24 B Raman (2001).
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Both heroin and opium cultivation have a negative impact upon the environment. 
For cocaine cultivation, virgin forests have been cleared in the Andean region in 
order to make space for increased coca bush planting. The Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reported,
[n]arcotics cultivation and processing cause serious damage to the 
ecology of the Andean region...As tropical rains erode the thin 
topsoil of the fields, growers must regularly abandon their parcels 
to prepare new plots—increasing soil erosion and runoff, depleting 
soil nutrients, and, by destroying timber and other resources that 
would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, decreasing 
biological diversity.
Forests are also cleared to allow for infrastructure, such as transportation routes 
(roads and airfields) as well living space for migrant workers. Additionally, the 
herbicides and pesticides used in farming can damage the sensitive ecology of the 
forest and rivers. In some cases, the conversion process to cocaine occurs within 
the forested regions. This process involves other chemicals such as ammonia, 
sulfuric acid and gasoline, which are dumped openly into nearby rivers that serve 
as drinking water.
At the same time, the herbicides used in crop eradication programs to destroy 
these illicit crops also have a negative impact upon the environment. The disputed 
chemical glyphosate is the main ingredient found in crop sprays. Glyphosate is 
highly toxic to plants and animals as well as humans. Paraquat, another chemical 
used in spraying, is:
highly toxic to animals by all routes of exposure...A single large 
dose, administered orally or by injection to animals, can cause 
excitability and lung congestion, which in some cases leads to 
convulsions, incoordination, and death by respiratory failure.
Both substances appear to destroy plant life that may otherwise be desired and 
have been also blamed for illnesses caused to adults and children in sprayed areas. 
In the 1980s, the US used paraquat sprays as a method to destroy marijuana crops
25 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2003).
26 Cornell University Extension Toxicology Network (1993).
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in Chiapas, Mexico. The chemical residues were soon located in marijuana on US 
streets and the chemical was banned. In 2001, glyphosate was used in crop 
eradication programs in Columbia. United States Representative Jim Kolbe 
refuted the criticism made about the action. Kolbe assured the public that the 
chemical was safe, noting that he uses a domestic version of glyphosate to 
eliminate weeds at his own home. He further stated that there was no harm to the
77environment or illnesses.
Migration, Refugees and Diasporas
Nancy McGuire from Georgetown University argues that economic downturn in 
the Bolivian mining industry in the mid-1980’s spurred mass migrations of 
laborers to the Chapare region to cultivate coca leaves. She notes that migration 
patterns are, in fact, indications of larger phenomena. Since, in the major growing 
regions of Columbia and Bolivia, the farming and production of cocaine are not 
carried out by those indigenous to that specific region, there must have been some 
other factors at play that caused the migrations in the first place. In this case, the 
factors were the inability of the government to properly manage the economy, 
which then led to large scale job losses. Attention to migration and immigration 
patterns in coca farming could then lead to larger clues about the roots of illicit 
drugs, which exist beyond the reach of countermeasures. McGuire also raises a 
point that may not be readily obvious to a Western reader: drugs provide jobs 
usually for those who would otherwise not have the minimum income needed to 
live.
The movement of people can also serve as a facilitator for the trafficking and 
distribution of drugs. As Justin Miller argues a key area that requires attention is: 
the role of outside supporters for insurgencies, primarily diasporas 
and political refugees...Significantly, analysts often overlook the 
role that migrants sometimes play in simultaneously supporting
7Qinsurgencies and the drug trade.
27 Michael Easterbrook (2001).
28 Nancy McGuire (2002).
29 Justin L Miller (2003).
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Miller points out that refugee camps played a strong part in bolstering the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an alleged fundamentalist organization operating 
in the Fergana Valley in Central Asia. The IMU is said to be involved in drug 
trafficking and other criminal activities as a support for their political ends.
Another aspect of the movement of people involves the consumption side of the 
illicit drugs equation. The return of refugees into Afghanistan did not bring 
increased opium cultivation as feared, but rather increased opium consumption. 
Desperate living conditions in Afghanistan combined with the trauma of decades 
of war: The loss of family members, poverty, and lack of work all facilitated 
(even amongst the educated classes) increased heroin use. The UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime in Kabul noted that “historically, Afghanistan never had a drug 
problem. This is something new”. Similar patterns can be seen in other refugee
T 1camps such as those throughout Africa.
Gender, Ethnicity and Culture
There has been a long debate about, and substantial literature criticising, the 
relationship of drug laws to women and particular ethnic groups. The debate is 
not only theoretical. Cases such as Regina McKnight, the first woman in the US 
charged for the stillbirth of her daughter, illustrate the connections between 
gender and drugs.33 McKnight used cocaine during her pregnancy and was found 
guilty of homicide. The debate on this issue maintains that the causal relationship 
between cocaine use and stillbirths is still unclear and that cases such as 
McKnight are really about race and gender discrimination. Similarly drugs 
sometimes become entangled with larger issues like anti-abortion and anti­
treatment.
In the same way drug laws are blamed for a disproportionate amount of 
imprisonment of certain ethnic groups. In the US and UK, minority groups:
30 ‘Afghans Succumb to Their Own Most Lucrative Export’ (2003).
31 See for example, Paul Spiegel (2004).
32 See for example, S Boyd and K Faith (1999) and Hilary Klee (1998).
33 Silja JA Talvi (2003). Also see Silja JA Talvi (2002).
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African, Mexican, Latin American and Caribbean comprise large portions of those 
arrested for drugs.
More than 1,700,000 people are in prisons and jails in the USA.
Half of all prisoners are African Americans and over 60 per cent 
are from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds. Nearly 20,000 are 
less than 18 years old.34 
This is part of a well known argument about discrimination against minorities and 
the social and economic conditions which predispose certain groups to be 
involved in drug use or sale.
Cultural attitudes and religious beliefs towards drugs can also place laws at odds 
with the norms of a particular society. Marijuana use in Rastafarian religion and 
coca leaf chewing by Andes Indians serve as two examples. The prohibition of 
khat, the leaves of the Catha edulis plant chewed in some African and Arab 
cultures, has been seen as part of the larger anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment 
in the West. Its placement as a Schedule I drug beside heroin was seen as 
discrimination, allowing the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to carry out raids 
on Arab residences and firms.
Individual rights, rights of states and the law
The issue of rights whether at the level of the individual, communities or states 
enters into the drug trade via anti-drug policies. Afghan opium farmers, as well as 
the cultivators of other drugs, have long argued that they are unfairly blamed for 
the drug trade when those making the real profits are left unmolested. Since 
profits are minimal at the cultivation stage, the ability to grow drugs is more often 
a matter of survival than the wealthy lifestyle associated with popular perceptions 
of the drug trade.
The fear of drugs and its potential harm touches questions not only of the 
relationship between the state and citizen, but also state sovereignty. The Bahamas 
was faced with a flurry of regulations after it was blacklisted by the Financial
34 Amnesty International, ‘Rights for All Project’.
35 For a discussion on discrimination and khat see Medrek Ethiopian Discussion Forum (2003).
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Action Task Force (FATF) as a “non-cooperative” nation. It was argued that the 
Bahamas served as a main location for money laundering of drug proceeds and 
that the government had not done enough to curtail this activity. Controversy 
surrounded new regulations such as the establishment of Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) within the Bahamas. FIUs were seen as extensions of other 
governmental agencies, namely the US Department of Treasury, implanted in 
sovereign territories to gather personal information on those citizens and then send 
that information abroad. Moreover, Morris argues, the FIUs are against the 
Bahamian constitution where they purport:
*
to effect a delegation by Parliament of its essential legislative 
function (namely, the exercise of its judgment as to what the law 
should be, by defining what conduct shall constitute an offence and 
prescribing the punishment to be inflicted on those persons found 
to be guilty of that conduct by an independent and impartial court 
established by law) in circumvention of the constitutional 
separation of powers; in the result depriving or being likely to 
deprive the individual citizen of constitutional safeguards essential 
to ensuring the protection of the law as guaranteed in Chapter III. 
Compliance demands placed on states then bring into public discussion debates on 
the law, whether it is legal to enact laws which override individual state 
constitutions. As Morris suggests compliance would not only alter the relations 
between the branches of government but would fundamentally alter the status of 
the citizen. Morris’ main contention is less that things should change, but more 
that the change is taking place within a process that is closed rather than through a 
process of open and transparent democratic dialogue.
O ther Areas
There are other relevant areas such as history, development, shipping and 
transportation, where drugs have an impact as related to International Relations. 
However, already from the preceding section a few brief conclusions should be 
drawn. First, how drugs are conceptualized depends largely on which drug is
36 Gilbert MNO Morris, ‘International Financial Services Regulations with Emphasis on 
Legitimacy in International Law’.
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addressed, where and when, as well as what are the main areas of manifestation: 
politics, economics, and who are the primary actors: farmers, militaries, 
politicians. Second, given all of the areas under consideration, one-dimensional 
perspectives on the drug problem, whether from IR or ir, are not able to engage 
the drug issue in any meaningful way.
Overview o f Theory and Drugs in IR
This section examines some of the theoretical basis found in IR that either have or 
could be applied to the study of drugs within the discipline. It serves as a 
foundation for the literature chapter that follows by opening up some points for 
further exploration on the IR and the drug issue debate. This section draws largely 
on the work of Professor Angela Burger at the University of Wisconsin who 
conducted a brief but concise review of the different theoretical approaches in IR 
and how each could contribute to a better understanding of drugs. Burger 
addressed the role of theoretical approaches in IR that can or are being used to 
examine the drug problem by dividing the theoretical categories of IR into 
Realism and Security Studies, Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Institutionalism, Economic 
Liberalism, Mercantilism and Dependencia or Structural World Systems Theory.37 
Though these categories are subject to criticism, Burger’s account serves as a 
useful way to introduce the general discussion. In surveying IR literature, very 
few theories or frameworks engage with the drug issue, at least not substantially 
enough to encompass the intricacies of drugs as previously outlined. This is not to 
say that existing theories and frameworks are not applicable, but that they require 
revisiting with the drug problem in mind.
Burger points out when treating drugs in IR, most works tend to be Realist or 
Security Studies based. However Realism and Security studies are not able to 
encompass the complexities that drugs bring with them. The basic perception is 
that drugs represent a threat or at best a corrupting element in society. 
Realism/Security simply positions drugs as a threat to the state which leads to
37 Angela S Burger (1999).
38 Ibid 4.
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unrest and conflict in much the same way that Ronald Reagan portrayed drugs in 
1986.
I n the third world the concept of national security embraced threats 
to state borders (secessionist efforts of Shan in Myanmar, Sikhs 
and Kashmiris in India,) to domestic ruling elites (Medellin and 
Cali cartels of Columbia), as well as internal political rebellion 
(Shining Path in Peru, tribes in Afghanistan against the Soviet 
puppet-govemment) [footnotes omitted].
This analysis shows how, from both sides, consumer countries and 
producer/trafficking countries, the Realist and Security paradigm was driving 
perceptions of the drug problem. While it was fair to say that drug profits were 
assisting in certain cases to bolster threats to the state, it is not clear whether the 
Realist view was useful in the subsequent actions it suggested. Since threats to the 
state are to be met by force, the natural course of action was to declare a “war on 
drugs”, to use Nixon’s phrase.
Since then however the success of the war on drugs has been questioned. Bertram 
et al asked in their book on the drug war, “Why have our drug wars failed and 
how might we turn things around?”40 They attribute the reasons for failure to a 
paradigm, or system, based on punishment rather than tolerance. Nadelmann 
called global drug policies, “failed and futile” referring mainly to the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, 1998 
(UNGASS).41 According to Nadelmann, the 2003 Mid-Term Review of UNGASS 
evidenced clearly that international drug policies had failed as the United Nations’ 
own statistics showed the “use of cannabis, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs has 
not decreased. HIV/AIDS and hepatitis rates across the globe are soaring; the 
dimension of the global illegal drugs trade continues to expand”.42 Such views 
bespeak a deeper concern with the general Realism and Security framework (that 
they are a threat and must be purged), which governs, and has governed, the view 
of illicit drugs.
39 Ibid 2.
40 Eva Betram, Moms Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas (1996).
41 Ethan Nadelmann (2003).
42 Ibid.
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In an interesting turn of the argument, Burger posits that if the Realists and 
Security supporters were true to their beliefs, particularly that of self-help, then in 
countries with extensive debt, like Mexico, they would have recognized that 
profits from the drug trade were a natural choice to alleviate the debt cycle.43 In 
the 1980s, acting on the principle of self help, Mexico chose to use illicit profits to 
cope with its economic crisis. Burger notes that while this was not acceptable to 
the Realist/Security paradigm that governed the countermeasures policies of the 
US, it represented a clear example of the very framework under which these 
policies were operating. Thus analysts should have anticipated Mexico’s action. 
Extending this further, Burger argues that this process could be viewed as “a new 
form of economic assistance from the First to the Third World” whereby “the 
transfer of wealth is neither controlled by the First World in terms of its use, nor 
has it to be paid back with interest.”44 This view is somewhat reflected in the 
strategy of Bolivia’s President Morales to legalize cocaine production as 
discussed above.
Burger next posits that Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Institutionalism provide better 
contexts for analysis as theories such as complex interdependence can more fully 
explain why states behave the way the do in regards to drug policy. Set against the 
emphatic rhetoric of the drug war, Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism begins to 
show a less rigid view of the drug trade. Burger notes that under Neo-Liberalism, 
at least the choice of debt-ridden governments to use drug funds can be 
understood; “priorities change.”45 Additionally, Neo-Institutionalism brings about 
a greater understanding of the anti-drug regime, how it was formed and how is has 
endured. From Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism, we can begin to examine the 
links between the historical roots of the League of Nations, the goals of individual 
states and diplomacy post World I. Already, the one-dimensional view of 
Realism/Security gives way to a more complex view of actors, circumstances and 
the normative elements of the drug issue. Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism 
reveal how drugs became an international issue and how their illegality arose from 
a sets of relationships that developed as a result of US views on drugs and from
43 Angela S Burger (1999) 3.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid 4.
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the early days of the League and its various conversations on opium to then shape 
drug policy today.
Another aspect of Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism and regime theory 
illuminates the process through which drugs are defined in the international arena 
by depicting how beliefs, values, and ideas are given form through counter drug 
agencies and groups. As Burger notes, and this author emphasizes, the great 
contribution of regime theory is to point out the historical factors which are 
simply omitted from most of the debate on drugs46. Regime theory brings to light 
the deep relevance of history, for example by challenging a key moral assumption 
of Realism/Security: that drugs have been, are now, and should always be 
considered negatively. Regime theory also brings with it other questions such as 
how can we know if the regime is successful, a question central to illicit drugs. 
Other questions include agent-structure and role of institutions, and global 
governance.
Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Institutionalism however can address only one aspect of 
the drug issue, that of the institutions and policies. These frameworks are adept at 
explaining why we have the process we have in the international arena. They do 
not say anything particular about the drugs themselves, why they exist, how they 
function politically, except to say that the presence of drugs leads to bargaining 
and cooperation between states at the institutional level.
To address these concerns, Burger discusses Economic Liberalism and 
Mercantilism as possible approaches to understanding the economy of drugs.47 
Economic Liberalism can open discussions on the drug industry, how this industry 
interplays with domestic and international interests, the value the industry creates 
and the areas of negative impact. Under Economic Liberalism, we could also 
discuss the political economy perspective of drugs where the governments might 
balance the benefits of certain economic activities while considering the cost of 
these activities domestically and internationally.
46 Ibid 5.
47 Ibid 7-10.
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Economic liberalism by its nature refers to a modem, post-Adam Smithian 
context, where mercantilism could provide a better description of drugs 
particularly on the cultivation and production side that resemble a time more akin 
to post-feudalism than post-modernism. Modem day farming of opium in East 
Asia is one possible example of this condition. The idea of drugs as a mercantilist 
system is not new as was noted by Pierre Chouvy, a researcher at the French 
National Centre for Scientific Research and a prolific writer on the drug trade in 
Asia. Chouvy argues that the drug trade today can be characterized as 
mercantilist, as can the drug trade historically.48 Considering, for example, 
opium’s early days under the British, mercantilism could provide a useful 
comparative tool for understanding how drugs continue to function today.
The last category of IR theory addressed by Burger is Dependencia or Structural 
World Systems Theory. From this approach drugs can be examined through the 
lens of North-South relations, which encompasses a discussion of core-periphery 
analysis 49 Anti-drug policies are seen, in this case, as privileging the needs of the 
North at the sacrifice of livelihoods in the South. Drug production could be seen 
as a form of liberal economic activity that benefits producer nations. In this light, 
counter measures take on a different impact as they are seen to impose the 
economic and morally based policies of the North onto regions where the growth 
of illicit drugs is economically viable and culturally accepted. World Systems 
Theory captures the perceptions of producer nations in that it represents their 
response to interdiction policies that are often perceived as forms of imperialism 
imposed by more powerful nations.
Burger concludes by stating that,
international relations theories and comparativist approaches do not 
usually provide a framework for analysis...Most paradigms of 
international relations are designed to assist our understanding 
of...licit and legal entities...Few models or theories exist to 
approach illicit narcotics.50
48 Pierre-Amaud Chouvy (2002).
49 Angela Burger (1999) 11.
50 Ibid 10-12.
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It should be clear that Burger is examining possible avenues for exploration in the 
application of IR theories to drugs. This is not to imply that such a research has 
already been conducted or that there is even a trend to move in this direction. 
Burger is simply laying out possible courses for such a research and raising some 
of the issues such as the role of history or the absence thereof and the tendency for 
IR to be realist focused when discussing illicit drugs. As she concludes, within the 
discipline of IR, the main focus remains the upperworld and not the underworld of 
international relations.
The Drug Issue and the Historical Debate
A main criticism of the drug problem, whether in IR or ir is that it is perceived as 
ahistorical. In his history of drugs in the 19th century, Mike Jay notes that drugs 
are often presented as a “subject without history” with occasional
glimpses of Victorian opium dens, or perhaps the stupefying 
effects of toxic plants on primitive people [sic] that [imply] drugs 
had always been illegal at least as soon as societies had evolved far 
enough to make sensible laws.51 
Historical accounts of the drug trade tend to focus on some three themes: the role 
of opium in colonial Britain, the genesis of international counter drug policy at the 
hands of morally driven Christian fanatics, and the study of drugs throughout 
historical periods dating back to the beginnings of human civilization. The 
conclusions drawn from these accounts are contested. Jay continues,
It’s one thing to cast a critical eye over the cultural and scientific 
context in which opiates where criminalized, and its another thing 
entirely to argue that history proves that these substances should 
simply be legalized.. .But we should remember, when we hear calls 
to return to traditional moralities and Victorian values, that those 
values included a regime of mass market, legally available
52opium.
There is, within history departments, a certain trend toward using history exactly 
for such purposes. When RK Newman presented data at a conference
51 Mike Jay (2000) 9.
52 Ibid 87.
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demonstrating that actual opium addiction rates were not at the epidemic 
proportions commonly believed, his work was “left out” of the book publication 
of the conference papers. Newman argued this occurred because his view 
challenges the anti-imperialist agendas that have long promoted the sickly 
Chinese addict as a symbol of the British crimes. That drugs were not and 
perhaps are not a scourge in China is a rather radical idea. Even those who 
promote legalization polices are hard pressed to make such an assertion and 
usually promote legalization as a solution to an existing crisis, but still accept as a 
given that there is a crisis. Newman’s point is related to Jay’s statements in that he 
challenges the use of history to support anti-imperialist arguments by taking away 
on of the debate’s pillars: that the British enslaved the Indians and the Chinese 
through opium addiction in order to create wealth. Whether this is true or not is 
beside the point. The question here remains the use of history and historical facts 
to support one argument over another.
Thus there are two factors to draw from Jay’s comments. First is that drugs are 
presented usually as being ahistorical, making anti drug policies seem natural, as 
if it has always been that way. Second is that whether promoting legalization or 
criminalization, when history is used, both sides are mining for proof to support 
their existing viewpoints. In this case history in and of itself can be said to support 
both and neither side of the debate at the same time.
Jay’s analysis of history and drugs reflects many comments made by Stephen 
Hobden and John M Hobson on the role of history in IR .54 They caution against 
the ahistorical attitude in IR which can be described in two terms: chronofetishism 
and tempocentrism. The former refers to a kind of ahistoricism, which manifests 
in three modes: reification illusion “where the present is effectively ‘sealed o ff 
from the past”, naturalisation illusion, “where the present is effectively 
naturalised on the basis that it emerged ‘spontaneously’ in accordance with 
‘natural’ human imperatives” and the immutability illusion “where the present is 
eternalised because it is deemed to be natural and resistant to structural change”.55
53 RK Newman (1995).
54 Stephen Hobden and John M Hobson (2002) 5-41.
55 Ibid 7.
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This leads to tempocentrism where an isomorphic illusion has taken hold that 
extrapolates “backwards in time to present all historical systems as ‘isomorphic’ 
or ‘homologous’...leading to an inverted ‘path dependency’”.56 This view is 
precisely Jay’s argument that drugs are represented as a topic without history 
which leads to a sense that drugs have always been illegal and should always be 
illegal.
As a solution, Hobden and Hobson point towards resolutions provided via an 
historical sociological approach. In response to reification historical sociology 
reveals “the present as a malleable construct which is embedded in an historical 
context” while for the naturalization illusion it shows that the present emerged as 
a result of “processes of power, identity/social exclusion and norms.” 57 The 
immutability illusion of the present is remedied by the revelation of “the present 
as a constituted by transformative [sic] processes that reconstitute present 
institutions and practices,” In short, that the present is in a constant state of 
movement and not static. Finally for tempocentrism, historical sociology “traces 
the differences between past and present international systems” thereby revealing 
their “unique features”.59
History then should neither be a mine from which supporting data is arbitrarily 
retrieved, nor a justification for why situations and events are as they are today. 
For the purposes of this research, a historical review of drugs reveals a debate that 
moves between legalization and criminalization which in turn illuminates certain 
perceptions and characterizations of drugs today. However the conclusions drawn 
from the binary view are not definitive, but rather suggestive of a larger context 
from which current perceptions are drawn. In this sense, history does not serve to 
prove one side of the debate over another, but places both within a deeper context 
of actors, interests and behaviors.
Definitions and Terminology
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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As is often the case in the social sciences, terminology presents an area of concern 
for the study of drugs. ‘Drugs’ can mean the drug itself, such as opium, or refer to 
the production-to-market process, or to legal definitions under the Controlled 
Substances Act, for example. Additionally, there are terms of concern to the 
present work such as ‘crime’ and ‘addiction’. Beare and Naylor said of defining 
organized crime,
Definitions are boring and we would have thought that no longer 
was it necessary to re-hash what is or is not organized crime. 
Unfortunately it is still an issue...if there is no specific type of 
crimes, types of criminals or even a distinct process that is 
distinguishable as being ‘organized crime’, or if the term refers 
equally well to all serious crime, then it refers to nothing. In which 
case the crimes exist but organized crime as a category of crime 
does not exist. If this were a mere issue of semantics, no one 
should ponder the issue—this is not the case however. There are 
direct policy and law enforcement implications to the quest of 
actually attempting to ‘understand’ the phenomena.”60 
Beare and Naylor argue further that terms affect the way a particular issue is 
perceived since the words used have clear ramifications in legislation and lead to 
very practical concerns when they serve as the basis for arrest and prosecution. A 
cautionary note however: the nature of this work demands less attention to rigid 
definitions and more attention to the specific types of connections these terms 
indicate within their contexts. As such the definitions below should be taken as 
flexible indicators within a larger argument.
Drugs and narcotics here are taken to mean specifically two of the three common 
“natural” drugs of concern to international trafficking: coca and opium. Marijuana 
as the third is included where appropriate though the system revolving around the 
marijuana trade does have some key distinguishing features which make its 
inclusion with coca and opium misleading. Designer drugs are included in some 
parts, though not directly addressed. The data on coca and opium is more 
advanced and subject to deeper analysis. Designer drugs such as
60 Margaret E Beare and RT Naylor (1999).
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methamphetamines, from an international relations perspective, are relatively 
new. Though some patterns can be applied to them from the drug trade in general, 
it would be unfair to make similar conclusions as “natural” drugs. For example, a 
chief feature distinguishing designer drugs is the fact that they are not 
agriculturally based and do not require a large labor force for cultivation. 
Furthermore they cater to a different market that requires periodic changes in 
colors, shapes and presentation of the drug. Marijuana and cocaine are not 
narcotics, though the term is used broadly to mean illicit substances, as in the 
countemarcotic programs which target marijuana trafficking.
Furthermore, it should be clear that cocaine is derived from the coca leaf and 
heroin from the opium poppy. To say transport in cocaine has different 
ramifications than transport in coca for example, because coca leaves are 
harvested in bulk and thus make transport cumbersome while the less bulky 
cocaine is a refined powder ready for sale and can be shipped pure, and then cut 
with fillers at distribution points.
It should be clear that crime, or more relevant here, transnational organized crime 
is not the same as drugs or the drug trade or money laundering. As Beare and 
Naylor note, there is no agreement on what is organized crime and this can be 
extended to all such terminology. The issue of definitions is indeed a difficult one, 
especially when dealing with IR which does not have a history of dealing with 
definitional problems associated with illicit sectors and which, in fact, exacerbates 
the issue by using various terminologies quite interchangeably. As such the use of 
terms here will, by perforce, also remain somewhat interchangeable, taking the 
lead from the author or work under discussion. In order to add some parameters, 
drugs will refer almost exclusively to opium and cocaine unless indicated 
otherwise. The drug trade will refer not just to drugs as an economic activity, but 
rather a set of processes which involve illicit drug cultivation, production (the 
conversion of raw materials into cocaine and heroin), trafficking and 
consumption. Crime and organized crime will refer most often to networks or 
systems of affiliations among people or groups of people involved in the process 
of illicit drug trafficking and selling usually at the international level. Again the 
use of these terms will follow the author or work under discussion.
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Statistics
In the study of drugs, statistics play a dominant role in shaping views on the size 
and depth of the drug problem. As such, the reliance on statistics for 
conceptualizing drugs and the criticism that has followed require a brief 
discussion here. Statistics have become, as Harry Gelber states, a prescriptive tool 
rather than a descriptive tool.61 When a study shows that opium production has 
increased in a certain country, the immediate reaction is to step up counter 
narcotics strategies in the region or to politically pressure local governments. 
However, between the statistic and the resulting action are several assumptions. 
First, we do not know how much opium, for example, is generally produced, as all 
figures are an attempt to quantify an inherently hidden activity. Second, even if 
production has actually increased, there is no indication that the excess yield will 
not be consumed locally. For example, if the US reports with great alarm that 
opium cultivation has increased, the assumption is that the destination of the 
opium is the US. It is possible however to imagine that the excess may be 
consumed at the local level or shipped to new markets. Third, even if sentiments 
of social responsibility prevail, there is no relationship between increased 
countemarcotic strategies and suppression of production. Statistics serve to 
perpetuate the tautology of the drug debate on all sides and often ‘fictional’ 
numbers are used to claim success based on other fictional numbers. One 
prominent case serves here to make this point.
Of the most widely quoted numbers for the value of the drug trade, $300-500 
billion per year is the most commonly adhered to number. In this there are already 
several concerns. What drug trade does this number refer to exactly? Is this gross 
or net income, because even traffickers have operational costs that need to be 
accounted for when discussing why the drug trade is lucrative (because it may not 
be)? Does it include designer drugs like the Ecstasy or does it refer to opium
61 Harry G Gelber (1997) 240.
62 Dominic Streatfeild reported that many street dealers were actually not the stereotypical, limo- 
driving, gold-wearing men, but that dealers actually made somewhere around the average 
minimum wage income per year. This was because it simply was not that lucrative o f a business 
but many chose this work because no other opportunities were available to them. Dominic 
Streatfeild (2001).
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gum or heroin only? Does it refer to crime in general including prostitution and 
sale of counterfeit Levi jeans? Where does the research basis of this number come 
from? What methods were used to calculate it? Since Pino Arlacchi, now the 
former head of the UN Drug Control Program, first uttered the figure, it has taken 
on new meanings. It is quoted as the amount of money laundering per year 
worldwide, or per year in offshore financial centers, a noteworthy distinction. The 
variations in using this figure include:
■ “The data compiled by the European Union indicates that $400-500
billion worth of drugs are sold worldwide every year, or one-tenth of 
global trade turnover.”
■ “Money laundering, bank secrecy, and off-shores allow for the advent of a 
new economic power which manages ca. $500 billion, equivalent to ca. 
2% to 3% of the world’s Gross National Product. This new economic 
illegal power is ranked 6th-7th in the hierarchy of the greatest world
»64powers.
■ “US crime achieves an annual turnover of 500 billion dollars. Ten years
ago this was 100 billion dollars. About 80 percent of total turnover is from 
the drug trade.”65
As it turned out the $300-500 billion figure is more guesswork than fact. “The 
figures of $300 billion to $500 billion for international flows are banded around 
and become ‘facts by repetition,’ but there is very little evidence to justify 
them.”66 In his book, Wages o f Crime, Naylor writes about encountering one of 
the UN officials responsible for the now-famous estimate that the world trade in 
illegal drugs is worth $500 billion each year. When pressed by Naylor, the official 
confessed that the estimate was based on rather flimsy evidence, but, the official 
added, it was great for catching public attention.67 Some might argue that it is 
enough to bin current policy and the surrounding debate based on this simple 
illustration alone. However, there is more to consider. This number has been used 
to justify just about every counter narcotic action in the last years. If it is true that
63 Natalia Shiryaeva and Vladimir Rudakov (2002).
64 Sandro Calvani (2000).
65 ‘Criminals Turn Over 1000 Billion Dollars’.
66 Michael Levi (2002).
67 Daniel McCabe (2002).
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numbers have become perceptive rather than descriptive, then there is serious 
cause to reassess current countermeasures.
A corollary to the matter of statistics is the broader status of statistical calculation, 
of any kind, in the Social Sciences, a largely unanswered dilemma. As will be 
discussed, statisticians themselves argue about what their calculations mean, what 
they can, or should, represent and how they should be applied. Therefore, this 
research remains highly suspicious of statistics used to promote one kind of policy 
over another. It strives to avoid the use of statistics unless the study is deemed to 
have particular relevance or credibility. Instead it takes the use of statistics on two 
grounds: 1) to consider the validity or invalidity of relevant statistics, and 2) 
whether valid or invalid; following the possible lines of argument that could 
result.
Structure o f  Research
Methods used to use explore the current perception of drugs in the international 
relations will compromise an analysis of official government documents and other 
secondary sources. Academically, the analysis will incorporate literature which 
attempts to address either drugs or immediately relevant subjects such as crime 
and terrorism. Additionally, concepts from criminology will be applied to bolster 
non-state actors and develop a more concise starting point for examining drugs in 
IR. Literature and documents that will also be used range from current policy 
reports to historical information. Since documents and writings draw from a 
variety of international sources, there is some variation in the spelling style used 
between UK and US. In such cases quotes were kept in the original spelling 
language while the rest of this work follows US English spelling.
Chapter Two will begin with a review of IR literature, surveying specifically how 
it is that drugs are treated within the discipline. This discussion will show how 
these approaches do not adequately address the complexity of the drug issue. The 
drug debate is fragmented in IR and while certain approaches such as non-state 
actors can be a “good start” for understanding drugs, they largely remain too flat 
to address the issue more substantially.
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Chapter Three will focus on how drugs are shown and treated in the international 
arena, especially by international organizations such as the United Nations. The 
first purpose is to unveil the contradictions between drug realities as briefly 
sketched above and the international treatment of the issue. Second, the purpose is 
to provide a point of comparison between how drugs are commonly viewed in the 
international arena and IR. Third, this chapter will begin to flesh out the often 
unstated principles which guide counter-drug operations and challenge the 
perceived objectivity of annual reports. Chapter Four serves to provide a 
historical background on how and why drugs became seen as a problem over 
roughly the last 100 years. This is done by opening up a series of vignettes in 
history as a means to demonstrate how little history figures into drug research and 
analysis today. Vignettes are used, first, as a way of mediating the tremendous 
amount of historical literature on drugs—consider for example the micro histories 
of drugs in the US, drugs in the UK, drugs in France, etc, and add in the micro­
histories of cocaine and opium in each region while accounting for the various 
arguments over which history is actually correct. Second, vignettes are used 
because a lengthy analysis does not serve any better to illustrate the degree in 
which history is left out of the drug policy debate. This omission is thus remedied, 
at least in part, through an attempt at presenting, as outlined by Hobden and 
Hobson, a broader context for understanding the drug issue by engaging history as 
a means to illuminate current perceptions. Chapter Five will assess the view of 
criminology on drugs by providing a brief background on the history of crime in 
order to introduce concepts from criminology that may enhance drug research in 
IR. Chapter Six will conclude with some summary remarks and the next steps for 
research.
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Chapter II. Waiting for the Ring: The Engagement 
between IR Literature and Drugs
Introduction
The debate in IR on drugs is fragmented and there is almost no deep 
conceptualization of the drug issue. With few exceptions, IR research has 
neglected to take stock of the drug debate: where it stands within the discipline, 
what categories of IR address it and what conclusions about it suggest for the 
discipline. Some barriers to discussing drugs in IR literature should be kept in 
mind. First, IR itself does not have strictly bounded literature as its 
interdisciplinary nature accepts works from a host of fields such as sociology, 
criminology, law, history and economics to name a few. There are no fixed 
boundaries for what is considered literature on drugs or illicit activities as there is 
no field of “drug studies” in IR, as there is a field of “war studies” or “terrorism” 
for example. This literature review is itself a preliminary attempt to define the 
parameters of such a literature. The authors represented below were chosen 
largely based on the common usage of their work, meaning that their works are 
likely to be found in a wide range of research that address drugs, crime and illicit 
sectors and which have an IR dimension. Included below are also some lesser 
known authors, such as Ivelaw Griffith, who have researched and written 
extensively on the drug trade even if their work is not well-known—this being a 
relative term since, for the most part, there are no well-known drug scholars in IR.
Second, within IR literature, drugs are intermingled with terrorism, money 
laundering, trafficking and organized crime making it unclear whether the focus is 
drugs themselves as a commodity, drug trafficking as acts and sets of relations, or 
organized crime and terrorists as the actors. Third, within IR literature, drugs are 
categorized under various subheadings and where there is crossover between 
security studies and IPE, for example, drugs can be viewed as a transnational 
economic threat. Fourth, to say drugs are addressed in IR often means a few dozen 
sentences mentioning crime, trafficking and organized groups in some 
combination before moving on to the primary aim of the work. Friman and 
Andreas note that even with the current recognition of the economic potential of
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illicit sectors, few works on international relations make more that a “passing 
reference” to the subject.68 For example, when writing on the causes of internal 
conflicts, Michael Brown lists “Criminal Assaults on State Sovereignty” as a 
subheading under which he mentions how post-Cold War reductions in foreign aid 
from Moscow and the US caused many regions to turn to drug trafficking.69 An 
additional sentence only point outs that the presence of drugs complicates 
conflicts but does not expand the notion of drugs further. Francis Fukuyama 
mentions drugs in his argument about weak states, but does not engage with the 
topic further in his work.70 Thus, given the current state of affairs, is not unusual 
that there is a wide range of literature to be considered here as a means to survey 
exactly what is being written about drugs in IR.
Non-state Actors
Non-state actors are highlighted as the binding thread in the effort to give some 
shape to the body of IR literature on drugs. Because of this a few paragraphs here 
are devoted to discussing the concept. Illicit non-state actors generally center on 
the post-Cold War environment and the new opportunities provided by 
globalization, how open borders, new technologies and increased movement of 
people and goods gave drug traffickers new avenues in which to work. Organized 
crime, drugs, and terrorist groups were the “new” players on the world stage that 
challenged the role of the state. These new players brought into question the role 
of the state and its supporting structures such as the government agencies and their 
methods as well as presented new security challenges.
The debate on illicit non-state actors after the Cold War developed largely as a 
response to observations by scholars, journalists and law enforcement officials on 
the increase, not decrease of drug production and criminal activity.71 This 
observation had a question hidden inside: how is it that the triumph of liberal
68 H Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (1999) 5 .1 will use the terms illegal, illicit and 
underground in line with how each author’s preferences. For example authors in economics tend to 
use underground while in IR the term illicit is more common.
69 Michael E Brown (2000) 191-192.
70 Francis Fukuyama (2004) ix.
71 Sarah Boseley (1993) 16; Terry Kirby (1991) 5; Europol Annual Drug Report (1998) and Paul 
Stares (1996).
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economics and capitalism did not bring with it an end to cocaine and opium 
production, but in fact increased it? There was an expectation that things should 
be good now. It was the dawn of “democratic-egalitarian consciousness” as 
Fukuyama put it which perhaps also purified of the darker side of international 
relations.72 The situation was quite the opposite. International policing agencies 
began to see new and more complicated forms of crime associated with internet- 
based money laundering and complex logistical processes for transportation of 
drugs. Scholars who had been following the Latin American drug trade though out 
the 70s and 80s noted that something was changing; the trade was growing and 
becoming more flexible. Demand also was increasing. As new middle and upper 
classes came into existence, they brought with them a new demand to enjoy the 
Suits of their success through a decadence that not only included the purchase of 
luxury goods and the elevation to jet setting lifestyles, but also the increased use 
of illicit drugs—a phenomena currently being witnessed in the second wave of 
opium addiction in China.73
Non-state actors in IR has traditionally dealt only with licit actors such as 
transnational corporations. Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek present a typical 
argument in their discussion of the role of power between the triad of NGOs, 
(non-governmental organizations) IGOs (international governmental 
organizations) and states where they challenge the realist tradition of dismissing 
the influence of non-state actors. They argue that NGOs, for example, do 
influence power relations in the international system and that by considering 
NGOs then different paths of power relationships are brought to light which are 
hidden when taking the strict realist view. Non-state actors are not restricted to 
NGOs and can include the Catholic Church and diasporas, grassroots movements 
and universities.74
It should also be noted that non-state actors and transnational relations concepts 
are not specific to the post-Cold War era. During the 1970s Joseph Nye and 
Robert Keohane made significant contributions in their work on transnational
72 Francis Fukuyama (1989).
73 Jan McGirk (2004) 27 and Richard Bestic (2000) 12.
74 See Srilatha Batliwala (2002), Kendall W. Stiles (2000), Thomas C Bruneau (1980) and 
Shahrzad Mojab (1998).
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relations, world politics, and global economic processes. Keohane and Nye were 
responding to the state centric view, dominant even more then than now, which 
was excluding the important role played by non-state actors both historically and 
contemporaneously. Keohane and Nye discuss for example the links between 
Communist parties and the international brigades in the 1930s as well as 
multinational enterprises such as the Hudson Bay Company. The authors also 
developed these linkages into their concept of complex interdependence—a theory 
that Thomas Risse-Kappen, professor at the Center for Transatlantic Foreign and 
Security Policy at the Freie Universitat Berlin suggested “was about to receive the 
new lease on life” due to networks of NGOs and their activities who are altering 
transnational relations. Extending this sentiment to drugs is reasonable; however 
within the literature complex interdependence, as a formal concept, it has yet to be 
fully applied to analysis of the presence of drugs in the world economy.
The 20 years that passed between Koehane and Nye’s first articulations of 
transnational relations and the collapse of the Soviet Union were filled with a rich 
and dynamic debate in IR. This debate can be divided into the three camps of IR 
theory: neorealism, transnationalism and globalism to use Torbjom Knutsen’s
77admittedly somewhat problematic taxonomy. Knutsen ties these three categories 
of IR theory to three ideological traditions: conservative ideology, liberal ideology
7 0
and radical ideology respectively. In the 70s and 80s drugs were mentioned in 
all three contexts but rarely if ever as a theoretical or conceptual issue. Other 
authors like Rensselaer Lee wrote about drugs from a supply and demand 
perspective. The main argument was that drug policies had failed because in 
places like Latin America drugs are too embedded in politics, economics and
70culture. Therefore the solution is to control the demand side. Later Lee would 
write one of the most well-known books on Latin American cocaine, White 
Labyrinth, which would detail why drug interdiction interferes with development
75 Joseph S Nye, Jr. and Robert O Koehane (1971) 721-748, Joseph S Nye, Jr. (1974) 961-996.
76 Risse-Kappen in Richard Higgott (1999) 31.
77 Torbjom Knutsen (1992).
78 Ibid 237-239.
79 Rensselaer Lee is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and President of 
Global Advisory Services. He has been researching and writing on the drug trade for over 20 
years. Rensselaer Lee III (1989).
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in Latin America and that the best solution still remains to solve the cocaine
O A
problem at home, not abroad.
Then came globalization. Arguably already in full force by the 1990s, at least 
from the point of view of business and finance, the rest of the world (and its 
scholars) who had been distracted by the complexities and fears of the Cold War 
woke up to new era. In 1990, Ethan Nadelmann published an article in 
International Organization called “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of
O  1
Norms in International Society”. Nadelmann who graduated from the LSE with 
his PhD in Political Science would later help found the Lindesmith Center which 
is now (called the Drug Policy Institute) one of the most well-known 
organizations for drug policy reform. His article, though it is just one a few works 
he ever published directly on the subject, is still cited today as the basis for a 
variety of research in drug policy. Nadelmann concerns himself not with 
international regimes as commonly studied but with those particularly aimed at 
producing prohibition policies. He posits that contrary to the common view that 
emotions and morals have no bearing on policy making, prohibition policies show 
that a large role is played these factors. But Nadelmann not only talked about drug 
trafficking, but he throws into the mix illegal poaching of animals and slavery, 
subjects that often provoke high moral sentiments, exactly to illustrate his point. 
In line with neo-liberalism and regime theory, Nadelmann traces back the 
historical roots of current prohibition policies. Ultimately he is concerned with 
how it is that some prohibition norms fail and some succeed—with the successful 
ones often appealing to a moral sentiment or emotion to affect deviant behaviors. 
This article served as the doorway into the illicit at a time when increased trade 
and movement of goods were slowly proving to be an asset to traffickers as well 
as licit corporations. Nadelmann’s concluding points were hard to ignore: global 
norms reflect the moral and emotional dispositions of the dominant members of 
international society, usually the criminal laws of those states and that either states
80 Rensselaer Lee (1989) 231
81 Ethan Nadelmann (1990).
82 See, for example, Harry G. Levine (2001).
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themselves or moral entrepreneurs such as religious groups move to mobilize 
public and political opinion in the direction of prohibition.
Drugs, Crime and Terrorism
Beyond non-state actors and transnational relations, there are several additional 
authors who have written works that depict drugs, terrorism, transnational 
organized crime and networks in different combinations. Mark Galeotti, Director 
of the Organized Russian & Eurasian Crime Research Unit (ORECRU) at Keele 
University, is one of the few authors who has written in depth on the role of illicit 
sectors and non-state actors and whose work is often used in International 
Relations. What distinguishes Galeotti’s work, and the reason for its inclusion 
here, is the comprehensive manner in which he brings together a multitude of 
perspectives and arguments. Having a degree in Political Science from the LSE, 
Galeotti is sensitive to the political, social and economic nuances missed by many 
authors. Galeotti positions transnational organized crime as the underside of the 
global era. Following a common theme, he states that although organized crime 
existed before, what is unique is the depth and reach of its current manifestation. 
Open societies and the technological revolution transformed not just the global 
market for licit commerce, but also for criminal actors. Thus, criminal actors have 
become transnational.
Galeotti adds observations on the conditions that are required in order for non­
state actors to be successful in obtaining their objectives, a point whose parallel 
can be found in discussions of licit non-state actors. For instance, in regards to 
nonprofit environmental organizations, Rodger A. Payne, Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Louisville examined how such organizations attempt 
to obtain their respective objectives by influencing governments and other non-
Of
state actors. Payne observed that particular political conditions must be in effect 
so that transnational relations can manifest in favor of obtaining the policy 
objectives of the nonprofit organization. These conditions could be at times 
contradictory. A closed government meant that it was hard for environmental
83 Ethan Nadelmann (1990) 47.
84 Mark Galeotti (2001) 203-217.
85 Rodger A Payne (1995) 171-182.
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organizations to enter, while an open government almost guaranteed access. At 
the same time, open governments tended to be decentralized which opened up 
many competing voices on a given issue—a complex debate could then ensue. 
Closed governments however tended to be centralized, therefore once in place, the 
organization was either ignored or its proposals readily accepted without much 
debate. Taking up this theme, Galeotti writes how both authoritarian and 
democratic political systems provide a suitable environment for criminal non-state 
actors. The difference is that under authoritarian regimes criminal actors rarely 
have the opportunity to become transnational while democratic regimes, by their
o /
nature, create transnational links which foster international criminal activity. In a 
recent statement the Chinese government blamed their increase in drug use on
on
globalization and liberal capitalism. While one may not expect any different of 
an accusation from a Communist government, in this case it may be more truth 
than propaganda.
Galeotti also includes a host of ‘players’ on the illicit stage including the Sicilian 
Mafia, Neapolitan Commorra, the Japanese Yakuza, the Russian Mafiya, and an 
assortment of criminal groupings from Chechnya, Nigeria, Dagestan and the
o o
United States. In this way Galeotti links organized crime with the diasporas. 
These groups are involved in various activities only one of which is drug 
trafficking. For Galeotti, it is not as important what they are doing, but rather how 
their presence creates certain political, economic, and social conditions. For 
example, their presence may have a destabilizing effect, it may determine the 
political agenda between states in terms of countermeasures, or it may 
compromise the economic viability of the nation or region.
It should be clear that Galeotti is not focused on drugs but rather on transnational 
organized crime. Transnational organized crime is associated with a series of 
“businesses,” only one of which is drug trafficking (others include trafficking in 
small arms and trafficking of women and children). Here some distinctions within 
the literature can be made between drugs as an object or commodity, drug
86 Mark Galeotti (2001) 203-204.
87 ‘Asia: China Says Drug War is Failing’ (2005).
88 Mark Galeotti (2001) 205-211. Also see Frank Bovenkerk (2001).
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trafficking as an act and organized crime/terrorism as actors. A parallel can be 
drawn between Reinalda and Verbeek’s conception of non-state actors and 
Krasner’s conception of transnational flows. Krasner argues it is less non-state 
actors themselves and more transnational flows that are important. Transnational 
flows or transnational relations are the interactions between states and non-state 
actors. While the actors remain important, the relationships they create and the 
movement of power they imply is more significant than their characteristics, e.g. 
being non-state. Krasner stressed that illicit behaviors as transnational flows are 
not easily controllable. Referring to the smuggling of illegal immigrants and drugs 
he notes that even if states made efforts to control borders it is not likely that they 
will meet with success.90 In this case, and as Galeotti implies, transnational 
organized crime is clearly an actor while drug trafficking is the set of relations 
that are created as a result of the objectives of these actors. The drugs themselves 
become a static object at best.
In contrast, Ivelaw Griffith developed the first structured steps for examining the 
role of drugs in a broad international relations context through his framework of 
geonarcotics.91 Griffith has written several books on the security dimension of 
drugs in the Americas and is currently the Dean of Political Science at Florida 
International University. At the onset Griffith frames his argument within the 
concepts of non-state actors and transnational relations. He posits four factors 
with in the inter-relationship of drugs since the Cold War: drugs, geography, 
power and politics. Geonarcotics describes a system of interactions between the 
main “problem” areas (production, transportation, consumption/abuse, and money 
laundering) and the security dimensions and threats that they produce. 
Furthermore the security dimensions and threats demand countermeasures both on 
the domestic and international level. This in turn incorporates a series of 
subnational to international actors such as corporations, guerrilla groups, drug 
cartels and individuals into the framework. “Two basic kinds of relationships are 
driven by the drug operations: conflict and cooperation. These exist among
89 Stephen D Krasner in Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) 259.
90 Ibid 259.
91 Ivelaw L Griffith (1993-1994). Also see Ivelaw L Griffith (2000b) and Ivelaw L Griffith 
(1997).
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different actors at different levels within the global environment. Relationships
09are bilateral and multilateral, and symmetrical as well as asymmetrical.”
Griffith’s framework is concise in that it indicates lines of special relationships 
such as the more intimate connection between transportation and 
consumption/abuse. Specifically, this depicts a phenomenon observed on drug 
trafficking routes where in drug transportation networks contain leakages and that 
addicts begin to appear along the transportation pathways at these points of 
leakage. Griffith’s framework thus provides the additional capability of explaining 
certain observed data regarding drugs. The strength in Giffith’s framework is the 
even treatment of actors, objects and relations each of which makes up a micro­
system of its own. For instance the movement of drugs from production to 
markets is portrayed as one micro-system with distinct relationships. However, 
this micro-system interacts and gives rise to other systems of relations involving 
actors such as the military, vigilante groups and NGOs. Furthermore, 
characteristics are taken into account such as the environment engendered by each 
set of relations: corruption, violence, resource depletion and so forth.93 Ultimately 
Griffith’s concern is how actors and their relationships lead to conflict. A 
drawback to Griffith’s work is that it does not take into account factors such as 
motivations, cultures and beliefs which in turn impact drug behaviors, whether on 
the consumption end, production end or in between. For instance, Griffith does 
not distinguish between different drug cultures. Marijuana trafficking is far less 
susceptible to violence and generates less cash than either heroin or cocaine. 
Additionally, Griffith’s framework underemphasizes the effect of the economic 
motivations perhaps only because economic factors are so often overemphasized 
when discussing drugs.
Moving beyond conflict as Griffith envisions it, and bringing in the security 
dimension firmly into the debate, Frank Cilluffo, Associate VP for Homeland 
Security at George Washington University, argues that crime, terrorism, narcotics 
and information warfare are the new transnational threats for the next
92 Ivelaw L Griffith (1993-1994) 34.
93 Ibid 32.
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millennium.94 Specifically, Cilluffo refers to the involvement of transnational 
crime in the different types of transnational markets which include counterfeit 
goods, weapons, and prostitution as well as narcotics.95 Furthermore, business 
relationships are developed across national boundaries through organized crime 
groups in countries such as Russia, China, Nigeria, and Mexico. The theme of the 
new era and the role of non-state actors and transnational relations is maintained, 
however the nature of transnational relations becomes distinctly economic96 
Thus, a picture is presented of actors operating across national boundaries, 
creating corruption and instability while generating significant sums of 
unregulated cash. Cilluffo’s view is representative of narcotics and transnational 
crime as a security threat, a depiction more elegantly articulated by Kaldor in her 
Nation article a few weeks after 9/11 where she called for a less alarmist approach
07to recent events, addressing the “new war” brought on by interdependence. 
Again, the actors are privileged over drugs as the focal point of the argument, 
leaving drugs as a means through which organized crime can become a threat.
Similarly, Cilluffo also places the relationship between terrorism and drug
Q O
trafficking as a means to a politically motivated end. This is also sometimes 
called narcoterrorism. Terrorist groups can traffic drugs directly or indirectly 
through the taxing of farmers and therefore where terrorism meets drugs is at the 
point of cultivation. Cocaine in Colombia and opium in Afghanistan are the most 
widely cited cases. From this situation arise sets of geopolitical and cultural 
considerations such as traditional relationships to coca farming, complicating the 
responses in terms of countermeasures.
A weakness in Cilluffo’s work (and similar types of arguments) is that he does not 
substantially examine the motivation, the political end for which groups are using 
drug money to fund. For as often as this concept is stated, the actual political end 
remains elusive. Sometimes the best assumption that can be made is that a group 
wants power for power sake. Erenfeldt attempts to address this by linking clear 
political objectives with specific terrorist groups and the drug trade. Her argument
94 Frank Cilluffo, S Oznobishchev and JH Brusstar (1999).
95 Ibid.
96 Also see Richard Clutterbuck (1991).
97 Mary Kaldor (2001).
98 Frank Cilluffo (2000).
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is that “Marxist-Leninist oriented regimes and terrorist groups have in fact, 
initiated, developed and nearly totally dominated this particularly dirty business” 
and furthermore that most terrorist organizations in the world today are influenced 
by some degree by Marxist ideology.”99 She posits that it was part of the official 
Soviet policy to use the linking of drugs and terrorism as a part of ‘unconventional 
warfare’ to destabilize countries.100 Whether her argument is empirically valid or 
not, it is a theme that continues to be repeated up to the present, usually referring 
to leftover socialist movements who can only maintain their power through drug 
trafficking. During the aftermath of 9/11 this argument was again revived until it 
became clear that terrorists did not need drug money because private donations 
provided sufficient funding for activities.101
There are a few additional variations on the theme of drugs and terrorism. Martin 
Navias from Kings’ College London takes an approach from the financial side, 
discussing how terrorism can be controlled though new financial regulations that
i mwould deny terrorists access to their funds. Navias’ argument maintains the 
primacy of actors and almost discards drugs entirely. Drugs here again take a 
tertiary role and are hardly mentioned except as the possible means of expanding 
anti-drug financial regulations to cover terrorist groups.
Navias is not the first to hint at connections between organized crime and
terrorism. When Consultant and terrorism expert Tamara Makarenko examines
the nexus between terrorism and organized crime she posits that during the last 10
1 0 1years there has been a decline in the state funding of terrorism. She does not 
clarify who these groups are and where their funding was from initially. In 
establishing the relationship between terrorists groups and organized crime she 
imagines a continuum where each exists at an opposite end of a line with a point 
of convergence at the center. There the convergence leads to four types of 
relationships, two of which are alliances and operational motivations.104 Alliances
99 Rachel Erenfeldt (1990) ix-xv. Also see Alison Jamieson (1994) and a slightly earlier work by 
Juliana Geran Pilon (1987).
100 Ibid. Erenfeldt bases these statements on the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1979.
101 Council on Foreign Relations ( 2002).
102 Martin Navias in Lawrence Freedman (2002) 57-78.
103 Tamara Makarenko (2003).
104 Ibid.
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for example are the joining together of FARC with Russian groups in cocaine 
trafficking. Convergence is the increased use of terror tactics by criminal groups 
and the increased criminal character of terrorist groups. Makarenko moves beyond 
singular motives of politics and profits as well as describing a more dynamic 
group structure. Here the drugs drop out almost entirely from the picture, and it is 
only the illicit actors and the relationships they have with each other that matter. 
What is more, the relationships these illicit clusters have with other licit actors is 
also diminished, though not excluded altogether.
Using the theme of the terrorist-organized crime nexus, organized crime expert 
and author Joseph Albini, describes a system of global networks where the 
networks are characterized by patron-client relationships of various kinds.105 
Terrorists will use these relationships to expand their power and reach, ultimately 
producing new challenges to the security and intelligence agencies. These new 
opportunities are permitted by the breakdown of security systems both in the US 
and Russia after the Cold War. In the Albini’s conception of networks, patrons 
seek to have as many clients as possible as a means of gathering power while at 
the same time expanding their relationships, rendering them able to provide more 
services to their clients. Therefore, a mutually beneficial relationship develops 
between, for example, drug traffickers and terrorist groups. Contradicting 
Ehrenfeldt, the authors assume here that terrorists and drug traffickers are 
independent groups or at least had been during the Cold War and that the changes 
within the international environment caused or allowed them to become 
interlinked. Ehrenfeldt maintained that these links were already in place and in 
some cases terrorists and traffickers were indistinguishable.
Albini brings into the discussion the concept of networks. Networks present a 
different way of examining drugs through a more fluid and decentralized 
understanding o f actors and relationships. Networks can be seen as a deeper 
extension of both non-state actors and transnational relations theories though there 
is not a linear progression of these concepts. A network is:
105 Joseph L Albini, RE Rogers and Julie Anderson (1999) 3-6.
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a series of connected nodes. Nodes can be individuals, organizations, 
firms, or even computers, but the critical element is that there are 
significant linkages among them. Networks can vary in size, shape, 
membership, cohesion, and purpose. They can be large or small, local or 
global, cohesive or diffuse, centrally directed or highly decentralized, 
purposeful or directionless. A network can be narrowly focused on one 
goal or broadly oriented towards many goals, and its membership in the 
exclusive or encompassing. Networks are at once pervasive and 
intangible, everywhere and nowhere. More prosaically, they facilitate 
flows of information, knowledge, and communication as well as more 
tangible commodities. They operate in licit as well as illicit sectors of the 
economy and society.106 
As pertains to international illicit sectors, the concept of networks presents an 
alternative to the standard view of international criminal activities as hierarchical 
in nature. This was largely due to a well-worn idea of Italian mafias and later of
• • 107Latin American cartels which were organized in a top-down structure. Such 
conceptions were perhaps once accurate enough and eventually led to the fall of 
the great cocaine cartels, but currently this perception is proving ineffective in
10Xcharacterizing illicit activities the era of globalization. Old rigid structures that 
were supposed to mimic corporations have given away to more flexible entities 
that can even be temporary alliances or projects which will disappear tomorrow.
RAND Corporation authors Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s research envisioned networks 
as early as 1993.109 Though they were concerned particularly with conflict, their 
focus is on characterizing the new relationships between non-state actors—again 
moving away from rigid organizational/hierarchical models with distinct lines of 
connectivity.
106 Phil Williams (1998) 155.
107 Ibid 62. According to Williams, the most complete articulation of an organized structure with 
assigned roles for its members was published in a report by Donald Cressey in 1967.
108 The term cartel refers commonly to a group of producers who work together to increase their 
earnings though what are called restrictive economic practices such as controlling supply and price 
fixing. The term is used here not necessarily to imply this particular practice, but because it is 
common to and often appears in IR literature.
109 Originally published in 1993 and reprinted as John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is 
Coming!”
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What distinguishes the victors is their grasp of information—not only from 
the mundane standpoint of knowing how to find the enemy while keeping 
it in the dark, but also in doctrinal and organizational terms. The analogy is 
rather like a chess game where you see the entire board, but your opponent 
sees only its own pieces—you can win even if he is allowed to start with 
additional powerful pieces.110 
The result is two different kinds of potential conflicts: cyberwars and netwars. In 
each drug traffickers and terrorists are seen as exploiting network relationships, in 
that they are more nimble than the heavy, rigid institutions that are trying to 
respond to them. Arquilla and Ronfedt characterize drug traffickers as non-state 
actors who are opponents and conclude that, “institutions can be defeated by 
networks. It may take networks to counter networks. The future may belong to 
whoever masters the network form.”111
In networks, as in Albini’s patron-client model, this value is not fixed and depends 
on two new elements: time and speed. This element is not made explicit in either 
work, though it is certainly implied. Drugs, traffickers and trafficking all become 
intangible assets with “potential value.” This potential value comes from the 
moment in time, when there is a convergence of client needs and the patron’s
i t ' }
ability to meet them. These needs are unpredictable and it is difficult to know, 
for example, when a patron’s access to certain transport routes may take on a high 
value due to the specific needs of another group in that moment. In Griffith’s 
conception value was constant and lines of relations were fixed. It is worth noting 
here that value based on speed and time is a characteristic common to 
contemporary, licit businesses as well. Even if still rather mysterious, drugs and 
cyberspace recall, though cannot be reduced only to, earlier discussions on non­
state actors and transnational relations—that the power and reach of state can be 
modified, altered or, in the case of networks, evaded altogether.
The drawback in networks is the propensity to say nothing other than the drug 
world is unpredictable. This problem arises partially out of its inability to provide
110 Ibid 23-24.
111 Ibid40.
112 It should be clear that Arquilla and Ronfeldt do not use the terms patrons and clients. These 
are Albini’s terms.
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a concise way of identifying relevant actors and relations at a given moment.
Actors themselves resist definition and relationships can be fixed or temporary.
The contribution of networks is to break open the rigid structure of organized
illicit activities and fixed actors, moving us from Fidelistas to Zapatistas, from the
Palestinian Liberation organization to Hamas, from the KKK to the American
• 11^Christian Patriot movement and from Cosa Nostra to Asian Traids.
Drugs, IPE and Economics
From the perspective of economics the main concern regarding drugs has been 
how to measure or quantify the underground economy. There is a general belief 
that various fiscal policies have an impact on the size of the underground 
economy, particularly when determining the number of individuals or entities that 
are willing to participate in response to a given policy. The underground 
economy can include illicit activities such as drug trafficking or parallel activities 
such as the sale of licit goods through illicit means. An example of the latter 
would be the sale of cigarettes or whiskey through channels that bypass the 
normal means of commerce and thus state tax. It can also include illegal labor 
markets where payments are made in cash and tax procedures are not followed.
David Giles, professor of economics at the University of Victoria in Canada, has 
researched the relationship between taxation policy and the varying size of the 
underground economy. Using data from New Zealand he was able to offer an 
explanation as to why it is the relative size of the underground economy has 
consistently grown in certain countries over a period of time.114 The study shows a 
statistically significant relationship between the overall tax burden and the size of 
the underground economy—the higher the tax burden, the higher the incentive for 
participation in the underground economy. Therefore, minimizing the size of 
government could be one solution in reducing the underground economy since 
smaller government would require less tax revenue.
113 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (1997) 6.
114 David EA Giles (1998). Also see, Friedrich Schneider (2001) and Peter Reuter and Victoria 
Greenfield (2001).
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In another study Giles et al. showed the reaction of the underground economy to 
changes in tax policies by classifying a series of causal relationships between how 
quickly actors would enter into the underground economy, and how long they 
would stay within the underground economy versus the benefits gained by not 
doing so.115 The study showed a more fluid conception of the underground 
economy where participants would go in and out depending on a ‘cost-benefit’ 
analysis of their respective situations. It also implied that some participants might 
prefer to stay in the licit economy and only choose illicit behavior out of need. 
This view brings into question the idea of choice for participants in illicit 
activities—to what extent do the participants choose to participate in illicit sectors 
and to what extent do external conditions force them into adopting illicit 
behaviors?
As a brief side note to the issue of why participants choose illicit behavior, there 
are studies from the fields of medicine, psychology and branches of sociology, 
where many authors have analysed why a person may commit a certain act, to 
steal or take drugs for example. While these studies are out of the scope of this 
research as they are rarely incorporated into the literature on drugs and IR, there is 
some value in briefly mentioning here that they are related to a discussion that 
related to the root causes of criminal activity.116 The study of root causes in IR is 
focused primarily on terrorism and only addresses the drug issue as a subset of 
terrorist activity. For example, Karen von Hippel from the Centre for Defence 
Studies at Kings’ College, London, placed poverty amongst the commonly 
believed root causes of terrorism. Through her analysis she shows “while it 
appears that a higher socio-economic status may be positively associated with 
participation in and support for acts of terror, the research is mixed with as to 
whether this also extends to volunteers.”117 There are a variety of factors that 
could influence choices, for example families of martyrs are paid well and this 
could be a motivation for an otherwise destitute family as well as the fact that the 
rural poor in certain areas believe that sending family members to jihad will fulfill 
a spiritual debt. At the same time it is also true that the profile of suicide bombers
115 David E Giles, Gugsa Werkneh and Betty J. Johnson (2001).
116 See for example, the Journal of Addiction, Journal of International Drug Policy and Journal of 
Substance Abuse Treatment.
117 Karin von Hippie in Lawrence Freedman (2002) 27,
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has shown them to be of well-educated and middle class to upper middle class 
backgrounds. There are comparisons to be drawn in the sale of illicit drugs as 
well. Though it is commonly believed that only the poor and uneducated deal in 
drugs, testimonies by the famous Latin American cocaine trafficker George Jung 
showed that at least some of those involved in the dealing cocaine in California, 
including himself, were from middle class and skilled backgrounds.118 Thus, while 
it is not conclusive whether poverty promotes illicit behaviors, questioning 
individual’s choices and the environment which gives rise to those choices adds 
another dimension to the conceptualization of drugs.
Returning to the underground economy, such studies therefore can be interesting 
in what they imply, though they do not address drugs in a direct manner. At times 
they can seem “more scientific,” and therefore more reliable to some audiences, 
because these studies tend to be more statistically based and are not complicated 
by the seemingly disordered context of political and social realities. The only 
actor is the individual and relations are established through the choices they take. 
Non-state actors and transnational relations are nearly absent in this literature. 
There is now a call to bring in more of the social and political context when 
analyzing statistical data to render a less sterile understanding. This call however 
does not indicate any formal ideas about non-state actors, though it could be seen 
as a distant step towards that inclusion.
The Founder of the Drug Policy Institute, Colombia and the author of several 
books on the drug trade, Francisco Thoumi, rejects the sterile view of drugs that 
economics proposes and instead shows how drugs are intimately woven into the 
politics and economics of the Andean region. His observations are common to 
works on the IPE of drugs in the major producing regions.119 A main issue faced 
in analyzing drugs from the IPE perspective is a carry-over from economics, i.e., 
how to measure the size of the illegal economy. The problem has many facets. 
First, what is illegal and where can the line be drawn? There is a familiar example
118 Bruce Porter (2001) 21-40. George Jung was part of the famous Medellin Cartel that, along 
with Pablo Escobar, flooded America with cocaine in the 1980s.
119 Franscico E Thoumi (2003). It should be noted that Thoumi has written extensively on the 
political economy of drugs and that his contribution is of particular importance to the research. 
Also see for the following discussions on IPE, Franscico E Thoumi (1995) and Ivelaw L Griffith 
(2000b).
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of a drug dealer using his money to purchase cigarettes. The convenience store 
and Phillip Morris both take a percentage of this money each using it to purchase 
other licit goods and services, and those businesses in turn use the money for other 
goods and services and the cycle is repeated again. The question is when does 
money and the value it creates stop being illegal?120 The case of the European 
Commission (EC) and RJ Reynolds highlights this problem well. The EC has 
brought several lawsuits against RJ Reynolds cigarette company for money 
laundering and cigarette smuggling. A main question is whether RJ Reynolds 
knew that they were selling cigarettes to organized crime groups and therefore 
receiving dirty money as payment which in essence makes the transaction an 
example of money laundering.
The second problem is how can a clandestine industry not subject to normal 
procedures of record keeping and tax reporting be represented? “Data on the size 
and ownership structure of the [illegal drug] industry are inaccurate, difficult to
tOtobtain, and frequently, at best, a fuzzy approximation of reality.” How could 
the effects of this business on money flows and national economic figures then 
properly be assessed? One proposal is to look at the size of the consumer market 
in Western countries because better data and reporting processes in those 
countries can yield more reliable estimates. Another proposal is to use satellite 
imagery to estimate coca and opium crop sizes and then estimate the probable 
costs and profits along the supply chain. A last approach is to actually survey 
farmers in a region on the amount of drugs they grow and then estimate the size of 
production based on the sample obtained and the number of producer regions 
known.122 Thoumi concludes that each of these approaches has their own 
drawbacks and none are entirely satisfactory.
As a corollary to estimating the size of illegal industries, Thoumi also discusses 
the role of money laundering. Money laundering is problematic in that it involves 
a process of complex financial transactions worldwide to clean cash and assets of 
illegal industries. In terms of estimates the question is whether money laundering
120 Douglas Farah (2002).
121 Franscico E Thoumi (2003) 141.
122 David Mansfield (2002).
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should be included in sizing the industry. For example, Thoumi notes that 
Steiner’s study on illegal drug income in Bolivia uses figures that were “total 
export estimates independent of the money actually repatriated back into 
Bolivia...which implied that there were no Bolivians involved in money 
laundering” .123 Though later Thoumi does discuss the negative impacts, he also 
demonstrates that money laundering can shape perceptions. To imply that 
Bolivians do not launder money becomes, despite the authors’ intent, not merely a 
political or economic statement, but also a moral one. Thoumi’s ultimate aim is to 
make better counter drug policy, the success of which he remains doubtful can 
occur in regions with weak states.124 The doubt stems from the fact that in order to 
have sound policy it must be applied over an entire country and that country must 
have the political and legal structures to sustain such a plan. The weak states in 
Latin America do not allow for such conditions and therefore anti-drug policies 
remain ineffectual.
Griffith agues that money laundering and drug trafficking can have a positive 
effect in income regeneration and revenue enhancement—this being the view 
expressed by Burger in the previous chapter when she suggested that Mexico 
could use drug money to pay off its national debt.125 This was the case, for 
instance, in Jamaica where drugs and money laundering replaced jobs that were 
lost in the declining agricultural sector. Going one step further, Morris 
characterizes “money as money. It does not know that it is bad, and unwittingly 
creates value wherever it goes. The problem is not the money; the problem is our 
perception of what it is doing.”126
It is important to understand the problems associated with money laundering since 
profits are often a central point, if not the central point, in discussions on drugs. 
Thoumi notes that “money laundering has not been the subject of academic 
research until recently” and therefore there remains much to be explored and
123 Franscico E Thoumi (1995) 153.
124 Franscico E Thoumi (2003) 369.
125 Ivelaw L Giffith (2000b) 17.
126 Gilbert Morris (2001b).
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several key questions to be answered.127 There are concerns over definition of 
terms, reliability of data used and the conclusions made about its impact. The 
examples from above on convenience store purchases and the RJ Reynolds case 
illustrate some of the complications faced. Under current laws and perceptions, 
purchasing goods at a convenience store is not considered money laundering 
because it does not create a sizable wealth whereas large purchase orders placed to 
RJ Reynolds do generate wealth. The distinction is questioned since in both cases 
the money creates bubbles of economic activity, distorting the economic realities 
of cities and regions as well as entire countries—this being the case of the 
Taleban’s money in Pakistan discussed in Chapter One. A further peculiarity 
associated with money laundering is that until very recently, only the placement of 
proceeds from drug activity were considered dirty money, where as the proceeds 
from other crimes such as robbery were not subject to anti-money laundering 
legislation. It is here that the unique and intimate affiliation was created between 
money laundering and drugs rendering a situation where the two are used almost 
synonymously.
Money laundering is itself a diverse and varied field of research. Factors studied 
include not just money laundering and drugs, but also methods of laundering, the 
post-Cold War increases of money laundering and its micro and macroeconomic 
consequences, the dangers of money laundering to state and international financial 
systems and structures, money laundering and tax evasion, regionally relevant 
effects of money laundering such as within the EU or Former Soviet Union, and 
finally the regulation of money laundering through state and international legal 
structures. Money laundering covers various categories of study, some of which 
are altogether divorced from the drug trade. Jeffrey Robinson’s famous book The 
Laundrymen, explores precisely this point. Robinson showed how money 
laundering was not only a way to move drug money into the licit economy, but 
also served as a service to world leaders such as Saddam Hussein who used these 
mechanisms to export state funds. Furthermore, with such large quantities at
127 Franscico E Thoumi (1995) 165. Also see Griffith (2000a) 25-26 and HRichard Friman and 
Peter Andreas (1999).
128 See for example, Peter Lilley (2000), Nathan Chipela DeAssis and Stuart Mankana Yikona
(1996), Jeffrey Robinson (1998), Mandy Bentham (1998), DC Jordan (1999), Bertil Linter (1997), 
BAK Rider (1997), J Wiener (1997), E Edwards (1995), and Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltman
(1997).
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stake, bankers, lawyers, accountants and a host of other licit actors were more 
than willing to put themselves at the disposal of questionable clients.
Thus in examining money laundering, the concept of drug money becomes more 
complex than previous characterizations of economic means to political ends, 
while focusing on the flows of money creates a more tangible line of relations 
than those of networks. However, in IPE these lines are less rigid than imagined in 
the organized crime model. For instance, in Griffith money laundering completes 
the cycle of drugs as the final step in the production, transportation-consumption 
chain.129 It is at the same time dependent and independent of the drugs 
themselves. Alone it drives its own sets of relations creating conflict and 
cooperation. However it is still clearly the result of the trafficking process and 
therefore does not exist outside of the cycle. In this sense money laundering is 
indicative of flows and relations, both internal and external to states and 
somewhat distanced from the non-state actors that create it.
At the same time, money laundering is addressing another facet of drugs which is 
corruption. Corruption is again another complicated aspect of illegal industries, 
for much the same reasons as drugs and money laundering; corruption is difficult 
to define or measure and much more subjective than either of the former. 
Corruption is important to understand because it is the means through which drug 
money gets translated into power. Thoumi locates one kind of corruption in the 
Columbian political structure arguing that political parties had to rely on local 
leaders to deliver votes since political parties tended not to have strong ideological 
cohesion.130 This structure led to the development of political support for the drug 
industry via the local level and also dispensed with the need for national level 
support since indirect support was created though the parties’ dependence on 
votes for their survival. Another manifestation of corruption is the ubiquitous 
direct payments to government officials to promote favorable legislation, policies 
and decisions. The most famous example of this was in 1984 when the Medellin
129 Ivelaw L Griffith (1993-4) 33.
130 Thoumi (2003)201.
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Cartel proposed to then president Betancur to pay Colombia’s entire foreign debt
111
(US$13 billion) in exchange for immunity from prosecution and extradition.
Corruption then is the manifestation of non-state actors modifying or influencing 
the state. This is a point often not clarified in the literature. When statements are 
made about drugs and crime diminishing the power of the state, the implication is 
usually through corruption. This can occur either to infiltrate the state, while 
maintaining the status quo, as in the Medellin case, or breaking the integrity of the 
state. However corruption is itself a much larger field of study than drugs. 
Corruption occurs in licit activities and is not necessarily a result of drug 
trafficking alone. In fact it could be conceivable that certain parts of the drug trade 
function without engaging in corruption at all. In regions with long porous borders 
for example, traffickers are able to move goods without needing to bribe officials. 
Then there are the more common stories of corruption such as the Enron scandal 
in America, political scandals of the Philippines’ Marcos, Suharto in Indonesia, 
Mobutu of Zaire and more recently Italy’s Berlusconi. These examples were 
about financial misuses of licit resources and the misuse of the offices and the 
privileges granted by those offices.
In discussing the political side of the drug issue, Thoumi also distinguishes the 
social aspects. In most works however they are presented together. The social and 
political elements then are commonly described as changes in social values such 
as materialism and easy money, use of violence and as a means to achieve goals, 
corruption in all strata of government and a weakening of the state.132 Change in 
values usually refers to a change vis-a-vis traditional social structures and 
behaviors. In economically depressed areas drugs are sometimes the only means 
to a desired lifestyle. This can be as true in the Middle East as in the United 
States.133 The use of violence is an ever-present characteristic of the drug trade 
worldwide. Violence can be associated with the previous discussions on terrorism 
and drugs, though ordinarily violence in the drug trade refers to local killings,
131 RB Craig (1987).
132 Thoumi (2003) 170.
133 Marwand Roghaniwal (2004). Roghaniwal reported in IPWR a story where Afghan farmers 
were using opium money to purchase cars: in particular Toyota’s luxury SUV Land Cruiser was 
named.
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torture, turf wars and border skirmishes. Catherine Brown discussed violence and 
the drug trade using a political economy perspective in order to examine Burma. 
Brown posits that the enduring conflict in Northern Burma is as connected to 
ethnicity as it is to opium, both largely ignored factors in international efforts to 
aid Burma. Traditional approaches to conflict do not take into account the political 
and economic factors together. Here she argues that violence serves as a way to 
achieve short and long term goals related to economic gain, resources, ethnic 
identity as well as security.134 She concludes that the opium economy in Burma 
serves at the same time to fund armed opposition to the government while giving 
the government money to fight the insurgents. In this sense both sides are the 
beneficiaries of the drug trade and it is in neither sides’ interest to stop it while 
other groups have understood that the state of violence is profitable and therefore 
are invested in perpetuating it; a similar argument is made by Barnett Rubin with 
regards to the former Taleban in Afghanistan.135
From IPE we see that the effects of the drug trade industry are thus manifold, 
sometimes positive, though more often negative. The industry can cause economic 
instability in producing regions and surrounding cities where drugs are present, 
can cause currency overvaluation and loss of competitiveness for exports and can 
increase expectations of high-risk investments.136 At the same time the industry 
does create jobs on a vast scale since coca and opium crops are labor intensive. 
Furthermore, the industry has an environmental dimension as seen in the use of 
herbicides and pesticides as well as in the clearing of forests for planting crops.
The concern with most IPE research works on drugs is that it is heavily 
empirically based tending more towards economics and less towards politics. This 
does not readily allow for the abstraction of concepts and the creation of links to 
existing theories. In order to make use of the data, patterns would have to be 
teased out and then linkages to other concepts made. The situation is as such 
because the IPE approach usually attempts to argue purely using the economic
134 Catherine Brown (1999) 236.
135 Ibid 252-253. Also see Barnett R Rubin (2000).
136 Thoumi (1995) 161.
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data on drugs.137 In fact, Thoumi’s work attempts to address this problem by 
integrating attitudes and values into a theoretical model that looks beyond 
economics data, therefore rendering a more balanced IPE approach.
Rodrigo Uprimny moves away from Thoumi’s empirically based approach and 
calls for developing an IPE theory of drug trafficking, a sentiment echoed by Jim
  1 -jo
Thomas, professor of Economics at the LSE. Uprimny begins by clarifying
several key points. First, drug trafficking is an illegal and not a parallel market.
The illegality stems from the prohibition of those items in particular and therefore
creates illegal markets only for those goods. In parallel markets the goods
themselves are legal while their method of sale is not whereas in illegal markets
both the goods and their sale are illegal. Uprimny concludes that studies which
mix parallel and illicit markets cannot be useful because the nature of the illegality
of a commodity leads to unusual manifestations in price elasticity while in Giles’
view the underground economy can include various types of
1 1 0illegal/informal/parallel activities under the same umbrella. At this juncture it is 
worthwhile to note that there is a need for such nuanced distinctions in discussing 
the drug economy as illicit activities do not have the same ramifications as parallel 
ones. A hypothetical characterization can illustrate the point: if we take the drug 
trade defined as a totally illicit act, we note that it tends to be populated by 
individuals who have a tendency to want to influence politics, society etc. while 
the those who work out of their homes making dresses and providing babysitting 
services for neighbors populate the informal economy and may not be as 
concerned with political power and influence.
137 Thoumi (2003) xv Thoumi presents a clear example of this when he contrasts the positive 
outlook of economic performance figures for Columbia and the declining standard of living he was 
witnessing during his research. He concluded that the economic figures could not have accounted 
for what was happening and other social and political elements had to be brought in.
138 Jim Thomas (1999) F381-F389. Rodrigo Uprimny is a professor of Constitutional Law, 
Human Rights, and Theory of the State at the Universidad Nacional, in Bogota.
139 Rodrigo Uprimny (1994) 12. In the basic concept of price elasticity, the more the price of a 
consumer good increases, the less demand there should be for it. Consumers are expected to find 
cheaper replacements for that good. However with drugs, demand seems unaffected by increase in 
prices and therefore price is considered inelastic. Price inelasticity is important because one of the 
bases for drug interdiction policies is to make business too costly for traffickers and therefore the 
drugs too costly for consumers. However both traffickers and consumers seem unaffected by 
higher costs. Uprimny is making the argument that the total and completely illegality of drugs 
leads to this inelasticity.
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Second, drug trafficking is not a crime like robbery but rather a ‘positive’ 
commercial process though an illegal one. This can be shown in the fact that drugs 
are more stable than traditional crops, which means at least more stable income 
regionally.140 In this way drugs can be characterized as a productive market rather 
than destructive economic activity. The drug trade also operates following the 
regular mechanisms of the market and includes the relatively consensual nature of 
all those involved even if violence and coercion also do occur. Viewing the drug 
trade as a consensual activity shows why farmers choose to grow coca since the 
previous beliefs that they were forced and coerced into growing crops did not 
adequately explain the protest of coca farmers against intervention efforts. 
Uprimny adds that the trade’s consensual aspects explain why repression efforts 
have been ineffective since “no one is interested in denouncing it because 
everyone benefits.”141 Furthermore, he argues that because of its commercial 
nature, high level dealers view themselves as positively contributing to society 
rather than their common portrayal as criminals, cancers or parasites. Therefore 
they do not see themselves as criminals and at the same time nor do the others 
around them.
Uprimny’s third point is that drugs have an international character a view which is 
now widely accepted. The benefit is that this characteristic can assist us in 
understanding the pricing of drugs, a key issue in estimating the size of the global 
drug market. Uprimny uses the case of Barco’s war on drugs to illustrate this 
point. The countermeasures instituted against the drug mafia caused,
an increase in the wholesale price of cocaine in the United States while 
causing a dramatic fall in the price of coca leaves and paste in Peru. The 
reason for this was that the repression by the Colombian government 
destabilized the few Colombian organizations which were supplied with 
materials from Peru. This in turn caused an excess of coca leaves in the 
Peruvian zone, accompanied by a relative decrease in the supply of the 
finished product to the US market.142
140 David Mansfield (2002). Mansfield noted that modern-day Afghan farmers choose to grow 
opium not because it is the most lucrative crop, but because it is the most risk free.
141 Rodrigo Uprimny (1994) 13.
142 Rodrigo Uprimny (1994) 15.
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The example shows that the drug trade is segmented as suggested by Griffith, 
divided into production, transportation and consumption. Disruptions at any point 
on the chain do not disrupt the entire system because modifications can be made 
(market flexibility). The result of disruptions is that certain anomalies arise. For 
instance, efforts to eradicate coca in one region lead to a production increase in a 
neighboring region. The economic data would reflect a boom in economic activity 
of the new region as an anomaly, pointing again toward the example on Pakistan 
presented in Chapter One.143
Uprimny, like Griffith, balances actors, commodities and actions, locating them in 
a market system. His conceptualization of drugs then is driven by rules of the 
market such as supply and demand, and rational choice. What Uprimny does not 
address is if it is possible to make a direct analogy between licit and illicit 
markets. One question to answer whether the mechanisms of supply and demand 
work the same way whether the product is licit or illicit and why?
Critical Approaches
Edwards and Gill take a constructivist approach to the concept of drugs, illicit 
activities and specifically transnational organized crime.144 Edwards and Gill, 
professors of criminology and political science respectively in the UK, emphasize 
empirical analysis rather than metatheory by exploring the discourse of 
transnational organized crime. Their research challenges many of the works 
above by challenging the context in which many authors write about the drug 
trade and their impetus for doing so in the first place. Edwards and Gill begin by 
describing the post-Cold War marriage between government and academics. They 
accuse journals such as Transnational Organized Crime of being oriented towards 
practioners while at the same time using evidenced based data from the very same 
communities for research. This creates a ring around the possible debate available 
to academics and puts them at risk of falling into a trap where they respond within 
a predetermined view. Practically, this means:
143 Rodrigo Uprimny (1994) 16-17.
144 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill (2000b) 204-205. Also see David Dingelstad, Richard Gosden, 
Brian Martin and Nickolas Vakas (1996).
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the ways in which knowledge about TOC [transnational organized crime] 
is organized pre-suppose[s] certain interventions and interpretation of their 
outcomes. In this sense ‘what works’ and what should work in the policy 
response to TOC are not questions that can be imposed externally upon a 
given construction of ‘the problem’ and ‘the response’. Rather policies for 
the control of TOC need to be understood as governmental saviours. . .145 
The way to escape the trap is by following a reflexive line whereby academics and 
policy communities consider treating terms such as transnational organized crime 
as the actual focal point of study since such terms are otherwise products of 
practitioner communities and by their very nature construct the parameters (ring 
fence) of the issue under analysis.
To illustrate what the ring fenced approach is we can take into examination Anton 
Weenink’s conception of the Russian Mafia.146 Weeninik posits that the Russian 
Mafia can be conceptualized as a private actor not dissimilar to a private 
corporation. Weenink considered a taxonomy of organizational types based on 
their scope and form. Their form can be private or public and their scope can also 
be private or public. In this way, he distinguished between different types of 
organized crime that is criminal organizations versus corporate crime or state 
crime. Weenink demonstrates a debate on how exactly to define and categorize 
crime and criminal actors that when contrasted with the analysis offered by 
Edwards and Gill, reflects the ring fenced notion of possible academic dialogue.
Edwards and Gill proposed two main discourses through which the threat of 
transnational organized crime is conveyed. These are associated with two 
conceptions of the state: one as a commanding sovereign and the other as steering 
or managing society. The first is associated with criminologies of the other and 
the second with the criminologies of the self.147 The former is based on a 
hyperbolic language of looming dangers, unseen threats and the need to wage war 
on crime and drugs. The latter is based on cooperation and “aims to modify 
everyday routines of social and economic life by limiting the supply of
145 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill (2002a) 247.
146 Anton Weenink (1998) 279-280.
147 Adam Edwards and Pete Gill (2002a) 245.
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opportunities, shifting risks and redistributing costs.”148 If the state is a command 
sovereign (Leviathan), then it is required to combat TOC—those outsiders who 
challenge ‘our’ society externally corrupting licit structures for their own gains. 
According to Edwards and Gill, this is the dominant discourse of government and 
the proponents of crime as security threat.149 In their conceptualization the authors 
see drugs, organized crime and other threats as subsumed within a discourse 
which can be based on the subject, commodity or behavior though such a 
distinction becomes somewhat secondary. A vague recognition of this sentiment is 
visible in Uprimny when he argues that the characterization of drugs using 
concepts such as the Mafia or organized crime leads to a superficial understanding 
and has many theoretical implications.150
In a similar vein, Peter Cohen’s Social Construction o f Drugs, examines drugs not 
in terms of what they “actually” do, but how and why we believe this is the case— 
in essence a larger expansion of the point hinted at earlier by Morris when he 
argued that money is money, having no inherent goodness or badness outside of 
our perceptions of it.151 Cohen is a Associate Professor, CEDRO Centre for Drugs 
Research at the Universiteit van Amsterdam and has been carrying out research on 
drug use and policy since 1980. Cohen begins with a critical view of science in 
general since his main focus is on addiction rather than the drug trade. However, 
his points are a concise representation of common depictions of drugs as a 
construct. His initial comments resonate with Edwards and Gill:
The determination of which branches and concepts of science will be 
developed or applied is, apart from chance and some interdisciplinary 
logic, dependent upon economic and political power. Because power 
cannot be evenly distributed in a community (the university included) 
those in power will develop science according to their interests and taste.
148 D. Garland (1996) 451.
149 Coincidentally, they place Cilluffo as of the exemplars of this discourse.
150 Rodrigo Uprimny (1994) 12. At its core the argument put forth by Edwards and Gill is 
concerned with the role of power in society and the nature of regimes which facilitate that 
power—in this case law enforcement regimes. For an in-depth examination of regimes see Michel 
Foucault (1995).
151 Peter Cohen (1990). Social construction means that an idea or institution is invented by 
individuals within a particular culture and society. The construction is accepted only because all 
those involved agree to behave as if it does exist, however, this idea/institution has no objective 
basis in a larger reality or truth.
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One should not look upon this as dishonesty or exploitation per se, but in
1most cases, as honourable and quite inescapable.
Cohen however does not take this to be a corrupting of academia, but an already 
existing and neutral fact. The conditioning then that has been created by the self- 
interested output of institutions is so pervasive there is no space for alternative 
views to be examined regarding drugs in society. He holds the medical 
establishment responsible for the overemphasis on the pharmacological and the 
dismissal of the social context; worse still the overemphasis is based on suspect 
“psychiatric models of explanation.”153 The result is a discourse on drugs that 
cannot escape the medical characterizations of pharmacology and pathology.
In an attempt to explore the positive view on drugs, Cohen proposes examining 
the pleasure of drugs empirically while leaving out the pathological dimension. 
Instead he argues research wastes time looking for the background causes of drug 
use, which include financial status, culture and ethnicity.
Is one’s major preoccupation our overdeveloped welfare state, then drugs 
are taken because of too much welfare state. Is one’s preoccupation 
unemployment, then drugs are taken because of unemployment. And when 
one’s preoccupation is pluriformity of culture, or uncertainty of about 
where to go in the world, the backgrounds or causes of illegal drug use and 
addiction are there. It is a ritual providing us with an ever new deus ex 
machina, one which is every time as impotent as any other.154
Cohen’s conception of drugs supersedes actors, commodities and actions, and sees 
drugs as words and processes within the larger system of self-perpetuating 
institutions. Specifically, he takes exception with projects such as determining 
root causes of drug use by asking:
how such knowledge about social backgrounds could be of any political 
relevance. Just assume that affluence among youth was a cause of drug 
use, would economic measures be taken to curb wages? Or assume that 
poverty among youth was a cause, would wages be made higher? And
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
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what if both were true for different groups? And continuing this argument, 
let us assume identity problems are a cause, will we facilitate identity 
searching?155
In contrast to von Hippel, determining root causes for Cohen can have no value 
other than to produce actions which only maintain the status quo while appearing 
to have proposed a solution.
Conclusion
From the survey above a few points should be readily evident. First, the debate on 
drugs in IR and neighboring fields is in fact fragmented. The broad range of 
fields, concepts and levels of analysis incorporated is a double-edged sword. In 
one instance it adds to the diversity and richness of ideas, on the other it adds to 
the fragmented nature of the debate. In the IPE discussion on drugs, for example, 
the difficulty in finding a common framework for traditional economic concerns 
and the political concerns of crime and corruption leads to a abundance of 
statistical data, with no clear way to conceptualize it.
Second, to varying degrees, non-state actors and transnational relations can serve 
as a binding thread within the literature, even though this link becomes distanced 
when discussing the purely economic view on drugs and vanishes altogether in the 
critical approaches. The literature contains often a generic acceptance of non-state 
actors and transnational relations without necessarily applying or appealing to the 
concepts formally.156
Third, most conceptualizations of drugs are one-dimensional. Especially within 
the debate on security, flat conceptualizations of mafia characters and thinly 
explained links to states render a superficial understanding of drugs. This is 
perhaps the most basic and often repeated problem within the literature. As with 
all one-dimensional views the depth of drugs in society and how they function is 
hidden by this characterization. It is one thing to envision Italian Mafia bosses at 
seaside cafes in Palermo, and quite another to understand the flexible and dynamic
155 Ibid.
156 See for example, Tamara Makarenko (2002).
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working of the drug business that the Mafia caricature represents. The point is not 
solely about the impressions produced, but ultimately the sets of relationships that 
are assessed and the actions taken. This case was most clearly demonstrated in 
networks when the rigid mafia structure was released into the net of information 
exchange. As Arquilla and Ronfedt noted, this kind of view on drugs and crime 
leads to a radically different response. In fact not only do policies need to be 
reformed, but also the rigid and bureaucratic entities that execute them. Law 
enforcement has long made this point: drug traffickers are more flexible and better 
funded than governmental agencies and therefore always are a few steps ahead.157
Fourth, when in those instances in the literature drugs are discussed, it can mean 
variously, drugs, organized crime, terrorism, corruption or a vague illicit sector or 
economy. The distinction is important because, as shown above, each implies its 
own set of relations and connection to either other actors or the state. Even if  there 
is a convergence of terrorism and organized crime, they are still not the same 
entity. However, the greatest confusion arises when actors, commodities and 
behaviors are intermixed. To say that drugs are a threat or drugs cause violence 
does not reveal anything about how or why this occurs. Furthermore it provides 
no way of assessing the validity of the claim even if  certain relations are drawn 
between drugs funding terrorist groups.
Fifth, the most common perception of drugs is as a negative factor, though some 
attempts have been made to include the positive side. Arguably, this is the most 
deeply rooted conception of drugs across all fields. Accordingly, a few authors 
have reacted to this characterization by questioning whether drugs actually have a 
negative effect and what leads us to believe so. The critical approach authors 
address this point directly by asserting that no drug issue exists outside of that 
which is made through discourse.
The implications of these five points on IR are profound. A fragmented debate 
means that there is no deep engagement with the research. For example, one 
question to ask is whether non-state actors are sufficiently addressed in the drug
157 PBS Frontline (2000).
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issue, or if, given the complexity of factors proposed by network theory, IR is 
fishing in the wrong conceptual pond. But as it is, non-state actors are not yet 
recognized as the foundation for addressing drugs in IR, therefore more pertinent 
questions remain unaddressed. Even if recognized, it is not enough to say that for 
decades we have studied ‘good’ non-state actors,, so now let us add in ‘bad’ ones 
as well. We have seen from the discussion on illicit and parallel economies that 
these sectors exhibit subtle distinctions that are foreign to our usual “licit world” 
spectacles. Therefore to say that there are bad non-state actors who need to be 
dealt with firmly through policing (today’s standard anti-terrorist argument) 
negates the very unique characteristics that have allowed the drug trade to survive. 
At this point we could also, ask but what of the connection between terrorism and 
organized crime? Many of those who facilitate the drug trade have an affiliation to 
neither category—peasant farmers are only the most obvious example of this 
point. And finally, going back full circle to the licit world, where does all this 
debate leave the upperworld-underworld nexus? The common realist based 
argument on drugs is that they are a cancer to be eradicated. Since realists see the 
international arena as anarchic, it is by nature subject to coercion and violence, 
and the war on drugs is simply another facet of this nature. But if the underworld 
were to fall away tomorrow would the upperworld find itself suspended in mid-air 
as many conspiracy theorists suggest?158
There are still deeper questions about the role of the state, and the nature of the 
international system with regards to drug trade. In his book Drug Politics Jordan 
brings together a collection of data regarding drugs, ultimately connecting the 
drug issue to the moral foundations of democracies. Jordan argues that the basic 
notion of the state has always been intertwined with religion and morality. But in 
the modem era religion has been replaced by drugs and promoted through famous 
counterculture authors such as Timothy Leary. Along with the counterculture 
there are a series of actors such as liberal capitalists (Jordan cites in particular 
George Soros) who use their wealth to promote drug legalization along with
158 A long standing argument from conspiracy literature is that no one really wants to eliminate 
drugs because everyone understands that drugs are an economic foundation. If drug were to 
disappear, certainly regional and perhaps even the world economy would collapse as the argument 
goes. See for example Mike Ruppert who was quoted as saying “The CIA has dealt drugs in this 
country for a very long time. The CIA sells drugs to support the U.S. economy” (Matthew 
Continetti (2004)). See also Michael Ruppert (2002).
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concepts such as harm reduction which only undermine democracy. Though 
Jordan’s conclusions on a return to the religious roots of democracy are debatable, 
he is one of the only authors to engage the liberal notion of the state and its role in 
facilitating the drug trade on one side and its inability to control it on the other—a 
kind of Frankenstein’s monster bom out of the ideals of free trade and liberal 
utopianism. It is not just that the frenzy of globalism has opened new access 
points for criminal activity, but that this activity is central to sustaining the 
system—a kind of conspiracy argument minus malicious intent—the logic of 
liberal capitalism playing itself out. But at the same time the very existence of the 
‘dark side’ brings with it an increase in violence and law enforcement, going 
directly against the core ideals of transnationalism and individual autonomy. The 
practical problem with Jordan’s argument, and as many temperance advocates 
discovered, was that morality is considered boring and drugs are considered fun. 
This was the dilemma faced then as now, especially among the younger, affluent 
classes. We will return to this issue in Chapters Four and Five when exploring 
earlier attitudes towards alcohol, crime and drugs.
We could also note at this juncture that the ‘non-state actor’ is itself a theory 
rooted in liberalism thereby again putting into question its viability. For now this 
concept, being at least one unifying element in an otherwise patchy debate, can 
serve as a starting point. For now we turn to little ir and its conceptualizations of 
the drug trade.
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Chapter III. The Objective of ‘Objective Authority’: An 
Examination of Institutional Reports
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to look at a selection of the written sources used in 
IR from the international arena that shape the drug issue. The purpose is to give a 
point of comparison for IR and also to take into account little ir, since, as the 
object of IR’s study, it should not be eliminated from the examination of how 
drugs are presented. Drugs within the international arena are examined here using 
documents from governments and international institutions, as it is these entities 
that primarily frame and express the direction of drug policy internationally. By 
the international arena it is meant the policy making, ‘non academic’ view on 
drugs.
The documents addressed here are as follows: The two United Nations World 
Drug Reports (WDR 1997 and WDR 2000), and the OECD/Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering Forty Recommendations (FATF). These are the most 
widely referred to non-academic documents on drugs. The UN reports are the 
most well known in terms of international drug policies and therefore receive 
greater attention here. The FATF report is examined because researchers who 
approach drugs from a money laundering or economics perspective often refer to 
it. Additionally, controversy over the FATF strategy against money laundering in 
2000 increased attention to the report, making its use even more popular. The 
WDR reports together are lengthy and an effort is made to include the relevant 
points without over-representing the texts.
Three additional notes serve here for clarification on the choice of the WDRs as 
the primary focus of this chapter. First, while there are other drug reports that are 
available their reach in shaping the drug debate internationally is limited. These 
reports include the US State Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report 
(INSCR) and The International Narcotics Board’s Annual Report (INCB).159 The 
INSCR has the main focus of examining nations with regards to how compliant
159 See United States Department of State International Narcotics Strategy Report and 
International Narcotics Control Board Annual Report for current and previous reports.
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they are with US countemarcotic and anti-money laundering strategies. This 
report serves more to assess the ‘credibility’ of nation rather than the international 
drug situation. The INCB reports tend to be thematic in that they take one aspect 
or issue seen to be of particular relevance to the drug trade and then examine it 
with the aim of policy recommendations. The INCB reports again do not address 
the international drug trade as a whole. For example, in 2002, the INCB report 
engaged a topic already discussed by some of the authors in the previous literature 
review chapter: the issue of drugs leading to economic prosperity in a region, 
therefore being value added.160 Of course as an entity partially bound to the UN it 
is not surprising that the report maintains that no such economic benefits 
ultimately are forthcoming from the drug trade. Second, the particular case of the 
WDR 1997 and WDR 2000, aside from their wide use in research and their 
attempt to address the drug trade as a global phenomenon, illustrates, as shall be 
shown below in the analysis put forth by Rossi, how such reports may not as 
objective as they might appear. Finally, the inclusion of other reports as well as 
other dates of the WDR publications seemed only to belabor the point that is the 
aim of this chapter which is to illustrate some of the ways drugs are presented in 
ir.
World Drug Reports
The following sections will examine two World Drug Reports: WDR 1997 and 
WDR 2000. Each report will first be described in terms of content and general 
message. As the drug issue is multifaceted, even the particular subjects discussed 
and omitted from each report help to characterize a certain perspective on the drug 
problem. Next, each report will be examined in terms of how it presents the drug 
problem and how it copes with various competing views on drugs. Lastly the 
reports will be compared to each other and views from other scholars concerning 
the implications of these reports will be incorporated to give a more 
comprehensive view.
Background on World Drug Reports
160 International Narcotics Control Board Annual Report (2000)
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There are three recent UN Conventions that shape the framework within which 
the current drug reports are produced. The first was the 1961 Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. One of its main functions was to consolidate other international 
drug control Conventions and treaties under Article 44 including The Hague 1912 
International Opium Convention, Geneva 1925 International Opium Convention, 
the Geneva 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and the Bangkok 1931 Agreement for the Control 
of Opium Smoking in the Far East. The 1961 Convention was also the first time 
that the cultivation of illicit drugs in their raw form, rather than the production of 
latter stage drugs, was placed under the purview of international drug control 
efforts. Ten years later, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances added 
non-plant based drugs such as hallucinogens, stimulants and sedatives. The 
common examples of these are LSD, amphetamines and barbiturates respectively. 
Both conventions assigned maintenance of the four-Schedule classification system 
of drugs to the World Health Organization (WHO).161 The 1988 United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
was the third major convention of international drug control. The contribution of 
this convention was to allow for the confiscation of the proceeds of illicit drug 
sales, including the forfeiture of seized assets and accounts to government 
authorities. Additionally, it tackled extradition and banking secrecy issues while 
striving to increase access to people and their personal information if suspected of 
drug trafficking.
In order to implement the pledges made within the conventions, before and after 
1961, the UN established several bodies to address the international drug problem. 
The first was the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) which was found in 1946 
by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Its main focus was 
policy-making for international drug control through analysis and 
recommendations. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was 
established under the 1961 Convention to monitor compliance of the treaties 
agreed to by signatories. The INCB is also in charge of monitoring licit
161 The four schedule classification system divides drugs into Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule
III, and Schedule IV in descending order of “danger’Vpotency with Schedule I being the highest 
degree. Opium and cocaine are listed as Schedule II drugs. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 
USC Sec. 812 01/22/03 Schedule II.
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production since licit production for pharmaceuticals often is siphoned off into 
illicit markets. As mentioned, the INCB is a quasi-independent entity and 
publishes its own reports.
The final and perhaps most important department is the United Nations Drug 
Control Program (UNDCP), now the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), which was established in 1991 by the UN General Assembly. This 
office here will be referred to by its current name UNODC. The aim of the 
UNODC is to assist member states in their respective efforts to fight drugs and 
crime. This is conducted through their ‘three pillars’ approach:
• “Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding 
of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence-base for policy and 
operational decisions
• Normative work to assist states in the ratification and implementation of 
the international treaties, the development of domestic legislation on 
drugs, crime and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and substantive 
services to the treaty-based and governing bodies
• Field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of 
Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism”162
The culmination of this activity is documented through the various publications of 
the UNODC. Of these, the WDR serves to offer a global perspective on the drug 
trade. There are two WDR reports that are of concern here: the World Drug 
Report 1997 and the World Drug Report 2000.163
WDR 1997
The WDR 1997 begins with the premise that the quantity of media attention given 
to the subject of drugs has created a false sense of knowledge about illicit drugs 
when in reality we really know very little about this subject. Thus the function of 
the WDR is to provide a more in depth view of the global illicit drug trade. The 
WDR includes in this approach issues related to production, trafficking and
162 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “About Us”.
163 Complete versions of both reports can be found at United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/world_drug_report.html (hereafter WDR 1997, WDR 2000 or WDR 
2004). The following sections will draw from these reports directly as they outline what each 
report communicates at face value.
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consumption as well as the various policies which attempt to address the problem 
at each point. It aims to do this through a sober analysis of the data available while 
at the same time acknowledging the shortcomings of the data. Drug data is first of 
all difficult to obtain due to the nature of the drug trade. Second, data is difficult 
to correlate because different countries use different methods to gather their drug 
information if they gather the information at all. This makes assessments on the 
international scale suspect since the data is not comparable or simply nonexistent. 
In these cases statistical methods can be used to compensate or to make educated 
guesses about the international situation.
WDR 1997 is structured into five main parts: Recent Trends, Theories and 
Interpretations of Illicit Drug Use, Health and Social Consequences of Drug 
Abuse, The Illicit Drug Industry, and Drugs and Public Policy. Part one is an 
overview of recent trends in cocaine, opium and cannabis production as well as 
the use of synthetic drugs. Here seizures of drugs and precursors are discussed as 
a main way of determining how much illicit trade is actually occurring. This 
means the total tonnage of a particular drug or the total amount of precursor 
material used in making a certain drug, for example opium into heroin intercepted 
by law enforcement, are used as a partial indication of the size of that industry. 
Seizure data is then weighed against other factors such as demand and price 
fluctuations to give a more accurate view of the overall illicit trade. Other 
indicators such as drug related deaths, arrests and emergency room visits are used 
to determine the demand for a drug. In addition the WDR 1997 relies heavily on 
the results of its Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) responses. Member states 
are required to submit the ARQ yearly and some non-members also participate in 
the survey.
Part two addresses the various views on why people take drugs. Drug use is 
attributed to personal factors such as genetic make-up, interpersonal factors such 
as peer groups, social-environmental factors such as culture, sensation seeking, 
perceptions of drug use, and finally social controls on drugs. It should be noted 
that the WDR 1997 maintains the distinction between different types of drugs and 
their accompanying factors. For example, physical predispositions do not just
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lead to a person choosing to use drugs, but more specifically these dispositions 
can determine what kind of drug the person will choose.
Part three examines the health and social consequences that arise from the abuse 
of drugs. Here the outcome of drug abuse is based on two variables: 
characteristics attributable to the drug itself and characteristics attributable to the 
user.
“The former include: pharmacological properties; route of administration, i.e. 
oral ingestion, snorting, inhalation, injection (subcutaneous, intravenous or 
intramuscular); whether it is taken alone or together with other drugs or 
alcohol; level of purity and presence of adulterants; dosage level. The latter 
include: personality of the user; intensity or frequency of previous use; user’s 
pre-existing state of health; social and economic circumstances of the user; the 
user’s expectations of the drug’s effects”164 
It is the interplay of these factors that account for the widely varied experiences of 
drug use and explains why some people can become addicted after just one 
experience while others can have a ‘take it or leave it attitude’ despite several 
experiences.
At this point, the report touches on several other consequences focused on 
women, family, crime and work productivity. Specifically, it looks at the gender 
issue in three ways:
1. Female non-drug users with drug-abusing families or partners;
2. Females who consume drugs illicitly;
3. Females who are involved in the production and/or distribution of 
drugs.165
In all instances, the consequences for female involvement in drugs are graver than 
for men. For example, females who are involved in drug production are at greater 
risk on several counts. First, females are the primary caretakers of the family, 
making the consequences of addiction or incarceration much stronger than for 
young males. Second, laws and prison systems tend not to favor females, leading 
to possibilities for extended sentences as well as physical abuse. For families,
164 WDR (1997) 71.
165 WDR (1997) 79.
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drug abuse has the now well-known consequences of violence, psychological 
disruption for children and financial stress.
The WDR 1997 notes that another consequence involves crime. Drug related 
crime refers to a range of offences. The WDR 1997 establishes four categories: 
drug law violations, violations of other laws induced by the use of drugs, 
predatory crimes such as robbery and the expanded effects of drugs and crime 
such as corruption and terrorism. The report continues to say that in terms of drug 
use, there is no causal relationship between drugs and crime though some specific 
studies on cocaine and crack have been able to establish specific drug-crime 
relationships for those drugs in certain regions.
Finally, WDR 1997 examines drugs in the workplace based on three factors: 
safety, productivity and cost. In this section, WDR 1997 includes also alcohol 
along with drugs. Safety is affected through the inability of the body to function 
properly, leading to accidents. Productivity is the quality and quantity of work a 
person is able to produce.
The fourth section of the WDR 1997 is perhaps the most relevant to International 
Relations and is often the section discussed in the IR literature when the report is 
cited. The illicit drug industry is run by a single motive according to the report, 
profits. The contrast of this fact to the myriad number of factors that lead to drug 
use is highlighted. As such the WDR 1997 focuses on the economics of the drug 
industry. Here the distinction between licit and illicit cultivation of plant based 
drugs is brought forth. The drug industry is likened to licit business structures 
where organizations are characterized by centralized top management supported 
by a descending chain of smaller managers and workers. Also included in this 
view are the various lawyers, accountants and scientists required to keep different 
aspects of the business operational.
The WDR 1997 maintains that the best way to look at drugs is as an industry, 
bringing in supply and demand dynamics. The framework for analysis then 
includes four factors: preferences, technology, factor endowments and institutions.
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Preferences is the term used by economists to describe the objectives of 
consumers...technology determines where and how the product can be 
produced; factor endowments determine which economic actors will 
engage in the production/ manufacture of the product; and institutions, by 
determining the legal status of drugs, thereby establish the degree of risk 
which is run by those participating in industry-related activities.166 
Another key calculation made in addressing the drug industry is price elasticity. 
Price elasticity as discussed in Chapter Two, measures the degree of 
responsiveness of demand to a change in price with all other factors held constant. 
In the case of drugs, price elasticity shows the degree to which consumers respond 
to a change in heroin prices, for example, by choosing cheaper drugs if the 
original price has increased. Price elasticity calculations for major hard drugs are 
not based on direct data but by extrapolating information from other goods such as 
alcohol and tobacco, thus making these calculations highly theoretical. In 
policymaking it was believed that an increase in price would lower consumption. 
However, the report shows that demand side behaviors have shown themselves to 
be more complex than price elasticity has been able to account for, echoing the 
point made by Rodrigo Uprimny in the preceding chapter when he noted that the 
illegal nature of the drug trade made it unresponsive to price increases: both 
traffickers and consumers seem unaffected by changes in drug prices which means 
there is price inelasticity.
The final way presented to examine the drug industry is through risk and price. 
The WDR 1997 maintains that, unlike licit agriculture, illicit cultivation is not 
dependent on factors such at labor and capital, but rather on perceived risks as 
various stages of production and sales. The closer the drug gets to its final 
destination, the higher the risk and therefore the higher the cost. In this sense, a 
major disruption of cultivation would not have the same cost impact as a major 
disruption at the point of market delivery. In this sense, crop eradication programs 
would have little impact on final prices unless there was an overwhelming 
perception that the risks to continue would not be would outweigh the profits.
166 WDR (1997) 124.
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The report states that profits are derived mainly from the value added to drugs 
during the trafficking stage. Local farmers and local traffickers only receive a 
marginal percentage of the trade’s profits and very little of these profits ever 
return to the source country. The UN estimated that, of the vast Bolivian cocaine 
trade, the farmers received only 7% of the profits. Here it should also be 
considered that the number of farmers is high and thus this 7% is spread over a 
larger population.167
The WDR 1997 implies that it is organized crime that takes the largest share of 
drug profits. It posits the role of organized crime as principle investor in the 
industry, citing the investment of emerald smuggling profits into the drugs trade
1 Afiby the Sicilian Mafia. These groups operate, for the most part, like 
corporations. One of their chief characteristics is their flexibility, which makes 
law enforcement efforts difficult. If a certain precursor chemical is banned, 
organized crime is able to respond quickly by developing another chemical that 
will allow them to manufacture their product.
The corporate model of the drug industry implies that the corporation is an 
employer. If this is the case, then there are questions regarding the employees and 
their impact on national economies. The presence of the drug industry as an 
employer remains difficult to discern due to lack of data. The WDR 1997 
estimates that in Bolivia, 60,000 farmers are employed by the coca leaf 
industry.169 However there is no reliable data that can show how much income is 
generated from this labor not does the WDR clarify the relationships between the 
number of employees and the 7% profit-share figure quoted above. Additionally, 
the export of illegal products show up as a positive increase in the balance of 
payments for the exporting country because of the incoming flows of foreign 
exchange created through drug exports which can further distort attempts at 
calculation.
167 WDR (1997) 131.
168 WDR (1997) 133.
169 WDR (1997) 142.
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Movement of drug money within licit state economies leads to questions of 
money laundering and, specifically whether this money undermines government 
policies and weakens the authority of Central Banks, since illicit capital 
investments are made not for the benefit of the country, but in considering the best 
way to guard against detection. Money laundering is used to lower the risks 
associated with dirty money. Unlaundered money is not useable because it links 
the criminal and the crime. One observation from the WDR 1997 is how criminals 
launder money through licit investments and “simultaneously ‘launder’ 
themselves, moving from underworld crooks to apparently bona fide 
entrepreneurs and financiers.”170
The last section of WDR 1997 deals with drugs and public policy. Here is found 
the basis for the UN’s international policies. The WDR 1997 establishes what are 
the function of law, morality and the differences between Christian-based and 
Islamic-based legal systems. The problem is that international legislation must
171encompass all traditions, balancing ethnocentrism with social relativism. A web 
of arguments that moves from tribal uses of drugs pre-colonialism to discussions 
of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill concludes that the UN must enforce anti­
drug policy, but also it must be culturally sensitive in the process.
WDR 1997 acknowledges, somewhat surprisingly, that all drug polices develop in 
a social and political environment. As attitudes and ideas shift, so does policy 
which is why there has been a swing between tolerance and intolerance over the 
decades since drug legislation began within and between states. Today policy 
objectives of different countries vary. Examples of this include Sweden which has 
a low tolerance for drug use, and the Netherlands and Australia that have a high 
tolerance for drug use and believe it is better to focus on harm reduction rather 
than eliminating use. Formulating policy then remains a complex task. The main 
function of the UNODC is to promote cooperation in international drug control 
efforts primarily through Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), treaties, 
conventions and mutual legal assistance treaties. The report ends by listing some 
of these and finally it discusses the support role provided by international agencies
170 WDR (1997) 137.
171 WDR (1997) 157.
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and nongovernmental organizations. International agencies include Interpol and 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) who work closely with the UN on drug 
control. NGOs, because of their diversity of interest areas covered, can serve more 
directly to assist drug control efforts through social development such as poverty 
alleviation. Its last point refers to the legalization-criminalization debate, stating 
that legalization is dangerous because it is irreversible once in progress and that 
majority of people surveyed in Italy and the US have said they do not want
170legalization.
WDR 2000
The World Drug Report 2000 by comparison to the 1997 report, contains only 
three sections: Recent Trends in Production, Trafficking and Consumption; The 
Three Pillars of Demand Reduction, Epidemiology Prevention and Treatment; and 
Alternative Development. WDR 2000 can also be distinguished by an unusually 
long and signed introduction from the then-Executive Director of the UNODC, 
Pino Arlacchi. Previously Arlacchi was a member of the Italian Senate 
(1995/1996) and the Chamber of Deputies (1994/1995). He served as Vice 
President of Italian Parliamentary Commission on Organized Crime and taught at 
the University of Florence and Columbia University in the late 1980 to early 
1990s.
In the introduction, Arlacchi attempts to reverse the pessimistic attitude towards 
drug control he sees. He argues that it is possible to reduce demand and stop all 
opium and cocaine production especially if we examine the successes of drug 
control to date. The height of this example is the successful control of opium 
production by India and the reduction of addiction by China in the middle part of 
the last century. Ignoring these and other successes leads to a ‘psychology of 
disempowerment’ that no longer is applicable due to:
■ Changes brought about by globalization that provide a different 
environment from that of the failed drug control operations in the 70s and 
80s
172 WDR (1997) 199.
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■ Changes from using embellished drug statistics to a more sober approach 
to measuring drugs
■ Changes in the post Cold War political attitude from conflict towards 
cooperation, thus opening doors for real cooperation on treaties. 
Additionally, as the drug trade has become more international, more
17^countries are affected and therefore have a reason to cooperate.
From here Arlacchi addresses briefly several points regarding international drug 
control. First, in 1998 the UN General Assembly held a special session on the 
drug problem where 185 countries signed a declaration committing themselves to 
address this issue, marking a significant moment in global cooperation. This 
implies that there is now an infrastructure forming that was not previously in place 
to make a success of international policies, going back to his earlier point of a new 
environment of cooperation. Second, Afghanistan, as the greatest producer of 
opium in the last decade, presented the largest challenge to drug control. 
Therefore, the Regional Action Plan for Afghanistan was developed to prevent 
trafficking, consolidate national institutions, prevent displacement, support 
country efforts and implement alternative development.174 Added to this are 
elements of human security and failed states that serve as the context for illicit 
drug production. UNODC has begun to address these issues through increased 
cooperation on criminal justice. Thus, there is a concise plan in operation for 
Afghanistan commensurate to the problem of drugs cultivation in the country. 
Arlacchi concludes with a positive view on the role of the UNODC and the future 
of drug control. He lists several elements such as providing quality data and
1 7<innovative initiatives in the future.
Chapter One of the report is divided into three sections: production, trafficking 
and consumption. These sections cover opium, coca and cannabis. Though there 
were periods of sharp increase in opium production in the last decade, overall 
production was much less than initially imagined. Coca leaf production has 
showed a clear decrease since the 1980s while cannabis has expanded
173 WDR (2000) 4-5.
174 WDR (2000) 8-9.
175 WDR (2000) 20-21
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significantly. In considering all the problems associated with estimating drug 
production, cannabis estimates are blocked by the additional barrier of the plant’s 
tendency to grow in the wild. It is not clear what the amount of wild growth is and 
how much of it is harvested for use.
The use of seizures as a means of measuring the overall trade appear again in 
WDR 2000, however this time with much more confidence as to their value in 
yielding proper estimates. The confidence is shown through a lack of examination 
of the problems associated with statistics. WDR 2000 makes superficial mention 
of the problems with statistics, yet does not engage in detail as to what the 
implications of these problems are for the data presented in the report. Thus the 
impression is that there are indeed problems with the statistics, however not 
enough to warrant serious pause. Additionally, seizures show trafficking patterns 
as more countries report the quantity and kind of seizures they are making yearly.
17As a result, key trafficking routes have now been identified for all three drugs. 
The remainder of the trafficking section focuses on detailed statistics of each drug 
and its recent history in terms of increases and decreases. This section also 
includes Amphetamine-type stimulants, commonly referred to as the ATS drugs.
Consumption of drugs is the last section in Chapter One and deals with the 
“consumer side issues” of drugs. Drug use becomes problematic when, “the use of 
a certain drug leads to treatment demand, emergency room visits...drug related 
morbidity...and other elated social ills such as drug-related crime and
1 nn
violence.” Using this definition as a basis, the WDR 2000 statistically 
examines drug use in every region, showing where certain drugs have a high use 
and others not. It also examines some trends in drug use, for example showing 
that, of the regions that reported an increase in drug use, the highest increase was 
for cannabis and the ATS drugs.178
Chapter Two focuses on demand reduction and the three pillars set forth by the 
UN to address this objective. The first is epidemiology. This approach defines
176 For a list of routes see WDR (2000) 34-35.
177 WDR (2000) 56-57.
178 WDR (2000) 63. It is not clear why ATS were added to the discussion of opium, coca and 
cannabis. It is perhaps that ATS are becoming of increasing concern.
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drugs first as a disease and second looks at the environment that allows that 
disease to either grow or decline, following the basic definition of 
epidemiology.179 In this approach three elements are measured: patterns of drug 
abuse, consequences of drug abuse, and the factors that link drug abuse to 
contingent circumstances.180 The patterns that result from this are then used to 
look for prevalence of a drug
problem with respect to the overall population, its ‘incidence’ (the number 
of new users), the frequency or intensity with which the behavior occurs 
the routes of administration (e.g. nasal inhalation, injecting or oral use), 
and the settings in which consumption takes place...thus in addition to 
measuring drug abuse, information is required on the socio-demographic 
correlates of drug abuse, e.g. age, gender, income, education, occupation, 
ethnicity, community size, region, as well as other factors such as attitudes 
towards drugs, involvement in activities or exposure to specific factors 
which are associated with an increased vulnerability to drug abuse
1 ft 1problems.
The key to this approach is that it traces data over time, presenting this as the most 
reliable way to have a comprehensive understanding of drugs. Again surveys are 
employed for gathering relevant data, except this data is less reliant on the ARQ 
and more on general population surveys. General population surveys provide 
basic information on income levels and demographics for example. Therefore, the 
WDR 2000 takes various general populations surveys and processes the data so as 
to determine prevalence and numbers of users versus total populations as well as 
mortality rates, drug use amongst young adults and efficacy of treatment 
programs. The WDR 2000 notes the limitations to the epidemiological approach, 
one problem being the limitation of some countries to gather the proper data.
The second main heading of this chapter is prevention. Prevention takes many 
forms, such as information dissemination media campaigns. Sometimes 
prevention strategies have had adverse effects. For example, if the information on 
prevention (perhaps on advertisement on why teens should not take drugs) appears
179 Merriam Webster dictionary defines epidemiology as “the sum of the factors controlling the 
presence or absence of a disease or pathogen.” (Merriam Webster Online, ‘epidemiology’).
180 WDR (2000) 87.
181 WDR (2000) 87-88.
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too sensationalized it is discredited and causes a backlash or rebellion resulting in 
increased drug use. Different studies are used to examine what kinds of prevention 
methods are the most effective though there is no one conclusive way identified.
As another means of prevention, WDR 2000 also identifies the risk factors 
contributing to drug use. Risk factors are those factors which if present can lead to 
a greater chance of drug use. Of the risk factors identified family and peer groups 
are the strongest. If there is drug use amongst peer groups of an individual, there 
is a greater chance that the individual will also use drugs. There are also other 
factors such as education, individual characteristics (as noted in WDR 1997) and 
social competence—a sense of future possibilities and “feeling in control of one’s
1 X7life”. Risk factors interact with proactive factors. The latter are factors 
supporting the non-use of drugs. To take one illustration not noted in the report, 
we could envision a situation whereby if young individuals were involved in 
formal after school activities such as football, they might be less likely to engage 
in drug experimentation. The availably and participation in organized sports then 
is a proactive factor which can balance risks such as chaotic neighborhoods or 
poor family structure.
The last section examines treatment. Treatment is simply the different ways 
people with drug problems can better their circumstances. It is common to place 
treatment as a part of drug reduction strategies in an effort to:
• “To reduce dependence on psychoactive substances;
• To reduce the morbidity and mortality caused by, or associated with, the 
use of psychoactive substances; and
• To ensure that users are able to maximize their physical, mental, and social 
abilities and their access to services and opportunities, and to achieve full 
social integration.”183
Various results of treatment studies are cited as to why treatment is a viable way 
to address drug abuse. The WDR 2000 acknowledges that treatment has its 
drawbacks, but overall is useful in both inpatient and outpatient type programs. In 
addition to pharmacological treatments for certain kinds of addiction, the report
182 WDR (2000) 107-108.
183 WDR (2000) 117.
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also presents alternative treatments such as acupuncture and psychological 
counseling as a means to rehabilitate individuals.
Finally, Chapter Three addresses alternative development which can be seen as a 
form of international drug control strategy. Alternative development can signify
• 184 •crop replacement programs or providing health facilities and education. Despite
sustained criticism, crop eradication has, according to the report, had many
1 «successes—witness China and India in the 1950s. The situation today is 
different in that production sites usually lie in areas where there is much civil 
strife and an absence of governmental controls. In these areas peasants are 
dependent on illicit drug cultivation. It is for this reason there is an 
acknowledgement of the economic reliance which is addressed though alternative 
income-generating options.
A sometimes problematic situation is related to alternative development that, at 
the national level, dmg control strategies remain diverse and are not always 
coordinated with international strategies. This is partially due to the varied nature 
of a drug problem in a particular country plus that country’s response structure in 
terms of government processes. Even early on, when one country, such as Turkey, 
was successful in suppressing production, the trade developed in another region. 
However, new perspectives from the 1970’s gave the possibility of developing 
new approaches to the dmg issue. The “New International Economic Order” 
attempted to address the wrongs of North-South relations by taking into account
1 8Athe needs and interests of developing countries. For the UN, this meant 
focusing on development while also considering supply reduction. However, the 
report notes the importance of political cooperation without which little of the 
alternative development programs could succeed. Thus, a series of political, social 
and economic factors leads to the success of international dmg policy.
Critique & Analysis of WDRs
184 WDR (2000) 9.
185 WDR (2000) 142.
186 WDR (2000) 148.
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Carla Rossi, from the Department of Mathematics at the University of Rome, 
conducted an extensive critique of the two WDR’s, focusing first on the 
differences between the two reports and second on the qualitative data presented 
in the WDR 2000.187 Rossi’s work is used here because she is a representative to 
the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Abuse (EMCDDA), where 
much of the WDR 2000 data is drawn from. As she notes in one of her articles, 
she was part of the EMCDDA group that produced many of the numbers that the 
WDR uses.188 Therefore, Rossi has a unique familiarity with the source data and is 
able to discern alternations made to this data when reproduced in the WDR 2000.
According to Rossi, WDR 1997 provided a balanced view of the world drug 
situation whereas the WDR 2000 was “not aimed at providing comprehensive and 
balanced information about the world drug problem, but rather at showing that the 
massive investments are able to reduce drug problems and that the [UNODC] 
policy is a success.”189
The most evident difference between the two reports is their length. WDR 2000 
consists of three chapters as shown above and omits sections on money 
laundering, organized crime, and corruption, in essence taking out the elements 
that refer directly to the countermeasures activities that the UNODC supports. 
This material is replaced with extensive discussions on alternative development 
programs. As Rossi notes, there is no explanation given for the lack of focus on 
law enforcement, especially when the largest part of the UNODC budget is spent 
exactly on countermeasures and much less on alternative development,190 It can 
only be speculation as to why the UNODC would want to hide its law 
enforcement activities while presenting the image of being oriented towards 
development. However, these are minor points compared to the concerns Rossi 
expresses regarding the use of statistical data. Using the graphs below, reproduced 
from the WDR 2000, Rossi makes several observations about the data.
187 Carla Rossi (2002) 221-231.
188 Carla Rossi (2004).
189 Carla Rossi (2002) 221.
190 Carla Rossi (2002) 222.
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Graph 1: Global Illicit Drug Production and Seizures 
Source: Reproduced from WDR (2000) 38
As mentioned above, seizures are a key component in measuring the illicit drug 
trade. Rossi examines what these figures actually represent, especially considering 
Arlacchi’s optimistic executive summary. Though not discussed by Rossi, the four 
figures above represent the “double nature” of seizure statistics: on the one hand 
showing the successes of law enforcement agencies while also showing the 
“visible tip of a much larger iceberg of drug supply and trafficking” in the 
increase of drug related deaths.191 Thus there is law enforcement success and an 
increase in drug use and related death which by its nature would contradict the 
claim that law enforcement is achieving success.
Rossi analyses the figures above, noting that
the trend in seizures is directly proportional to the trend in production.. .the 
greater the amount of drugs produced, the greater the amount of drugs 
seized. (The proportion of the amount seized is therefore constant with
191 WDR (2000) 36-37.
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respect to production), which means that it can be considered a sort of 
fixed tax which traffickers have to pay...Figures 15 and 16 in the Graph 1 
show how the amount of seizures is directly proportional to consumption, 
measured by deaths for heroin and by survey data among American 18- 
year-olds for cannabis. These figures confirm what has already emerged 
from the two previous figures: that the more the market grows, the more 
seizures grow. The effectiveness of seizure action has not changed, and 
remains rather low.192 
Therefore, the claims that UNODC’s policies have led to successes are not 
substantiated by the data. The point here is less whether the UNODC deliberately 
manipulated data to bolster its policies and more the impression this process gives 
regarding the drug problem. The “double nature” implies that the drug problem is 
at the same time measurable and containable, while still it is something 
intimidating and vast (an iceberg). It is precisely because the WDR 2000 presents 
data in the manner that Rossi examines which allows this double “falsity” to exist. 
The drug trade may be measurable, though as we have seen so far, its 
measurements are highly problematic and large questions about approaches 
remain unanswered. The same measurements are used to assess the size of the 
drug problem. Whether the trade is large or small then is difficult to say with
193certainty.
Rossi cites a second example in the use of original drug statistics from their 
EMCDDA source. In the original EMCDDA estimates, the Benelux countries 
were depicted individually as Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. However, in 
the WDR 2000, they are grouped together as Benelux. As Rossi notes, the mean 
estimate of problem drug users for Benelux is
not drawn from EMCDDA data, but is an ad hoc calculation made by 
putting together the estimates for Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg in a 
worthless jumble (there has not even been an attempt to produce a 
weighted mean by taking account of the different populations of the three 
countries).194
192 Carla Rossi (2004).
193 Refer to the section on Statistics in the Introductory Chapter of this work.
194 Carla Rossi (2004).
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It is not unusual to use individual country statistics to produce estimates for the 
region, but Rossi contends, in this case, it was not done accurately from a 
methodological point of view.195 In the case of Benelux, it is significant because 
the actual figures for the three countries are quite different.
In Luxembourg, for example, the figures are more than double those for 
Belgium as three times higher than those for Holland...an operation such 
as that [was] performed... to obscure the Dutch data, which are much 
more positive than all the others, by using a shameful trick.196
There is another instance of contention regarding the Dutch data. The prevalence 
of drug use discussed above in Chapter Two of WDR 2000 does not discuss the 
statistics for the Netherlands and Belgium. For Rossi, the absence of the two 
countries is attributed to their low prevalence rates as reflected in the original 
EMCDDA data.197 The distortion of Benelux data is possibly due to human error. 
However, Dutch drug policies seem to be a more likely reason for the distortions. 
In 1976 the Baan report recommended that List One drugs be legalized. “List One 
drugs [are] those that present ‘an unacceptable risk (heroin, cocaine and LSD)’ 
and List Two drugs (cannabis products, such as hashish and marijuana) [are] seen 
as less dangerous and ‘softer.’ Essentially, Parliament depenalized the possession 
of 30 grams of marijuana or hashish...”198 The policy of legalized marijuana has 
been unpopular with organizations such as the UN, who ultimately promote 
countermeasures over legalization as the conclusions of WDR 1997 stated. Rossi 
argues the distortion of data paints the Netherlands in a negative light, since the 
original EMCDDA data showed the prevalence in the Netherlands as being quite 
low. In short, drug tolerant countries that show up statistically with data showing 
low drug use discredit UN policies. The UN would not want to promote a country 
where legalization appeared to be working and therefore left it out altogether.
Rossi’s argument focuses mainly on the decline of objectivity from WDR 1997 to 
WDR 2000, thus making an argument of degrees. Through her detailed analysis of 
the statistics she shows how the potential value of WDR 1997 as a more
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Carla Rossi (2002) 224.
198 Larry Collins (1999).
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expansive representation of the global drug trade was reduced to trickery in WDR 
2000. Rossi’s concern is not the use of statistics, and indeed she appears to 
maintain the basic premise that statistics are useful in examining drugs. Her 
concerns focus on how the statistics were unethically manipulated to give a 
certain impression of the drug problem.
Statistics are not the only contention with the 2000 report. There are also critiques 
based on the tone and implications of the narrative itself. Particularly, if taken 
separately from the 1997 report, WDR 2000 seems to provide a logical and 
comprehensive assessment of the arguments regarding the drug problem. The 
areas covered, such as prevention, treatment, economic trends and political 
aspects, all seem to encompass the multi-faceted aspects of the drug issue as we 
discussed in Chapter One of this work, yet there are some elements left out as the 
next sections will discuss.
Recalling Arlacchi’s opening statement, he referred to the pessimism that had 
taken over the international drug control regime. He called for a reversal of this 
attitude in favor of one where the successes of drug control could be properly 
considered. The ‘pessimism’ that Arlacchi is referring to is “the psychology of 
despair that has gripped the minds of a generation and would have us believe that 
nothing can be done to roll back, let alone stop, the consumption of drugs”.199 
Arlacchi here is actually presenting a piece of the drug policy reform debate. Part 
of the reform debate is premised on the assertion that drugs are too prevalent and 
impossible to control through countermeasures. As Professor Emeritus and 
Attorney, Arnold Trebach notes
He [Arlacchi] goes on to seemingly equate modem reformers with those 
‘Who believe that states and institutions are weak and will capitulate in the 
face of the organized criminal networks ...’.T o  those negative thinkers, he 
goes on to lay out ‘... [there are] a raft of recent and decidedly positive 
developments on the drugs front...’. The report is in many respects a
199 WDR (2000) 1.
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defence of the existing drug control order and of the jobs of the staff and 
of the continued existence of their institution. It is a professional effort...200 
Thus drug policy reformers are not only pessimistic in their attitude, but also 
advocate pandering to drug dealers and criminals. Furthermore, reformers have 
little faith in the integrity and power of states and institutions, a harsh 
generalization of reformist attitudes. When taking into consideration the critique 
of Trebach and Rossi and the calm and confident tone of Arlacchi’s statement, the 
overall logical and comprehensive surface of the 2000 reports, gives way once 
again to the long-standing debate between legalization and criminalization. 
Trebach continues,
[T]his report is also riddled with bias, irrationality, and outrageous errors. 
It does not deal fairly with new innovations and experiments that are 
visible on the cutting edge of the drug field. Harm reduction—including 
drug maintenance, needle exchange, general health care for using 
addicts—receives inadequate attention...Even within existing treaties and 
international institutions it is possible to fashion responsible reports laying 
out practical strategies that will improve the terrible problems now 
afflicting much of the world in the drug arena... While this report describes 
some encouraging innovations around the world, it hews mainly to 
established, traditional methods closely in line with a conventional mind- 
set.201
This statement goes back to Rossi’s observation that the 2000 report seems to 
want to hide the fact that most of the UN budget goes towards countermeasure 
activities. Trebach’s ‘pessimism’, as Arlacchi might call it, is to call for drug 
policy reform, focusing more on harm reduction efforts rather than law 
enforcement measures.
Reuter also notes the problematic features of the report, but adds three points 
indicating the more profound elements in the report.202 First he notes the report 
addresses the regulation (criminalization)-legalization debate, while noting how
200 Arnold S Trebach (no date). Arnold Trebach has been called the shadow Drug Czar of the 
United States and is the author of an early policy reform book called The Great Drug War 
[Trebach (1987)] which looked at why drug policies were failing. He also used to once head the 
Drug Policy Alliance now headed by Ethan Nadelmann who was discussed in Chapter 1.
201 Arnold S Trebach (2002) 237-238.
202 Peter Reuter (1998) 730-734.
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little the report attempts to skew its arguments towards one side. The second and 
third points he raises are related to the statistical issue. One of the statistical 
problems relates to the Drug Abuse Index (DAI) and the Drug Abuse Trend Index 
(DATI). Both are used to measure the gravity of certain drugs in a given nation. 
The DAI and DATI also allow comparisons across different countries. Since each 
country uses different methods to obtain data, Reuter maintains there is difficulty 
with the comparison.203 The other statistical problem refers to one previously 
discussed in Chapter One: the issue of estimating the international drug trade. As 
he notes, “the problem is not one of pedantry about measurement. A certain 
amount of serious policymaking is dependent on the froth of international drug 
trade estimates” 204
FATFForty Recommendations
The predominance of the World Drug Report in creating the policy view of the 
drug problem within the international arena is joined by another report that takes a 
more economic-centered view of the drug problem. The FATF was established in 
the Paris G-7 Summit (1989) to address money laundering issues particularly as 
they related to international banking and finance.
The Task Force was given the responsibility of examining money 
laundering techniques and trends, reviewing the action which had already 
been taken at a national or international level, and setting out the measures 
that still needed to be taken to combat money laundering. In 1996 the 
FATF issued a report containing a set of Forty Recommendations 
for combating money laundering and later published a FATF 2000 Blacklist of 
nations identifying non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT).205 This 
listed countries that were considered non-cooperative in implementing effective 
anti-money laundering financial practices. In 1990, the FATF first drew up its 
forty recommendations, but it was the 1996 report which clearly addressed the 
environment of money laundering that had grown since the Cold War ended. The 
blacklist, was published later with periodical updates where new countries added 
and other taken off as non-cooperative nations. The 1996 report was quite short
203 Ibid 731-732.
204 Ibid 734.
205 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, ‘History’.
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and simple: it would set out 40 recommendations for anti-money laundering 
frameworks that would have “universal applicability”.206 The 1996 report was met 
by a tide of criticism and creating deep tensions between the OECD, who housed 
the FATF, and blacklisted states.207
The FATF conceived of the drugs problem as clearly an economic issue and 
recommended a three-pronged approach relying on cooperation from legal 
systems, financial systems and international cooperation. If each country would 
implement a certain set of laws and modify a certain set of financial practices, 
then this could serve as a basis for combating money laundering and, implicitly, 
drugs. International cooperation would assist law enforcement efforts through 
information sharing (See Appendix A for the first ten of the original forty 
recommendations).208 The first ten recommendations were perhaps the most 
controversial. Captured under the headings ‘scope of the criminal offence of 
money laundering’, ‘provisional measures and confiscation’ and ‘customer due 
diligence and record-keeping’ the recommendations were calling to significantly 
alter the landscape of international finance, particularly offshore banking 
practices.209 Recommendation two placed legal personnel, meaning lawyers and 
tax agents, in the same criminal basket as Mafia heads, assigning them legal 
responsibility for any activity that may be construed as money laundering. Thus 
the scope of criminal offence was now extended to placing under scrutiny all legal 
and financial advisors who might be advising their clients to move assets offshore.
Recommendation three, under criminal measures and confiscations, called for 
giving authorities the right to research and seize assets of criminals. This included 
giving authorities the leeway needed for tracing and verifying the source of assets. 
Known as asset forfeiture, it remains one of the most controversial practices as it 
ties monetary gain of legal authorities and their departments to confiscation of 
criminal assets and is a point we will return to in the next chapters. Furthermore 
complications arise out of data protection issues which must be overlooked in
206 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1996).
207 See Robert Lee (2001) and Gilbert NMO Morris (2002).
208 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1996).
209 The first ten recommendations are addressed here for illustrative purposes. This is not to 
discount the importance of the latter thirty recommendations. These first ten however are sufficient 
to address the concerns and scope of this research.
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order to soundly verify sources of assets. The last cluster of recommendations 
took this point further by calling for all financial institutions to know the origins 
of customer assets. Banks were essentially placed as quasi-police that had to 
conduct due diligence on their customers and keep detailed records of 
transactions, always looking for any activity that may be associated with money 
laundering. As recommendation seven noted, this included also cross-border 
activities, presumably to not leave a loop hole where criminals could hide assets 
in other countries due to lack of communication and record-keeping between 
financial institutions. Again privacy issues and concerns over abuse of such 
knowledge ensured.
The recommendations appeared simple enough, however their implications were 
subtle. For example, many offshores financial centers relied on banking secrecy 
and anonymous accounts for their financial success. There was a belief implied 
through the FATF that if there was nothing to hide, then there was nothing to be 
concerned about in reporting account details. However, the world of business 
proved to be more complicated. For example, if we consider corporate espionage 
as a reality of the business environment, we can see that secret accounts could 
assist corporations in preserving projects in the development stage by obscuring 
their expenditures from competitors. The FATF also brought into question the 
difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Pensioners, who had moved 
their money offshore to gain advantage from the tax shelters offered, held many of 
the offshore accounts. This was not illegal per se as attracting foreign investment 
was part of healthy financial competition. What seemed to be missing in the 
debate was the subject of drugs. Money laundering only superficially maintained 
its connection to the drug issue, and soon spiraled into debates about Western 
nations tracking down their tax dollars, interference in domestic economies, and, 
ultimately, national sovereignty. Soon money laundering became bad for its own 
sake, and the element of drugs only gained secondary mention from both sides of
o i nthe debate. It was usually enough for an author to assert that they disagreed 
with drug trafficking and did not promote drug use or terrorism without greater 
analysis of the drug issue. Even the original conceptualization of drugs and money
210 Dan Mitchell (2001).
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laundering were based on thin caricatures. Drug traffickers and drug dealers were 
demonized as gluttonous, evil and indiscriminate profit seekers. Rahn addressed 
this point by noting that in money laundering, characterizations of evil acts are not 
so simple:
If you hesitate while trying to come up with a definition, you have begun 
to understand part of the problem. Money laundering is hard to define 
because it is not a crime like murder, robbery, or rape, where the evil act is 
clear. It is a crime of motive rather than activity. In fact, two different 
. people can engage in the exact same set of activities, and one can be guilty 
of money laundering while the other is not. In fact, money laundering has 
only been illegal in the US since 1986, and it is not illegal in all 
countries.211
In Rahn’s article again appear the recurring themes of definitions, national versus 
international policies, problem of gathering data and the legalization- 
criminalization debate.
Similar to the WDRs, the tone of the FATF is that countermeasures will prove 
successful in curtailing money laundering. In fact, the forty recommendations are 
no more that a list of countermeasure activities to be enforced though 
penalization. Recommendation one clearly states this through its advice on how to 
criminally categorize such acts and even minimum sentences to be imposed on 
perpetrators. In addition the tone of the forty recommendations does gives the 
sense that money laundering is within measures of control and even quite easily at 
that.
There is also a similar issue regarding money laundering being a “foreign” 
problem, though it is not as prevalent as in the WDRs. Offshores after all were 
‘offshore’. However, the two countries distinctly absent from the FATF non 
cooperative blacklist were also the two main locations for money laundering in 
the world: the US and the UK, while countries like the Bahamas and Russia were
211 Richard W Rahn (2001).
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indisputably included without, as the critique goes, any effort to contact those
•  •  •  212 representatives of those countries before publishing the blacklist list.
Conclusion
The exact fact that The WDR reports explore so many facets (albeit much less in 
WDR 2000) of drugs makes countermeasures policies more problematic, not less 
so. The WDRs acknowledge the various complexities of the drug trade, yet 
ultimately, and as Trebach noted above, the conclusion is to defend drug control 
strategies. This process within the reports leads to a convolution of key ideas:
1. that countermeasures and alternative development are similar
2. that terms such as users and drugs are self evident obscuring relevant 
points about the drug trade
3. that drugs and their usage is a class issue and a poverty issue
Starting with the first point, countermeasures are related to law enforcement 
tactics. Their goal is to locate individuals and groups who are participating in the 
drug trade with the intention of interrupting their activities and ultimately 
removing them from society through imprisonment. Alternative development is to 
create conditions where those groups and individuals would find it to their own 
benefit not to participate in the drug trade. The elements of force and coercion are 
missing from alternative development, although forced crop eradication programs 
are obscuring this premise.
The second point refers back to questions of terminology and opens another 
fissure in the drug debate. If the WDRs take drug related effects and users at face 
value, however, there is a large debate over what is a drug user, what is a drug and 
what is a drug related death. In his article The Social Construction o f  Drug- 
Related Death, Augustinus .Cruts argues that there is no objective reason why a 
substance should be illegal and that legal issues are more closely related to 
accidents of history.214 Cruts takes this point further, stating that even what is a 
drug user and a drug related death is constructed. Attributing a death as being drug 
related is not falsifiable and assumes that the person would still be alive if the
212 Gilbert NMO Morris (2001).
213 Augustinus Cruts (2000) 381-385, Raffi Balian and Cheryl White (1998) 391-396, Andrew 
Weil, MD and Winifred Rosen (1983).
214 Augustinus Cruts (2000) 381.
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drug has not been present, but Cruts posits we can never know this; this is a 
counterfactual argument. Thus the reasons about the cause of death can only be 
derived from social constructions as they cannot be derived from any knowable 
reality. In this he presents the case of a fictitious cab driver named Taki:
Taki is bom to a family [sic] shopkeepers. His parents are often at work, 
and have not enough time left over to pay attention to raising Taki. He gets 
emotionally neglected [sic]. This way he becomes an easy victim for 
harassment at school, during military service, and finally in his job as a 
taxi driver. When thoughts about suicide become too obtrusive, he drinks 
away the unbearable stress by means of alcohol, [sic] on an ill-fated day a 
supra-national treaty imposes an unrestricted free market on the taxi 
business. Negotiating with prospective clients requires social and 
emotional abilities which Taki unfortunately does not have, [sic] He tries 
cocaine [sic]. On a bad day, due to excessive cocaine use, Taki loses his 
critical self-reflection. He fatally overestimates himself by trying to 
overtake a competing taxi driver. With too high a speed in too sharp a 
bend, Taki crashes and dies.
The question Cruts asks is what killed Taki? In hospital records this would be 
documented as a dmg related death, but was cocaine really the problem if one 
considers plurality of social and economic factors that led him to use cocaine? 
Similarly Raffi Balian and Cheryl White, two specialists in harm reduction 
policies, argue that who is a dmg user and who is not is constructed—usually 
based on class, gender and ethnicity.216 The implication is that white, affluent 
children using drugs are rarely labeled as ‘dmg users’ while poor children of 
minority decent are often associated with this label. Extensions of this argument 
could lead to extreme assertions such as free markets cause death, a point related 
back to the liberal utopian dreams of liberalized markets and liberal states. All this 
is important because it shows the degree to which so much of what is used to 
discuss the dmg trade is taken for granted. It is natural to assume that something 
like a dmg related death should be easily defined, yet even here there are several
215 Ibid 382-383.
216 Raffi Balian and Cheryl White (1998).
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discussions that immediately open up and again here comes into questions the 
reliability of the statistics we use. This time however the contention is not on how 
calculations are made as Rossi pointed out in the World Drug Reports, but on the 
validity of the data gathered and how much that data actually paints a realistic 
enough picture of what is happening in society irrespective of the presence of 
drugs.
Lastly, the reports, including those of the FATF, have a tendency to give the 
impression that drugs are a “third world” problem, even though they do talk about 
the large western consumer markets. This viewpoint is mainly transmitted through 
the various pictures such as the Thai addict in a dirty rehab clinic and non-whites 
in the poppy fields.217 What are distinctly absent are photos of affluent whites 
using heroin and taking cocaine. These characterizations of the drug problem 
distort dialogues such as the motivations for selling drugs (which may not always 
be profit based), and the consideration of the role of consumer markets (such as 
the affluent Europeans and Americans who supported the cocaine boom in the 
1980’s).
With regard to WDR 1997, there are some specific points that require 
examination. It is true that compared to the 2000 report, it is much more 
expansive in the topic areas covered and the depth in which they are addressed. 
However it is not so different when considering its characterization of the drug 
problem. The 1997 report received much less criticism than the 2000 report. Since 
it was the first World Drug Report, and this being, in and of itself, a unique 
publication for the field, the lack of response was probably because there was no 
precedent. Furthermore, as a publication of a respected organization and for what 
it contained, the WDR 1997 seemed new and interesting to most readers. 
Additionally, the lack of response could have been due to the lack of a scholarship 
that understood the significance of what the report implied, recalling that Rossi 
was an “accidental critic” of the 2000 report because she happened to have been 
involved in the original ECMDDA data processes. Even with this, it was not until 
2002, two years after the second report and 5 years after the first one, that Rossi
217 WDR (2000). For examples see pages 7 ,11 ,19 ,21 ,32 , 124, and WDR (1997) 131 and 161.
218 Peter Reuter (1998) and Jamie Rochelle King (1997-1998) 432-436.
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was published in the Journal o f International Drug Policy along side new critics 
of the UN reports such as Trebach. Of the few reviews of WDR 1997 produced, 
analysis is limited to statements such as the “World Drug Report is very well- 
researched and well-presented”, indicating again the focus on the innovation of 
the report rather the implications of its content.219
Reports such as the WDRs and from the FATF are influential in that they create 
the perceptions of the drug problem for policymaking and now, increasingly, for 
wider public circles.220 This influence is unquestioned; perhaps because there still 
remains an old belief that the UN, along with the OECD, are relatively neutral 
entities or that international organizations are in some ways beyond politics.
What this analysis shows us about perceptions of the drug trade in ir is threefold. 
Whether considering drugs or money laundering, first we see that the drug trade is 
taken as something describable and knowable. There is confidence in both WDRs 
in their ability to represent this topic at all. The drug problem then becomes a 
definable thing even though there is an effort to show the complexities of it in 
WDR 1997. The second characterization refers to the measurable aspects of the 
drug trade. At the same time measurement implies objective or scientific 
understanding. Additionally the results of measurement give shape to the drug 
issue. If estimates of the drug trade were set at $10 million a year, hardly any 
policymaker would bother with drugs at all. Yet, numbers shape the drug issue 
and consequently shape the response. At $500 billion a year, the quality of the 
response to drugs is much different than at $10 million. Budgets, willingness to 
use force, public opinion are all shaped by numbers and what they imply about 
reality.
The third characterization refers to the controllable nature of the drug trade. If it is 
describable and measurable, then, the argument goes, it is controllable. This is a 
problematic reasoning because we can describe and measure many elements
219 Jamie Rochelle King (1997-1998) 436.
220 Here I add anecdotal evidence that colleagues, friends and family have come across the WDR 
and have enthusiastically recommended it to me as the pinnacle work on the drug issue which I 
‘must include in my thesis research’. In conferences I have attended the WDRs and the FATF 
reports are authoritatively cited by distinguished, international scholars as if such reports were 
beyond scrutiny.
110
which we cannot control. From here comes the idea that something can be done 
about the drug trade and therefore something must be done about the drug trade. 
With this in mind, Arlacchi’s opening statement becomes questionable not 
because of its optimism or its attempt to place favor in countermeasures, but 
because of a core assumption that the UNODC is able to control drugs (perhaps 
there is an unconscious acknowledgment of this by the UN when the United 
Nations Drug Control Program changed its name to the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime, dropping the ideas of control altogether). Levine notes that,
drug prohibition remained a kind of ‘hidden in plain view’ secret. 
Government publications and other writings have instead used the terms 
‘narcotics control’ and ‘drug control’. The UN agency that supervises 
worldwide drug prohibition is still called the International Narcotics 
Control Board. Until recently, the global drug prohibition system has been 
taken for granted and nearly invisible. Now that is changing. As global 
drug prohibition becomes easier to see, it loses some of its other
9 91ideological and political powers.
At the same time that the WDRs and FATF reports characterize the drugs and 
money laundering as knowable, definable and controllable, they also present it as
999hidden, elusive and beyond control. The first is that the drug problem is 
something that is unknowable.223 This theme exists when considering the hidden 
nature of drug use and the social stigma associated with it, or the hidden modes of 
operation by drug mafias. This hidden nature makes drugs hard to describe, to 
define and to encapsulate. Following from its hidden nature, drugs become 
unknowable and indefinable, usually termed ‘complex’ or ‘difficult’. These 
conditions give rise to fear, usually fear of the unpredictable or imagined dangers 
of corruption of individuals and societies through drug use.224 At the root of this 
fear is precisely that drugs are not controllable, for if drugs and drug use were 
controllable, then there should be no fear. This then comes back full circle to 
contradict the concept of drug control in the first place. In the case of the FATF,
221 Harry G Levine (2003) 145-146. Perhaps a better way to look at addressing the drug issue is 
not through attempts to control it, but by guiding it towards a positive direction.
222 Susan Speaker (2001).These characterizations are partially drawn from an analysis by Susan 
L. Speaker on the theme of conspiracy in drugs.
223 WDR (2000) 23.
224 WDR (2000) 9 ,12  and 21.
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the tautological argument refers directly to money laundering; however the same 
chain of logic is maintained as in drug control. Money laundering is to be feared 
because it causes corruption of financial systems, jeopardizing economies in 
unknowable ways, and is thus to be feared. At the same time money laundering is 
knowable, traceable and definable, therefore controllable through the FATF 
recommendations.
Thus we see that in little ir, the relatively clean categorizations of Non-state 
Actors, Crime/Terrorism, IPE and Critical Theory as seen in IR literature give 
way to an intertwined set of perceptions mixed with political interests. 
Publications such as the WDR and the FATF reports serve to sustain the 
predetermined viewpoints of the organizations which publish them. While this in 
and of itself is not unusual, there are a few implications to consider. First, political 
motivations of a publication are rarely considered by those who use these reports 
and who often cite them as “facts” rather than as constructed or manipulated 
documents.
Second, where such considerations are made, they are rarely in the detail as
presented by Rossi, who as mentioned accidentally happened to have been
involved in the original data collection for the statistics that the WDR
subsequently “modified”. Hers is a rare and significant case. Rossi’s points to the
omission of the Netherlands and Belgium in the WDR 2000 and the use of these
publications as a tool to rally support for counter narcotics. A similar point can be
made about the FATF who omitted the five US “offshores” from its NCCT report.
In addition, the use of seizures statistics is a key component in measuring the
illicit drug trade. Rossi examines what these figures actually represent, especially
considering Arlacchi’s optimistic executive summary. As mentioned, the four
charts shown in Graph 1 above represent the “double nature” of seizure
statistics—on the one hand showing the successes of law enforcement agencies
while also showing the “visible tip of a much larger iceberg of drug supply and
0 0  ^trafficking” in the increase of drug related deaths. Again, there is law 
enforcement success and increased drug use and death, contradicting law
225 WDR (2000) 36-37.
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enforcement claims of success. In all this the question arises as to how statistics 
specifically and these publications in general are used and whether Rossi’s 
observations represent an isolated or common case. This contrasts with IR in that 
IR, at least from preliminary analysis, seems to have a less intentional agenda, 
though as noted in the case of Newman’s challenging opium histories as presented 
in Chapter One, IR literature is not removed from politics.
In comparing the literature of IR and ir some final comments can be made. If a 
definitive stance had to be taken on ir literature, it seems more oriented towards 
realist perceptions of drugs as a security challenge or at least it employs the 
similar language of threats and dangers which must be addressed through law 
enforcement reinforced with some kind of development program. This can be 
witnessed for example in Arlacchi’s epidemiology metaphor, which is really a 
more refined version of the longstanding drugs as a “cancer” or “disease” 
argument. Furthermore ir literature manifests the legalization/criminalization 
dichotomy as witnessed in the Trebach-Arlacchi debate much like was seen in IR 
literature. Additionally, as the tale of Taki the taxi driver demonstrates, simplistic 
one-dimensional characterizations of the drug problem also are present in ir and 
the brief unpacking of a simple phrase such as “drug related deaths” reveals a 
whole series of hidden questions that are often overlooked .
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Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in 
Afghanistan’226
Finally it seems the international arena 
(little ir) literature is also subject to 
Hobden and Hobson’s misuse of history. 
Here we have to open a large parenthesis to 
understand the importance of this seemingly simple point. Key historical 
moments are often held as models for drug control including the success of China
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in eradicating opium in the mid-1900’s, Iran’s reduction of heroin trafficking 
under Khomeini and the more recent case of the Taleban’s cultivation reduction in 
of July 2000 (see Graph 2). Here it suffices simply to consider China and 
Afghanistan. Between 1949 and 1950 the communist government of China wiped 
out opium production. As Arlacchi noted this event is hailed as a counter narcotics 
success story. However it should be considered that communist tactics for 
achieving this goal were questionable at best. As drug historian and researcher 
Alfred McCoy notes,
After 1949, the Chinese Communist regime used a mix of unrestrained 
repression and social reform to eradicate the world’s largest opium market. 
By the mid 1950s, highland opium areas had converted to new crops, 
dealers had been executed, and the country’s estimated 10 million addicts
997had been forced into compulsory treatment.”
Similarly the Taleban’s techniques for opium eradication as noted by Professor 
Graham Farrell,
Local community groups and religious leaders were made to implement 
the Taleban’s policies and could be punished themselves if anyone was 
found cultivating opium poppies in their area...Farmers who refused to 
comply with the policies had their faces blackened and were jailed. In
99 ftextreme cases they were paraded through the streets”
In the same interview, Farrell notes that the successful measures of the Taleban 
were nonetheless draconian and would not be feasible for implementation in other 
areas. Taken together, the cases of China and Afghanistan present a clear 
contradiction of values. The most successful cases of drug control, as envisioned 
by the UN and western states, have been implemented by regimes which possess 
values in direct contradiction to those held by the very same states and the UN 
itself. It is exactly because the Taleban were repressive and brutal, because they 
did not heed human rights, because they were not nervous about threatening and 
killing anyone that contradicted them that allowed for a successful 
implementation of the poppy ban. The same could be said for China as well as for 
Iran under Khomeni.
227 Alfred W McCoy (no date).
228 BBC News (2004).
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Here there are two interesting and important points to observe. The first is that we 
have to ask why only those regimes considered to be the worst examples of 
western values are successful at implementing counter narcotic polices created by 
western governments. This point goes beyond criticisms of countemarcotics 
policies. It forces the question of whether the values upheld by western nations are 
inherently opposed to counter narcotics as a solution to drugs. Second, as Hobden 
and Hobson noted for IR, history in ir is used also as a data mine to find support 
for existing arguments. In fact, only a brief engagement with history would reveal 
that what Farrell’s research showed about the Taleban is true for at least the last 
100 years of drug control. Perhaps, as Rossi might argue, Arlacchi knew this fact 
and anyway used history to support the UN approach, perhaps not. This author 
hopes that IR has at least moved beyond naivety of whether bureaucrats and 
politicians skew information to favor one policy or another. What is pertinent for 
this research is how these systems work and their relation to the understanding of 
the drug issue in IR. A simple example illustrates this. When in IR we call for 
increased drug control or increased anti-money laundering regulations, we have to 
then be able to answer questions such as those raised above: when has such 
regulation worked, under what historical and political conditions, why should it 
work now, are these viable processes to begin with, how are they related to larger 
concepts such as democracy and human rights? Only after such questions have 
been engaged can a call to increase countermeasures make sense, otherwise it is a » 
mere parroting of what has already been said—another swing on the pendulum 
towards criminalization or legalization, which adds no real contribution to the 
debate.
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Chapter IV. Pulling Back the Curtain: The Histories of 
Drugs
Introduction
This chapter presents a series of historical sketches or vignettes to demonstrate 
pertinent views and questions that are contained in the unexamined history of 
drugs. These vignettes were chosen because they are considered ‘common 
knowledge’ in the construction of the drugs problem as many papers and books 
refer to them. The point of departure is the initial ideas of historical sociology. 
The need to illustrate this point comes from a general discontinuity in our 
information and understanding about drugs and drug policy, again recalling Mike 
Jay’s words:
Like most people, I grew up believing that drugs were a subject without a 
history. Almost everything I was taught, or read, or saw on television, 
implied that they were something new, a plague introduced into society by 
hippies in the late 1960s. Occasionally the curtain was pulled a little 
further back to reveal glimpses of Victorian opium dens, or perhaps the 
stupefying effects of toxic plants on primitive people. But the implication 
was still that drugs had always been illegal—at least as soon as societies 
had evolved far enough to make sensible laws. These substances had only 
ever existed on the shadows of civilization, and no respectable person had 
ever been interested in them, with the exception of doctors and police 
whose job it was to stamp them out.
It should be clear that historical sociology here serves as a mere tool to highlight 
what is missing from drug analysis and how history is used in the drug debate. 
The aim is not to conduct a faithful historical sociological analysis of drug history, 
nor to defend historical sociology as a concept, but to take into account the 
preliminary step towards what historical sociology has pointed out as the failings 
of IR (also in ir as we saw in the previous chapter). Hobson noted that, “the study 
of history is crucial not simply for itself (as many historians often assume), but as 
a means of problematizing and critically exploring the origins of modem domestic
229 Mike Jay (2000) 9.
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and international institutions and practices.”230 The vignettes presented 
problematize current views of drugs by revealing a rich and dynamic drug history 
that extends beyond chronofetishism and tempocentrism. The limited, yet vital, 
scope of this chapter is to demonstrate that there is not an informed debate on 
drugs which can engage history. To that end only a few instances of history serve 
to reveal exactly how much is missing from the current drug debate and the 
addition of several more instances would only belabor the point. Any one of the 
historical flashes presented below could be mined deeper with a more rigorous 
eye on methodologies put forth by historical sociology. While this would be 
useful in adding depth to the drug debate, for now, this degree of depth remains 
both outside of the scope of this work and premature as a research step for the 
study of drugs.231
th thThe main time frame of history used is the late 19 -20 century with a focus on 
the US and UK. This is because there is a general, even if unsaid agreement 
amongst historians that this period of history is the most relevant to the current 
manifestation of the drug issue. Their rational appears to be one of simple access 
to information and documentation. There is little known about medieval or the 
prehistoric role of drugs aside some from piecemeal information on drug use n 
various societies sprinkled throughout the globe. The US and UK are taken into 
consideration because they are seen as the main countries of influence (both in IR 
and ir) on the drug issue in addition to having a broad range of research, from 
historical to medical to legal, available on the topic. The following sketches hint at 
the emergence of the legalization and criminalization debate and show that what is 
licit and what is illicit is not as obvious as it might first seem. To assist in 
following some of the various acts and legislations involved as well as to provide 
a context for some of the legislative activity discussed in the following sections, a 
timeline is provided in Appendix D.
An Early History o f  Opium 
W hat is opium?
230 John M Hobson (1998) 286.
231 See conclusion for recommendations on future courses of research
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Opium falls under a category of drugs called Opiates or Opioids which are more 
commonly called narcotics. Their general effect is to deaden pain and relax the 
user. The key element in opium is morphine. Frederich Wilhelm Adam Sertumer 
in 1803 first isolated morphine as the main alkaloid in opium. Sertumer also 
paved the way for a new field of alkaloidal chemistry. It was he who named the 
chemical Morpheus after the Greek god of dreams. The opium poppy also 
contains other alkaloids: codeine and papaverine as well as thebaine and 
oxycodone which are semi-synthetic derivatives of the opium poppy. This 
category includes opium, heroin and several cousins such as meperidine (used to 
make the popular prescription dmg Demerol) which are synthetic.
Opium is still gathered today as it was long ago by making incisions in the bulb of 
the poppy plant and allowing the sap to seep out overnight. The sap is scraped off 
and the process is repeated until the bulbs are empty. This sap is called raw 
opium. It is the first stage in many for preparing opium for smoking, eating or 
injecting. Subsequent stages produce white or brown heroin powder, depending 
on the type of poppy, which is then cut with other substances to increase profits 
and sold on the illicit market.
There is an old story which tells of the first discovery of opium. It was said that 
sheepherders in an unnamed region noticed that their sheep came back from 
grazing in certain fields in an unusual state, somewhat disoriented and euphoric. 
Further investigation showed that the sheep were grazing on certain plants that 
were shown to be the catalyst for their changed state, that plant was the opium 
poppy. Stories like this are abundant and the opium mystique spans far beyond 
our contemporary understanding. Even before the first written documents on 
remedies, people used flowers, herbs and animal parts to cure ailments. In the 
burial sites of early man, about 58,000 BC, archaeologists found scatterings of 
flowers, pollen and seeds which were used to aid the dead person in their journey 
into the next world. The use of plant medicine did not die out with early man 
however. In fact, as mankind developed, they continued to use plants for healing. 
Such medicines are sometimes a part of religious healings, mixed with
232 For a detailed description of processing opium to morphine and then to heroin No. 1, No. 2 and 
No. 3 see Drug Enforcement Administration (2001).
233 Barbara Griggs (1981) 5-7.
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superstition and ritual while other times they are a part of systematic approach to 
medicine not unlike western medicine today.
Places and Uses
Though traces of the opium poppy have been discovered in Neolithic 
archaeological finds, current research on the early movement of the opium poppy 
begins with Sumer.234
[The opium poppy] was originally cultivated in 3400 B.C. in lower 
Mesopotamia...Sumerians would soon pass along the plant and its 
euphoric opium effects and medicinal effects to the Assyrians. The art of 
poppy-culling would continue from the Assyrians to the Babylonians who 
in turn would pass their knowledge onto the Egyptians. In 1300 B.C., the 
capital city of Thebes in Egypt, began cultivation of the opium poppy in 
their famous poppy fields. The opium trade flourished during the reign of 
Thutmose IV, Akhenaton and King Tutankhamen. The trade route 
included the Phoenicians and Minoans who move the profitable item 
across the Mediterranean Sea into Greece, Carthage, and Europe.
The combination of social attitudes, rituals, belief systems and accidents comprise 
the use of opium throughout history which can be placed in a few simplified 
categories: health, spiritual, economy (business and trade), politics, crime and law, 
literature and art. The Greeks depicted Morpheus and Hypnos with opium poppies 
as a part of their spiritual beliefs. Hippocratses used opium for sedation around 
400 BC and the Arabs used opium in 300 BC as a tranquillizer. In China it was 
used to cure dysentery in 600 AD. Opium is also alluded to in Homer’s Odyssey: 
Then Jove’s daughter Helen bethought her of another matter. She drugged 
the wine with an herb that banishes all care, sorrow, and ill humour. 
Whoever drinks wine thus drugged cannot shed a single tear all the rest of 
the day, not even though his father and mother both of them drop down 
dead, or he sees a brother or a son hewn in pieces 
before his very eyes.236
234 Martin Booth (1998) 15-19.
235 PBS Frontline (1998).
236 Homer
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It should be noted that many other practices, traditions and products were also 
traded during this time. Thus emphasis on the poppy during its movement across 
the ancient world should not be overstated for three reasons. First is the general 
tendency to mystify any data related to drugs, that this data somehow represents a 
deeper meaning or a higher value than what we are able to comprehend. Second is 
that the data is unreliable. For example, the data quoted above reappears 
throughout several contemporary works yet with different dates. Third, as 
cultures interacted there was a quite natural exchange that occurred on all levels 
from the tangible to the intangible: ideas, beliefs, habits, systems, weapons and 
foods just to name a few. The opium poppy was then but one element of this 
exchange. Additionally, ancient history has a grounding effect which diffuses 
alarmist tendencies associated with drug use. If the Sumerians used opium and 
still were able to produce the Epic of Gilgamesh, then certainly the use of ecstasy 
in London it is unlikely to produce an epidemic which will destroy the social 
fabric as alarmist propensities in the press would portray. Of course this is not to 
say that all societies which have open drug use produce artistic masterpieces, only 
that there is a tendency to go to extremes when discussing drugs and one of those 
extremes is that if there is drug use present then it must be devastating not only 
individuals but also the societies which surround them. The example of the long 
history of art and drugs shows that this is not always true.
A Recent History o f  Criminalization
The dominant narrative of today is that there were amongst the Christian 
missionaries of America and Britain many who protested what they saw as the 
corruption of the Chinese population at the hands of opium imported from India. 
This outcry had resonance with groups in Britain, though the Americans are 
always given more credit for the international drug policy regime. The fact that 
this regime stems at its core from religious morals is the primary point of 
contention for the legalization proponents in the current debate even if this is a 
rather simplistic view of events.
237 Virginia Berridge (2000), Martin Booth (1998) and Richard Davenport-Hines (2004).
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The anti-opium movement eventually includes a host of individuals and entities 
from traveling show masters to pharmaceuticals companies, ultimately 
encompassing national level politics and finally converging on the international 
stage. There were complementary currents to criminalize opium in Europe and in 
the East and they too found resonance with proposals at the international level. 
However no other nations were able to effect change at the magnitude of primarily 
the Americans and the British. For this reason the discussions below will 
remained confined to the US and UK. The aim is to expand on this point by 
focusing on the criminalization of opium, however this history is never far from 
other substances such as alcohol; invariably these others must also be discussed.
Up to the year 1868 opium was treated as legal product and was not subject to any 
restrictions after importation in Britain. In America the import, sale and 
manufacture of opium was legal as well. That is to say more accurately in both 
nations opium was not illegal. This marks a important moment in the drug debate 
because it is after 1868 that we can see a kind of system of actors begins to form 
around the opium issue. As we shall see there was a time where opium was 
neither legal nor illegal. In this period there were a host of actors who become 
interested and invested in opium. During this period the debate on opium is 
exploratory and consists of questions regarding its uses and applications. There is 
also a small debate which comes from the temperance movements who had not 
yet fully established a moral narrative against opium.
After 1868 attempts to increasingly regulate and outlaw opium needed to 
consistently address the interests that allowed opium to flourish in the pre-1868 
environment. Such laws and regulations had to then address both the positive 
outcomes of opium such as increased business profits, and negative outcomes 
such as opium dependence. Filtered through the limits of policy making and 
legislation, the debate which emerges from the trend towards criminalization hides 
the complexity of the pre-1868 opium dynamics. That is to say criminalizing 
opium through policy insufficiently addresses the competing actors’ interests and 
ultimately renders a simplistic view of the problem as seen in the binary debate.
238 The 1868 Pharmacy Act was a step in a longer process of changes within the medical 
community which will be discussed later.
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Opium and O ther Substances in the 1800s
The 1800s can be called the age of drug discovery before the efforts of prohibition 
took root in the 1900s.239 More precisely the 1800s mark a cycle of rediscovery 
because as we saw before drugs have been known to mankind for some time. 
Opium was prepared originally according to the creative desires of the drug 
manufacturers and clever entrepreneurs. The list of concoctions is numerous. 
Ayer’s Cherry Pectoral, Mrs. Winslow’s Soothing Syrup, Godfrey’s Cordial, and 
Dover’s Powder were just a few popular names. Such medicines were usually 
patented and varied in opium content. They were marketed for infants and 
children to relieve teething pain as well as to adults to cure Cholera, dysentery, 
relieve fatigue and to treat female hysteria.
Opium, or morphine to be more concise, was also seen as an acceptable 
alternative to substitute for alcohol addiction.240 Alcohol itself had once been seen 
as a cure for ailments but had slowly moved to the role of social hazard. This shift 
was a similar course to the one opium was about to embark on, though alcohol’s 
story would not truly end until the repeal of prohibition in America.
The scientific and social exploration of substances was not limited to opium, 
cocaine and alcohol. At the beginning of the 19th century, Humphrey Davy, an 
English chemist, discovered the effects of nitrous oxide on the human body. He 
was so stuck by the results, via self experimentation, that he became certain this 
substance had a endless possibilities to serve mankind, including opening the door 
to higher states of consciousness. He joined with Dr. Thomas Beddoes as an 
assistant in Beddoes’ Pneumatic Institution near Bristol. After publishing his 
results Davy became appointed as the first lecturer in chemistry at the Royal 
Institution of London.241
At the Pneumatic Institution Davy and his newly discovered gas came into contact 
with Samuel Coleridge who was a patient of Dr. Beddoes. When Coleridge heard
239 Mike Jay (2000) 11.
240 JR Black (1889).
241 Chemistry Heritage Foundation (2005).
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one of Davy’s lectures he made the connection of the use of gasses and the 
possibility of obtaining a transcendent, ideal, unified state of being, themes often 
present in Coleridge’s work.242 The Institution was already an odd mix of 
scientific center and literary circle. With the news of Davy’s wonder gas, it 
eventually becomes a gathering point where society’s top personages would come 
to partake in doses of pure nitrous oxide. Eventually the Bristol Circle, as it was 
known, comprised in part by William Wordsworth, Robert Southey and Dr. Roget 
of the now famous Roget’s Thesaurus.243 Naturally the experiences of nitrous, 
having come in contact with artistic circles began to gain expression, in artistic 
works such as those of Coleridge.
The story is repeated again and again with the re-discovery of every new drug. For 
cocaine it was the creation of a cocaine laced wine by a pharmacist, Angelo 
Mariani. Known as Vin Mariani, this wine was the toast of the top circles in 
England and Europe. Mariani collected the testimonials of his best clients and 
published them as publicity for his wine. The list included Pope Leo XIII, Pope 
Pius X, Thomas Edison, Sarah Bernhardt and Queen Victoria of England to name 
a few.244 Cocaine’s greatest proponent came though in Sigmund Freud and his 
famous work Uber Coca.
Similarly opium found itself in artistic expressions of Oscar Wilde (.Picture o f  
Dorian Gray), Roger Gilbert-Lecomte (Reve Opiace), Colette (Le Pur et 
L’impur), Jean Cocteau (Opium: Diary o f a Cure), Magre (Les Soirs d ’Opium).245 
In 1845 a type of Bristol Circle was established in the form of the elite Parisian 
Club of Haschichins, founded to experiment with the uses of opium and 
hashish.246 Its guest list included Balzac, Baudelaire and Karr. Additionally, 
Oliver Cromwell, Charles II, Clive of India and Gladstone were opium users in its 
various forms of smoking, eating or laudanum in syrups.247 Of course there was
thalso perhaps the most famous (if fictional) opium user of the late 19 and early
242 James Engell and W Jackson Bate (1983). Coleridge’s exploration of the idea of the unity of a 
poem can be found in Chapters 12 and 13 of Engell and Bate.
243 Mike Jay (2000) 29.
244 Ibid 168 and April Rottman (1997).
245 Barbara Hodgson (1999) 83-99.
246 Ibid 86.
247 Mike Jay (2000) 51-87.
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20th centuries: Sherlock Holmes. From the sciences, the most renowned opium 
user (heroin to be exact) was William Halsted, the father of modem surgery and 
one of the founders of Johns Hopkins University.
It should go without mention that the scientific and literary strides of the 1800s, as 
well as the century that was to follow, rested on minds who at one time or another 
were preoccupied with alcohol, cocaine, opium or any other substance that could 
be obtained. This is the lost point in the criminalization debate and the one used 
most often by legalization proponents today to counter notions that drug addicts 
are a drain to society because they are unproductive and cannot contribute to 
neither their own well-being nor to the user communities.
Moving Towards Regulation
As addicts began to turn up on both sides of the Atlantic, concern grew about the 
effects of opium, and as always the optimistic frenzy of the miracle plant, which 
had led to popular use of opium, began to turn the tide. The public then, as with 
the public now, being susceptible to sensationalism, were captured by a few 
stories in the American press which described the “yellow peril” where white 
women where lured into Chinese opium dens and were later to be found laying 
half dressed and listless.248 The basis for this image is questionable as the same 
theme repeats itself with cocaine and marijuana: cocaine crazed Negroes become 
superhuman, resisting bullets and would then rape white women, Mexicans smoke 
marijuana and begin to wield machetes after which they would rape white 
women.249 Cleveland Moffett reported in Hampton’s that “the slayer of little Mary 
Smith in Asbury Park, New Jersey, confessed himself the victim of a cocaine 
habit, and no less than the assistant chief of the Chicago Police Department told
248 This theme still repeats itself today, most recently in the film Traffic. See Padideh Tosti,
‘After the Hype: Drug Policy and the Film “Traffic”’. The term itself is said to have come from the 
German Kaiser Wilhelm and was used to describe the immigration of Chinese and Japanese to the 
“West” and not from Chinese opium dens.
249 The Medical Record (1914). There is a substantial amount of literature which addresses two 
factors from the above statement. First that drug regulation was largely a class and race issue and 
that as long as it was respectable whites enjoying drugs, the situation was harmless. However 
lesser men could not be trusted. Second that at least in America, this view was largely promoted by 
the media tycoon William Randolph Hearst who would use the drug and race issue to promote his 
own interests. Also see Drug Policy Alliance, ‘History of Prohibition’.
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me of an unsolved murder case where suspicion was pointed to cocaine.”250 These 
types of reports increased the fears of cocaine in the hands of the poor and 
minorities which could result in unforeseeable levels of violence. In such reports 
the sense of impending disaster was perhaps deliberate or perhaps not, yet it still 
fuelled a nervousness which could only be answered by a quick and tough 
strategy: law enforcement.
In between opium, cocaine and marijuana, alcohol was not forgotten. In 1902 the
US Senate passed the Protection of Native Races against Intoxicants Act which
1
prohibited the sale of alcohol “to aboriginal tribes and uncivilized races. The 
law meant that Indians were deprived of access to alcohol and thus were not able 
to sell it. Additionally, the Indian’s use of the peyote plant for religious ceremony 
was likened to allowing blacks to use cocaine in church. Dr. Thomas Blair 
published an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 
which he dismissed peyote use as superstition. Dr. Blair brings to light two issues 
with regards to peyote’s suppression. One is the commercial interest of the peyote 
traffic and the second is the invasion of religious freedom. He concludes these 
two elements make peyote’s suppression difficult. In this sense Blair may have 
been the first to recognize the problems of anti-drug policies.
In 1875 San Francisco enacted the first law against opium by regulating Chinese 
opium dens. This new law had race and class implications. In Britain a similar 
trend was underway, though the classicist overtones dominated. Purportedly, there 
was a general attitude of the upper classes towards the working classes on many 
aspects of behavior which the upper classes would attempt to alter. In the case of 
opium it became linked to the practice of infant rearing. Children were often given 
one of the many types of syrups available to keep them docile while the mothers 
worked.254 Several organizations and women’s groups were established to deal 
with this perceived crisis and the end result was the passage of laws to control
250 Hampton’s (1911)
251 United States Senate (1902).
252 Thomas S Blair (1921) 1034.
253 Michael Thorny (1995), Randall Kennedy (1998), Barry Stimmel (1984).
254 The practice of doping children is not unusual amongst workers and peasants who need to 
work and are not able to look after children. This is as prevalent today as it was in the 1800s. 
Rifatullah Orakzai (2003).
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opium consumption, that is the 1868 Pharmacy Act which was the first time 
opium had been regulated in Britain.
Pharmaceuticals, Pharmacists and Medical Associations
Of all the actors in opium’s history who helped shape the drug issue, perhaps the 
health industry was the most powerful. In many ways the drug issue was 
connected with fundamental questions about individual health and by extension 
the health of societies. Implied in this were also the ever present pursuits for 
higher levels of human potential. Therefore the health establishment became the 
starting point for such questions and concerns (preceded sometimes by the 
Church).
In Britain the Pharmaceutical Society was established in 1841 by Jacob Bell. 
During the 1700s druggists and chemists had emerged as a result of the economic 
changes of that century which gave rise to the beginnings of modem urbanization 
characterized by brick and mortar shops rather than open air marketplaces. 
Chemists and druggists occupied a position in society where they provided the 
basic services of modem day doctors, dentists and pharmacists. They dispensed 
drugs, treated ailments and sold medical supplies. In this sense there was no 
tradition of a clearly defined health industry either in Britain or in nascent 
America. The role of pharmacists changed dramatically by the mid-1800s. 
America however progressed rapidly and a tradition of drugstores was well 
established by the 1850s. In Britain, Bell’s Pharmaceutical Society was granted 
greater powers through the 1852 Pharmacy Act bringing into reality Bell’s vision 
of creating a proper professional space for chemists based on rigorous education 
standards and recognized systems of professional registration.
It is here that the first signs of drug control regulation begin to truly manifest. In 
1857 the UK government produced the “Report from the Select Committee of the 
House of Lords on the Sale of Poisons, Bill” which called for the restriction and 
sale of poisons.256 On one level this was an interference in the original spirit of the
255 SWF Holloway (2002).
256 Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sale of Poisons, andc Bill 
(H.L), 1857 Session 2, HMS01857.
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Pharmaceutical Society that had in part been designed to secure the trade’s profit 
side (Bell was himself a the owner of a large pharmaceutical business). The Sale 
of Poisons bill had a dual potential: on the one hand it could take away the self 
determination of chemists through licensing procedures or on the other hand, if 
constructed well it, could restrict the sale of poisons exclusively to chemist shops.
In a story that would repeat itself in America, the Pharmaceutical Society was not 
alone on the scene. The General Medical Council (GMC) was established in 1858 
under the Medical Act and attempted to unify doctors, like the chemists, under 
one professional organization. It also proposed to maintain a medical register. 
Both doctors and pharmacists were engaged in efforts to separate themselves from 
the charlatans, the less educated and trained tradesmen, and the sideshow 
peddlers, while assigning to themselves ever larger roles. The conflict between the 
two groups was inevitable as their functions in many ways overlapped. Not only 
did the GMC also try to gamer the sale of poisons to its own benefit, in 1863 it 
also proposed that pharmacy was a work best kept under the umbrella of the 
medical trade rather than a separate entity. There was yet another contender, the 
United Society of Chemists (USC) which represented all those barred from the 
Pharmaceutical Society.257 The USC was hard competition as it set itself up as a 
non elitist institution and did not make the rigorous educational and training 
demands that the Pharmaceutical Society required.
In 1852 the American Pharmaceutical Association was founded. Its charter stated 
its goal “To as much as possible restrict the dispensing and sale of medicines to 
regularly educated druggists and apothecaries.”258 The American Medical 
Association was founded only a few years earlier in 1847 with the ostensibly less 
aggressive role to “promote the science and art of medicine and the betterment of 
public health.” As in Britain a conflict ensued. However what remained 
uncontested was that drugs and dependence were properly to be addressed by 
health professionals. When in 1859 Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution 
bolstered fears about the use of poisons (they were seen to possibly aid the
257 Virginia Berridge (2000) 115.
258 David F Musto (1999) 258.
259 Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘American Medical Association’.
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devolution rather than evolution of humanity) it only reaffirmed the position of 
the health industry within the shaping of the drug debate. The only question that 
remained was who, the doctors or the chemists would take center stage.
It should also not be forgotten that the holders of patents for many of the poisons 
under question were the companies such as Bayer, Merck and Parke-Davis. Merck 
lead the manufacturing of morphine and also increased its cocaine production 
along with Parke-Davis once the true value of cocaine was finally brought to light 
by Carl Koller, a colleague of Sigmund Freud. Koller discovered on a hunch that 
the application of cocaine to the eyes would numb the areas without having to put 
the patient to sleep, thereby resolving a long-standing problem of local anesthesia 
in surgery.
With in a year of cocaine’s introduction, the Parke-Davis Company 
provided coca and cocaine...including coca cigarettes, cocaine for 
injection and cocaine for sniffing. Parke-Davis and at least one other 
company also offered consumers a handy cocaine kit. (The Parke-Davis kit 
contained a hypodermic syringe.) The firm proudly supplied a drug that, it 
announced, “can supply the place of food, make the coward brave, the 
silent eloquent and... render the sufferer insensitive to pain.”260 
As Tables 1 and 2 below show, Merck’s cocaine imports from Peru 
increased significantly in a short period of time. Thus it is easy to understand why 
the proposals of the anti-drug proponents went directly to the core of international 
business activities. “Control advocates and opponents forged an uneasy 
compromise between competing aims: the desire to minimize drug abuse, the need 
to maximize medicinal assets, [and] the necessity of avoiding injury to 
commerce.”261
Similarly, in 1895 Heinrich Dreser discovered that if morphine was diluted with a 
type of acid it would yield a modified substance that did not seem to possess the 
undesired effects of morphine. Dreser was an employee at Bayer and soon the 
company began to manufacture and sell its new product, heroin. Bayer promoted
260 David FMusto (1991).
261 William B. McAllister (2000) 4.
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heroin as non-addictive hoping to replace habit forming morphine with its better 
cousin.
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The International Component o f  Drugs
It might seem that the connection between the social, national and international 
component of the opium is neither direct nor clear. However, a brief illustration 
shows how direct lines from small town America reached the highest quarters of 
international organizations.
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Charles Brent was a drug reformer in the United States during the early 1900s. As 
an Episcopalian Bishop he had long spoken out against the social costs of opium 
use within the Christian context, i.e., its corruption of the individual. Brent had 
been the Episcopalian Bishop of the Philippines, and along with the Philippines, 
America had won an opium problem. Opium smoking was common practice in 
the Philippines and many US servicemen picked up the habit. This is sometimes 
seen as the entry of opium smoking into western America because the servicemen 
returned home to San Francisco and brought opium with them. Brent had seen 
opium’s effects first hand and his efforts at drug reform were not to be in vain. 
Brent, partnered with Dr. Hamilton Wright who was a self proclaimed expert in 
tropical diseases and took up the anti-opium cause, getting himself appointed as a 
US State Department Official. Brent had worked independently prior to getting 
his proposals in front of would-be president and close friend William Howard 
Taft. Taft had looked over Brent’s proposal for opium reform and in 1903 set up 
the “Opium Commission to visit countries where opium is used and ascertain the 
methods of regulation and control.” Brent was on the commission. It was Brent 
and Wright who ultimately made the proposal to establish the first international 
conference on opium regulation which would become the groundbreaking 
Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909. Brent ultimately took the Commission’s 
presidency while Wright became the non appointed director. The Commission 
aided by the now President Taft’s support, also outlined in its proposals how 
opium was indeed a trade issue and could be maneuvered to open China’s markets 
exclusively for America.264 This brought the drug issue close to the discussions on 
trade tariffs and foreign market access for US interests.
»
After the Commission’s meeting, both men continued in their work domestically 
and internationally. Wright also focused on other drugs including cocaine and 
worked to pass domestic legislation as well. Once, Wright, while addressing the 
US Congress stated, “one of the most unfortunate phases of smoking opium in this 
country is the large number of women who have become involved and were living
262 ‘Opium Commission Named’
263 Arnold Foster (1909).
264 William B McAllister (2000) 30-31.
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as common law wives or cohabitating with Chinese in the Chinatowns of our 
various cities.”265 Therefore comments such as those by Cleveland Moffett 
discussed earlier were in fact being used as evidentiary support for promoting the 
regulation by criminalization of opium. The point to consider here is not merely 
that such comments were sensationalist and had strong roots in class and racism. 
The latter point goes almost without saying. In the post-Enlightenment era, the 
continued view of the supremacy of Christianity, the Industrial revolution and in 
dozens of smaller ideas such as Eugenics, it is hardly possible that the beginnings 
and continuation of the criminalization trend (and by the way the legalization 
trend) could be at their core anything but racist or elitist. The point is that even if 
the race and class objections were removed from current policies, then would the 
policies themselves be more effective? The race and class “card” is often used in 
the legalization debate to indicate that these policies ought simply not to be race 
and class biased. The implication then is that somehow with these elements 
removed the policy would work.
A History o f Legalization
The history of legalization does not really gain full force until the early 1970’s. 
The debate on drugs from this perspective dwindles after the conferences which 
followed the 1920 implementation of the 1912 Hague Convention. These 
conferences dealt with the details of how exactly the Hague convention would 
practically manifest in each of the signatory nations. Arguments from delegates 
continued much as before. India had argued for over a decade that the eating of 
opium (as opposed to smoking) was not a harmful practice. As far back as 1893 a 
Royal Commission (UK) report had found that opium eating in moderate amounts 
was not harmful. The report had been assembled in an effort to assess the harm, if 
any, of opium production and consumption, and to make recommendations based 
on the findings. The report, which was two years in the making, concluded that 
opium use was not epidemic and that anyway it had little harmful effects. Since 
the report primarily concerned itself with India, it was not odd that its findings 
were so diverse from the accounts pouring in from China on addiction. Opium in
265 William L White (1979).
266 EN Baker (1896).
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India was eaten and not smoked. In this way the British opium trade remained 
legal until 1905 when a new Liberal Parliament gained the political power to 
change course.
On the medical side, in 1926 the Rolleston Report detailed the case for prescribing 
drugs as a part of treating addicts with the idea that the ultimate goal was to 
remove the dependence altogether.
It recommended that two groups receive treatment with morphine or 
heroin, namely: Those who are undergoing treatment for the cure of 
addiction by the gradual withdrawal method, and Persons for whom, after 
every effort has been made for the cure of the addiction, the drug cannot 
be withdrawn either because: complete withdrawal produces such serious 
symptoms which cannot be satisfactorily treated under the normal 
conditions of private practice; or the patient, while capable of leading a 
normal life so long as he takes a certain non-progressive quantity, usually 
small, of the drug of addiction, ceases to be able to do so when the regular 
allowance is withdrawn. This pragmatic approach in which the care of 
opiate users was entrusted to doctors continued without serious review 
until the late 1950s.267 
The goals of the Rolleston report have often been questioned. This report was the 
first to classify addiction as a disease and it maintained that, as disease, only 
doctors should be allowed to prescribe the drugs needed for treatment. This 
ensured that the prescribing of medicine stayed in the hands of doctors. The 
legalization debate draws from the Rolleston Report to show that drugs are a 
medical and not a criminal concern.268 Likewise the report is used to show how 
drug policy is not about drugs at all but about interest group.
The Interim Years
The question is what happened to drugs in the years between the Rolleston Report 
and the next marker in drug policy history, President Nixon. There was in the 
1920s very little in the way of opposing voices as there had been little opposition
267 ‘The History of Methadone And Methadone Prescribing’
268 See for example Steven Wisotsky (1992).
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in the way of domestic legislation. This point is related to the fact that opium was 
not legal or illegal, but simply had no status vis-a-vis the law. The opposition 
could not have come in any form other than to attempt to take the issue off of the 
legal agenda altogether. Thus the question became not how to oppose 
criminalization, but how to work within the trend of criminalization while 
maintaining the advantages brought to those vested in opium’s non-legal status. 
As we have seen, the vested actors were several: the emergent merchant classes, 
private businesses, doctors and pharmaceuticals.
It was not until President Richard Nixon declared his War on Drugs campaign in 
the early 1970s that the movement of legalization proper began. Nixon’s plan was 
obvious given the indulgence of the hippie movement in the 1960s and the shock 
it had produced on the near puritanical America of the 1950s i.e. the voters. Books 
on the question of drug laws and drug policy began to proliferate around 1970. 
Prior there had been few political analyses of drugs excepting some attempts by 
authors like Timothy Leary and his Politics o f  Ecstasy first published in 1968.269
Therefore in the intervening years between the outlawing of opium and the 
declaration of Nixon’s war on drugs which really awoke the legalization 
movement. Of course between 1930 and 1960 America had much to keep it 
occupied, the effects of the Great Depression and WWII to name the most 
significant events. This is not to say that opium use and its accompanying debate 
had completely disappeared, but that political and public attention was taken up 
by more pressing matters. A brief survey of key reports between 1894 and 1980 
(see Appendix B) shows that between 1930 and 1960 there is only one significant 
report issued on the drugs: The LaGuardia Committee Report.
The LaGuardia Committee Report dispelled almost every myth related to 
marijuana that had persisted since the days Hearst had published his reports of 
crazed Mexicans. Mayor LaGuardia of New York commissioned the report to find 
out if there was indeed a marijuana problem in the city. He sought an impartial 
group to conduct the study and ultimately decided upon the New York Academy
269 Timothy Leary (1998).
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of Medicine. The report debunked the two main linkages used to make marijuana 
and other drugs including opium illegal. The first point relates to marijuana alone 
and is called the gateway theory which states that marijuana is a first drug on the 
path to others such as cocaine and opium. The second point maintained that 
smoking marijuana increased sexual desire to uncontrollable levels and third that 
marijuana smoking caused users to commit crimes. The study found no basis for 
any of these claims and concluded, quite astonishingly for 1944 America that:
The consensus among marihuana smokers is that the use of the drug 
creates a definite feeling of adequacy....The practice of smoking 
marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the 
word...The sale and distribution of marihuana is not under the control of 
any single organized group...The use of marihuana does not lead to 
morphine or heroin or cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a 
market for these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana
smoking Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of
major crimes....Marihuana smoking is not widespread among school 
children...Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of 
smoking marihuana...The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of 
marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.270
The report was scandalous on several fronts. It challenged the notion of marijuana 
as a crisis in New York. Here we could refer to current alarmist tendencies 
regarding drug use as well as the previously mentioned point that drug use is often 
attached to a fear of a decline in the social fabric. The LaGuardia Report showed 
that there was no such threat. On the sub categories of this point it challenged the 
notion of marijuana as a gateway drug to harder substances, the notion of 
marijuana use in connection with crimes and marijuana use as an addiction.
The report was eventually denounced in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA). In an article entitled “Marihuana Problems”, the credibility 
of the report was questioned and it was concluded that it did not conclusively
270 New York Academy of Medicine (1944). This report is more commonly known as the 
LaGuardia Committee Report.
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771 • •prove anything about marijuana’s potential dangers. Why this article was 
printed is subject to much controversy. One explanation is that Harry J. Anslinger, 
the first US drug czar, had persuaded JAMA to write the article in order to head 
off the possible effects of the LaGuardia Committee Report.
If the early inception of the drug debate had been characterized by doctors, 
businesses and governments, its post-193 Os manifestation added another actor 
whose role was to become central in future of the drug questions: the bureaucrats. 
In 1930 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was established to counter the 
drug epidemic in America.272 Since its inception there had been several 
accusations of its interference in research and activities related to the legalizing 
drugs or at least taking out the criminal component and moving towards treatment. 
One such case was Lindesmith v. Anslinger.
Alfred Lindesmith was an Indiana University sociology professor who was 
a long-time advocate of medical treatment of addiction, [sic] Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) attempted to intimidate Lindesmith, stifle his 
research, and interfere with his publication of articles counter to FBN 
policies. In addition, [sic] the American banning of the 1946 Canadian 
film on drug addiction, Drug Addict, may have been a pivotal event in a 
pattern of censorship and disinformation carried on by the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics (FBN) under the leadership of its long-time Director, Harry
77^Anslinger.
One reason posited for the lack of research and ideas towards legalization during 
the interim years is precisely that such research was suppressed.
In 1972 the most important report for the legalization debate was published. This 
report is still heavily cited today. The Consumers Union Report: Licit and Illicit 
Drugs (CURE Report) outlined in detail the history of licit and illicit drugs,
271 ‘The Marihuana Problems’ (1945).
272 In 1973 President Nixon consolidated Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Prohibition, 
Bureau of Narcotics, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in order to create a single 
body to address the growing drug problem (as it was perceived) in America. This availability was 
linked to a lack of intelligence and coordination in efforts on behalf o f the bureaus. The new entity 
was called the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
273 John F Galliher, David P Keys and Michael Eisner (1998).
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encompassing opiates, nicotine, caffeine, alcohol, inhalants and LSD.274 After 
hundreds of pages of exhaustive research the report’s recommendations conclude 
with understanding
[w]hat should have been obvious since 1914— that heroin is a drug most 
users go right on using despite the threat of imprisonment, despite actual 
imprisonment for years, despite repeated ‘cures’ and long-term residence 
in rehabilitation centers, and despite the risks of disease and even death. 
Heroin is a drug for which addicts will prostitute themselves. It is also a 
drug to which most addicts return despite a sincere desire to ‘stay clean,’ a 
firm resolve to stay clean, an overwhelming effort to stay clean—and even 
a success (sometimes enforced by confinement) in staying clean for weeks, 
months, or years. This is what is meant by the statement that heroin is an 
addicting drug 275
The CURE Report opened a debate that had been nearly dormant for over 40 
years. CURE addressed several components of the criminalization debate 
including the notion that neither law enforcement nor treatment programs will 
curb the next generation’s likelihood of using heroin. Though legalization 
proponents use the CURE Report often as a basis for their arguments they do 
often omit its stance on treatment programs which are still viewed as a key answer 
to the shortcomings of criminalization processes.
Conclusion
Summary Points on the Binary Debate
Drawing out a summary of the criminalization argument, it begins with the 
general assertion that drugs are bad for an individual’s physical, moral and mental 
health. In this we can see the beginnings of the criminalization movement as
274 Edward M Brecher and the Editors of Consumer Reports Magazine (1972).
275 Edward M Brecher (1972) Chapter 69.
276 For both sides of the debate, international development and general changes in what the role 
of law is also impacted processes. Here we could look at the establishment o f the League of 
Nations and the 1945 establishment of the International Court of Justice for examples of such 
changes. At minimum these provided the structural capability to control the drug trade on an 
international level. In addition, these changes allowed for the movement of ideas about the drug 
issue between states. For the purposes of this research the role of international law in the drug 
issue however does not play a determinant role in assessing the drug issue in IR. See also Antonio 
Cassese (2004 ) 5-21.
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described in the 1800s. The cocaine Negroes and crazed Mexicans stories imply 
that drugs are bad for the physical, moral and mental health of all other 
individuals and societies that the drug user has contact with. In short, users are a 
threat to themselves and others. The result is increased crime including rapes, 
assaults and robberies. The argument continues by positing that there is an 
inherent harm to innocent people, such crimes inevitably have a bottom-up, 
negative effect leading to the corruption of neighborhoods, societies, governments 
and eventually nations. In this side of the debate there is only drug use or nonuse, 
and all those who use drugs are by definition a liability.
To counter legalization attempts the criminalization side posits that legalization 
would not stop the black market, as there would always be a market for underage 
consumption, “but what about the children?” could be the common motto for this 
argument. Thus, the only recourse against drugs is firm laws and the will to back 
them up with firm actions. Users and traffickers alike are deterred by anti-drug 
laws and therefore laws decrease use, decrease addiction, decrease crime, decrease 
profits to drug lords and so forth.
The legalization argument begins with drug use and the individual. The 
legalization of drugs would permit safe access to drugs without the false stigma 
created through criminalization. The stigma is false because criminalization 
portrays users as useless and corrupt much like the early caricatures of women 
lazing about in opium dens. Furthermore, legalization offers cases like William 
Halsted to show that it is possible to be a productive and functional drug user. 
Thus legalization posits that drugs could be controlled though proper quality 
control methods and instances of HIV would be reduced through clean needle 
access. Here legalization makes a distinction between what are called recreational 
users and those who have an addiction problem. With legal barriers removed, 
those individuals who have passed from drug use to misuse would have the 
opportunity to seek assistance without fear of legal reprisal. That drug addiction is 
a medical and not criminal issue was one of the arguments of Lindesmith’s work 
as stated before. There would then be an upward positive effect where individuals, 
societies, governments and countries could come together in an equitable 
environment. Since the drug laws do not work and prohibition creates violence
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and crime, fair drug education and a focus on the root causes of misuse such as 
poverty rather than control will resolve the drug issue. The last point echoing the 
astute 1902 observation made by Dr. Blair that depriving Indians of peyote via 
legislation simply would not work due to social and economic reasons. 
Additionally, governments will receive the profits of drug sales instead of 
traffickers and the system as a whole will be more financially efficient (also see
• 277Appendix C for an overview of legalization and criminalization perspectives).
This point is subject to misinterpretation therefore clarification is necessary to 
avoid a misreading of subsequent arguments. If the curse of the drug debate is 
binary thinking (legalize or criminalize), then the curse of the historical 
perspective on the drug debate is the same. When confronted with basic data such 
as anti-drug policies were at odds with international business, the split 
immediately begins to form: either business is wrong because business is greedy 
and has no social responsibility or anti-drug efforts are forwarded by religious 
fanatics who wished to destroy civil rights. A third view is needed to take into 
account both sides as a part of a larger whole to be examined not linearly, but 
multi-dimensionally. This has a precise meaning. As mentioned, usually history is 
seen as another element to be placed either on one side or the other of the debate. 
Legalization uses history to highlight the arbitrary nature of drug policies, stating 
that laws came into begin as a result of interest group competition, especially 
doctors and pharmaceutical companies in an environment of extreme racism and 
classism. On the other side, criminalization uses history to express the devastation 
caused my unregulated drug use especially in terms of moral decay as seen in
7 7 R *China. However both uses of history are one dimensional. As discussed in
277 Incidentally, both arguments assume an unstated point: that there is a “natural” human state 
and that this state gives rise to a series of rights. Most of those making modem day arguments do 
not engage in profound philosophical analysis and do not present themselves as such. Thus the 
arguments which follow are based on a thin conception of the natural rights of the individual. This 
process tends to make either side of the drug debate take on a characteristic of objectivity—that is 
that each side is battling to regain a perceived natural state of man whom the other sides’ policies 
and corrupt ideas have taken society away from. History here then also serves to show that the 
core assumptions in the chug debate did not come from a mythical natural state which was then 
deviated from, but from a specific set of circumstances. Perhaps there is something to be said 
about man’s objective and natural state, however it has never made its way into serious policy 
making.
278 The degree of addiction in China is now being contested. RK Newman argues that in fact 
there was never any epidemic and that the epidemic argument has been perpetuated by the anti­
imperialist movement which has hijacked history in order to provide evidence against the major
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Chapter One, Mike Jay noted that “It’s one thing to cast a critical eye over the 
cultural and scientific context in which opiates where criminalized, and it’s 
another thing entirely to argue that history proves that these substances should 
simply be legalized...But we should remember, when we hear calls to return to 
traditional moralities and Victorian values, that those values included a regime of 
mass market, legally available opium.”279 Thus, a more inclusive and informed 
view shows that the emergence of the drug debate is substantial: comprised of 
many actors, ideas and circumstances and that the assertion that any one portion 
o f history definitively supports a particular view is absurd.
Summary of History on Drugs, IR and ir
We have seen that drugs do in fact have a history and that this history, at best, has 
been generally used to support one side or another of the binary debate on drugs. 
In addition, we have seen that this superficial use of history is inadequate, and that 
history has to offer something much more meaningful in the analysis of our drug 
policies today. Rather than falling into the trappings of chronofetishism and 
tempocentrism, these brief sketches have shown that this history is about 
competing interests of different actors and very rarely about the drug traffickers or 
about the drug addicts. The focus on users and traffickers endures today because 
the present has been ‘sealed o ff from the past making it seem as if focusing on 
traffickers and users is a ‘natural’ and normal progression of human history—here 
the criminalization side would offer that more ‘evolved’ societies do not use drugs 
due to higher moral awareness and the legalization side offers that drug use is 
(ironically) a natural human activity with each side accusing the other as being the 
deviant or bearer of ‘unnatural’ ideas and behaviors—this is the immutability 
illusion discussed in Chapter One. Each side then falls into the trap of 
tempocentrism, promoting its own ‘isomorphic’ illusion of history.
The implications of this for IR and ir are significant. First, these brief sketches 
problematize the ‘drug user’ and ‘drug trafficker’ focus. In short they
powers today. Newman further indicates how dissenting voices are not allowed in the China 
epidemic debate and any evidence to the contrary of the anti-imperialist stance necessarily 
implicates one into the other camp. See RK Newman (1995).
279 Mike Jay (2000) 87.
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problematize the actor in non-state actors. This is not to say that non-state actors 
or that drug users and traffickers are rendered irrelevant, but that to focus on 
traffickers means that one must have at least a minimal awareness of why the 
trafficker is a point of analysis in the first place. Here there could be discussions 
on the modem economic and political systems particularly if we examine the 
contingent nature of dmg policies today informed by a history which can at least 
in part demonstrate that the debate to legalize and criminalize rose out of the 
move to regulate drugs. The regulation of drugs was motivated by a series of 
individuals who wanted to, for morality or for profit, maintain their interests while 
negotiating around policy barriers. Thus when it was stated previously that IR 
conceptions of the dmg issue are one-dimensional, it was referring to exactly this 
point. The one dimensionality is beyond the quarrels of definitions of terms as 
noted in the case of Taki the taxi cab driver in the previous chapter (though even 
this level of engagement is already a step forward), but taking that problem of 
definitions and informing it by a long history.
Second we could examine then why drugs are illegal. Considering the role of the 
medical and the pharmaceuticals industries, a case could be made that dmg 
policies today are more about the progression of science, and research into health 
and new medicines rather than a strict concern over addiction rates. Since this 
historical thread has been lost, it seems right then that ir should have an intense 
focus on criminalization. A challenge to ir would not be one of blame or cynicism 
as often shown by the legalization side, but one that has been informed by a 
history which declares that perhaps the problem of dmgs is really a ‘problem’ of 
larger societies and systems.
Following from this is the third point: history shows what is seen as licit and what 
is seen as illicit is not as clear cut as previously imagined. By taking away the 
naturalization illusion of legality and illegality, history opens a nexus where the 
licit and illicit are seen as overlapping factors. This moves our attention away 
from simplistic binary debates about licit or illicit. This nexus shows that there is 
no separate illicit realm from the stand-point of a variety of social and economic 
factors as discussed above. Activities regarded as illegitimate are intertwined in
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every legitimate activity. As such, illicit activities also influence and are 
influenced by social, political, cultural and economic spheres, both nationally and 
internationally. Furthermore, and as we shall see in the next chapter, this nexus is 
also embedded in society and one of the consequences of which is that counter­
measures against illicit activities for example invariably interfere with the licit 
realm. Cases of this include anti-money laundering policies that tend to affect 
legitimate businesses more than traffickers for the simple fact that legitimate 
businesses are risk averse where traffickers are not. In such a case 
countermeasures could have a more profound and immediate impact on the former 
and less on the latter.
280 See for example Padideh Tosti (2001/2002).
281 Ibid.
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Chapter V. Terra Incognita: Contributions from the 
Study of Organized Crime
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to offer alternative lines of questioning to the 
themes discussed regarding drugs and IR by introducing a set of ideas and 
concepts from Criminology and organized crime. As we have seen thus far, there 
are no conceptualizations of drugs within IR or ir that allow us to escape one­
dimensional characterizations or the pendulum-like debate between criminalize 
and legalize. Here we will discuss key ideas that developed from the early 20th 
century as an observation on the perceived increase in crime activity, particularly 
organized crime (OC), during American alcohol prohibition. It should also be 
noted that there are many facets to Criminology and the debate on OC that have 
been omitted for the reasons of scope, keeping in mind that the aim is not to 
present a faithful account of Criminology, but to bring in some lines of thought 
from Criminology as a way to open the door for further considerations on the use 
of such concepts from this discipline in IR.
Next is a discussion of various models of organized crime that have an impact on 
contemporary perceptions. Most notable of these is the alien conspiracy model 
where crime was attributed to an outside group or foreign element. This notion 
has done much to shape notions of illicit non-state actors as a threat—a notion that 
as we have seen permeates much of thought in both IR and ir. Additionally, the 
history of OC is a close cousin to the history of drugs. Finally, there will be an 
analysis of how these contribute to the conception and analysis of drugs. Overall 
the first sections serve to provide non-Criminologists a context from which 
discussions from Criminology arise. Thus while such a presentation may seem not 
to do justice to the quantity and depth of information under consideration, from 
the IR perspective it is already sufficient to make the case that Criminology has 
interesting and valid lines of thought that can inform and enhance the IR debate.
It is a warranted to ask at this point what the link is between the study of 
organized crime and the study of drug trafficking and whether it is valid to use
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concepts from one to illuminate the other. The answer begins with a simple fact: 
there is no such discipline as drug studies even if both in International Relations 
and in the arena of international policy making there is an assumption that there is. 
Here we could also recall the fragmented, superficial and arbitrary nature of “drug 
studies” discussed in previous chapters. Criminology has a history of engaging the 
drug issue even though criminologists have concerned themselves more with an 
actor oriented approach, organized crime, than drugs per se. Again, when 
considering the emphasis on law enforcement, it is not surprising that actor based 
approaches would be more common. This actor based approach also brings 
criminology close to IR conceptualizations of drugs in terms of non-state actors 
even if there are elements in the respective approaches which differ.
Primary Concepts o f Organized Crime Up to the 1990s
In discussing OC and its models, past and present, it should also be clear that there 
is no definable and linear development of models. Many ideas about crime existed 
simultaneously in varying degrees of depth and articulation. At times a concept 
would appear as a single line in a newspaper article, such as crime is a business, 
and then would disappear only to resurface decades later.
Early concepts of organized crime were not unlike concepts found in early 
perceptions of drugs. Metaphors of OC as a disease and infestation ruining the 
moral fabric of society replayed themselves in the public domain at regular 
intervals. Author and political activist Gus Tyler states that with every new 
breaking investigation and expose came another public outcry and round of 
legislation against OC, the revelation of the great profits brought on by the alcohol 
prohibition and its subsequent repeal serve as one example.282 In the early days of 
formulating OC, there was a distinct presence of the alien conspiracy model, 
especially with regards to drugs and race-motivated fears of Chinese and Negroes. 
Dwight Smith notes that the alien conspiracy model does not however come into 
full fruition until the 1960s.283
282 Gus Tyler (1962) 3.
283 Dwight C Smith (1980) 361.
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Alien Conspiracy/Hierarchy Models
The alien conspiracy model was most avidly promoted by Senator Estes Kefauver 
in the 1950’s while the hierarchical model was advocated by Donald Cressey, 
whose research was first laid out in a task force report submitted to the Kefauver 
Committee hearings. The alien conspiracy model characterized organized crime as 
rooted in foreign elements and ultimately with certain ethnic groups. Headed by 
Senator Estes Kefauver, the Kefauver Commission (1950-1951) was tasked with 
investigating illegal gambling in the United States. The results of the investigation 
were key in the conceptualization of crime as organized and ethnic-based, namely 
the Italian Mafia. The Commission’s findings caused a general alarm within the 
government and the public alike describing how crime had now become a 
centralized business. The Commission’s findings were part of a larger trend that 
had commenced in the 1940’s where the FBI had:
set about improving the image of the police. They achieved this largely via 
media propaganda such as banning films and radio programmes that 
glorified gangsters[sic]. Instead, law enforcement investigators became 
glamourised and depicted as the front line in the fight against unscrupulous 
gangsters who threatened the American way of life. Put simply, the sordid 
image of law enforcement officers, judges and politicians working with 
gangsters was reinvented for political ends as a simple case of Them 
versus Us—the dangerous criminal against the fearless protectors of the 
vulnerable law-abiding public.
After Kefauver the alien conspiracy notion was again raised under the Johnson 
(President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 
1965) and Reagan administrations. Under Reagan, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, alien conspiracy was integrated with drugs and drug traffickers. The 
Reagan Commission adapted the discourse on organized crime to drugs and 
broadened “aliens” to include Asian and Latin American Cartels.
284 Andre Standing (2003). Also see Rufus King, ‘The Drug Hang Up, America’s Fifty-Year 
Folly’. King argues the Mafia myth was actually constructed by die Kefauver Commission where 
criminals were brought in for questioning and their statements fitted into predetermined “roles” 
rendering, ultimately, an image of organized crime as centralized and ethnically based. The 
purpose was to support the already mentioned attempts by the FBI to refurbish the image of 
corrupt cops by shifting attention towards the encroaching danger of the monolithic Italian Mafia.
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The alien conspiracy model of organized crime therefore was popularized by the 
presidential commissions. Klaus von Lampe measured the frequency of 
appearance of the term organized crime in the New York Times Index and in Der 
Spiegel.285 He notes how the term really gains attention in the media in the period 
between 1960 and 1980 in the United States, coinciding with the creation of the 
crime committees.286 Von Lampe’s study also shows that concepts such as 
organized crime wax and wane in popularity. While von Lampe attributes this to 
the media attractiveness of a subject, it is difficult to locate whether it is the media 
driving the policy agenda, visa versa or still whether there is real new crime 
activity that has caught the media’s attention. It is easy to assume that the 
presidential committees were intentionally promoting a particular view of 
organized crime: as hierarchical and as dominated by foreign elements. 
Criticisms of Kefauver characterize him as the mouthpiece of the FBI in whose 
interest it was to promote this particular view of organized crime, a view 
promoted by the very same Henry J. Anslinger who, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, had challenged Indiana University professor Alfred Lindesmith on the 
medical treatment of addiction and who was the then at the head of the FBN 
having worked for decades to illegalize drugs.
Kefauver Committee was mainly concerned with the issue of gambling287 The 
FBN on the other hand had the aim of drug control was most noted for its key role 
in outlawing marijuana with the passing of the 1936 Marijuana Act. The FBI was 
more oriented towards enforcement and stopping organized crime. In fact,
the agency chosen to represent the New Deal’s commitment to 
enforcement was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1934 the 
FBI was given additional jurisdiction over a variety of inter-state felonies, 
such as kidnapping and auto-theft. Its director, J. Edgar Hoover, 
immediately exploited the publicity value of his new powers by directing 
his agents against the bankrobbers, who had been avoiding capture by 
crossing state lines.288
285 Klaus von Lampe (2001b).
286 Ibid 102-103 Von Lampe also notes how there is a brief lag where the term organized crime 
does not become central to German policy debates until the late 1980s.
287 Michael Woodiwiss (1990).
288 Ibid.
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American History and Crime specialist Professor Michael Woodiwiss noted that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal took the “service” out of some OC activities by 
creating a context in which they were no longer needed.289 In essence, Roosevelt 
moved towards looking in our own backyard by regulating business and 
addressing corrupt politicians rather than focusing policy on solely on an external 
threat. This approach also included aspects of traditional crime fighting through 
legislation and subsequently law enforcement tactics.
In the New Deal, OC moved towards increased government legislation as 
witnessed in the bolstering of agencies such as the FBI.290 As the intricate history 
of the FBI and the presidential committees played out over the years there were 
subtle and incremental shifts which gradually removed the introspective approach 
and cemented the alien threat model; ultimately all connections which called for 
internal examination of circumstances were closed giving rise to a unidirectional 
focus on the outside perpetrators. Woodiwiss notes that the theme of monolithic 
OC/Mafia, of the clearly Italian kind, is repeated until it begins to take hold, 
eventually establishing the monolithic theme as the proper way to conceptualize
291crime.
As a brief side note, it should be mentioned that within the politics of the United 
States there are considerations which relate to the still-enduring tension between 
states and the federal government system. These should always temper tendencies 
to describe intentions within US policy actions. Until the 1900s
social problems that accompanied urbanization and industrialization, crime 
policy was often viewed as properly belonging to state and local 
authorities. The U.S. Constitution, combined with a tradition of 
federalism, reserved police powers for the states, and both the federal and 
state governments were satisfied to keep it that way, at least until the 20th 
century. Before the 1900s, most of the federal government’s forays into 
crime policy involved regulating interstate commerce and the railroads,
289 Michael Woodiwiss (2001) 153. The next section will discuss in more detail the concept of 
crime as providing a service rather than being parasitic as is often thought.
290 Kenneth O’Reilly (1982) 638-658.
291 Michael Woodiwiss (2001) 261-263.
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protecting the mails, combating counterfeiting, and conducting such moral 
purity crusades as those of pornography and lotteries...After the turn of 
the century, Congress increasingly turned to passing legislation to solve a 
growing crime problem.292 
States tend to guard closely any rights closely linked to self-determination while 
trying to outsource costs associated with self-determination to the central 
government. Meanwhile, the Federal government tends towards diminishing local 
rights while insisting on cost sharing for administration over states. This note is 
added here only to say that any comments on US policies should always be 
tempered against a somewhat unique set of forces that exist in US domestic 
politics and the federal-state system in which domestic politics function.
During his presidency from 1963-1969, Lyndon Johnson ordered a crime 
commission that again implicitly reaffirmed the alien conspiracy model, though it 
focused more on the hierarchical organization of OC. From this commission arose 
the current method of operation for addressing this issue, i.e. informants and law 
enforcement, as the method of choice. If we go back to historical sociology, 
here we see that law enforcement was a method chosen at a moment in history to 
address a particular situation and not the “natural” solution to crime that it often 
appears to be.
In the same year that ended Johnson’s presidency, University of California, Santa 
Barbara professor Donald Cressey, also considered the founder of the modem 
study of OC, would expand the hierarchical model in a soon to be famous book 
entitled Theft o f  a Nation in which he conceptualized organized crime as 
analogous to the organized bureaucracies that operated nationally in the US.294 
Cressey drew upon his work with the Kefauver Committee and various 
testimonies of hearing participants to formulate the hierarchical model of 
organized crime. As a sociologist, Cressey’s conceptualization was rooted in Max 
Weber’s theories of bureaucracy. Cressey stated that Cosa Nosta was an 
organization containing at its base street criminals who acted under a series of low
292 Steve Hoenisch (1996).
293 United States Senate (1976).
294 Donald R Cressey (1969).
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level managers; they in turn have contact with people who communicate with the 
next tier up, the associate Dons who in turn have direct contact with the Dons 
themselves. Each Don sat on a committee which taken as one entity ran OC 
throughout America. Cressey’s model was so influential that it can be considered 
one of the main conceptualizations of OC and rests at the base of many models on 
OC since then.
As mentioned earlier the alien conspiracy element did not drop out of the analysis 
and was in fact ever present in Cressey’s work. It was given further support 
through another influential article written by Robert Anderson which begins by 
stating, “the old Mafia of Sicily was a pre-industrial peasant institution. Its 
organization was intimate and diffuse. It now operates in a highly urbanized and 
industrialized milieu of the United States.”295 It could be argued that in the case of 
Cressey and Anderson the use of the ethnic element is more an inherited 
conception from the Kefauver Committee rather than an integral part of their core 
conception—remembering here that the Kefauver Committee hearings were 
televised over one year and were estimated to have attracted between 20-30 
million viewers 296 Furthermore, the Kefauver hearings were the first televised 
Senate Committee hearings, thus increasing their power in shaping perceptions in 
society. That is to say that both Cressey and Anderson could have been influenced 
by events, incorporating the ethnic element in their work either automatically or 
intentionally.
The distinction between hierarchical and alien conspiracy is also somewhat 
blurred. In the early days of the “yellow peril” and “cocaine crazed negroes” there 
was no structure implied, though the alien aspect was obviously present. Then 
came more formalized concepts of OC which then took on the “alien” 
characteristic. Thus it is important to remember that these models are fluid and 
cannot be easily demarcated and fixed.
295 Robert T Anderson (1965) 302.
296 Theodore Brown Jr, ‘Cary Estes Kefauver’.
148
Contemporary Conceptualizations o f  Organized Crime
Transnational Organized Crime
In the 1990s, the idea of OC, which had more or less already been an international 
phenomenon, became truly transnational. That is whether in perception or in 
actuality, the transnational element became emphasized and concerns about it 
expanded. As Woodiwiss argues throughout his research, the US notion of OC 
began mostly as a domestically-based and American crusade which slowly finds 
expression in the international arena.297 In this way the US ‘exports’ its concept of 
OC to the international community, meaning, in part, that the alien conspiracy 
finds new audience on the international stage. As would be expected the resulting 
methods chosen to address the issue are much the same. In this case, we can look 
back to the approach to drugs taken by the World Drug Reports and understand 
the sets of historical circumstances that led to this current characterization in ir. 
Also here we should recall that Reagan had really combined drugs and OC in the 
1980s with the Certification Act previously discussed, so as the 1990s wore on 
these messy and somewhat ill conceived notions of OC, drugs, and later terrorism 
ultimately fell into the same pot. The latter point reflected clearly in the piecemeal 
and scattered way in which IR has addressed drugs as discussed in earlier 
chapters.
The 1990s brought in a new era and aliens took on new character with the concept 
of crime as networks and cells, where perceptions of alien actors became 
disembodied within cyberspace, stripped of all identity including ethnicity, 
becoming the “other” in its purest essential form. This “other”, it seemed, had to 
find either a new face or disappear altogether. And so it happened that 9/11 saved 
the alien conspiracy and gave it a new face as al-Qaeda, now decentralized, 
phantom like, yet still ethnically based and highly organized as well as effective. 
This is not to say that terrorism and OC are one and the same, but that the concept 
of the “alien” seems to have found a new form in al-Qaeda rather than in the 
Italian Mafia or Columbian Drug Cartels.
297 Michael Woodwiss (2001).
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In the 1990s OC models were further detailed though an analysis of the different 
kinds of conditions that give rise to various forms of crime as well as the specific 
manifestation of that form in terms of its structure. Scholars categorize models of 
organized crime in different ways. What follows is a discussion of these models as 
seen through the works of some of the predominant scholars who have written on 
crime models.
Organizing Models of Organized Crime
Boronia Halstead at the Australian Institute of Criminology divided OC into 
several models.298 Halstead notes that, “All models reflect the world view of those 
who create them. An anthropologist will provide a quite different perspective 
from that of an economist, for example. Inevitably, some models will suit some 
purposes better than others.”299 Models then explain various aspects that lead to 
specific formations of OC. “On the micro level, for example, how illegal 
enterprises can be perceived as organizations influenced by internal and external 
stakeholders.”300 Group focused models included models that focused on the 
structure of OC as put forward by Cressey. The main criticism of this view is that 
even if true, this model cannot apply in circumstances where organized crime is 
not connected to Italian ethnic groups. Next there are the ‘flexible network 
models’ which do not have the rigid hierarchical structure proposed by Cressey. 
Halstead notes that in these models the image of the streamlined corporation is 
replaced by competition and treachery where it is difficult to distinguish good 
from bad, criminal from non criminal, in effect a blurring of lines which seem so 
clear in the Cressey’s model.301 Unlike the disciplined characterizations of mafia 
members who conform to group behavior, the network model characterizes 
participants as opportunistic with little desire to conform to rules and rigid 
structures.
298 Boronia Halstead (1998) 2.
299 Ibid.
300 Klaus von Lampe (2003) 2.
301 Boronia Halstead (1998) 3.
150
More recently Halstead notes that there are a series of writers who promote the 
“global monolithic threat” model seen in the works of Claire Sterling and Frank 
Cilluffo.302 This model is essentially alien conspiracy on an international stage. It 
maintains that crime is predatory and non-consensual, meaning that organized 
crime of this variety is coercive with clear victims who are forced to participate by 
a handful of powerful and morally corrupt groups. Naturally global conspiracy 
models also maintain divides between upperworld and underworld in which 
legitimate society and economy is segregated from the corruptive influences of 
organized crime. The US model then becomes a hybrid of previous models, called
' l A ' J
by Halstead the “Official US View” model. This view combines hierarchy and 
ethnicity as has already been said. It can be detailed by four further 
characteristics:
1. OC is similar to a corporation
2. OC seeks to monopolize its industry nationally and internationally
3. OC membership is based on ethnicity
4. OC undermines the foundations of democracy corrupting public servants 
and professionals304
These characteristics are differentiated from the patron-client models often 
combined with hierarchical ethnic based notions of OC. The difference is that the 
patron-client model refers specifically to the Italian patron-client system on which 
the Italian Mafia is based.
In examining the economic models of OC, Halstead notes that these models have 
a contribution to make, especially if we can move beyond simplistic accounts of 
supply-demand mechanisms. For example, in examining transaction cost 
economics we can see that in there are essentially two ways in which a consumer 
can obtain the desired product or service. The first is to locate a firm that already 
provides the product or service and the second is to take the DIY approach in 
which the consumer creates the factors of production, presumably because it is 
more cost effective than going to the firm.306 The difference is that the firm has
302 Ibid 4.
303 Ibid 5.
304 Ibid. Quoting Mastrofski and Potter.
305 Ibid 10.
306 Ibid 12.
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already implemented the process which organizes the factors of production and 
therefore is able to benefit from economies of scale, meaning that the firm is more 
efficient. At some point it becomes more cost and time effective for the consumer 
to go to the firm rather that choosing the DIY approach. Taking this into the illicit 
market, it is clear that to simply purchase heroin or cocaine from OC groups is 
much more sound than to attempt to create the factors of production: cultivation, 
processing, transportation and so forth one’s self. At the same time, that groups 
have organized these factors is neither unexpected nor indicative of anything other 
than a natural business process. Halstead notes that “where illegal commodities 
are concerned, ‘organization’ is somehow mysterious and shockingly remarkable 
to observers” where instead “organization in the abstract sense is a logical result 
of the need to lower transaction costs” in the same way that taking milk from the
*307farm to the consumer requires a series of intermediary steps.
Finally, Halstead takes the multiple constituency model for organizational theory 
and posits that this model can explain the nature of the interest various actors have 
in illicit enterprise.308 Based on studies of pressure groups, this model argues that 
interests can arise not just from profit motivated drug dealers and pleasure seeking 
consumers, but also from policy makers, law enforcement officials and even the 
media. The character of the illicit activity then is not merely a result of suppliers 
and consumers participating in an illegal transaction. The nature of the 
relationships between each interested actor and their relative power vis-a-vis other 
actors determines the nature of the particular illicit market as a whole. Unlike the 
early efforts of authors writing on prohibition, Halstead does not seek to remove 
the “illicit” from illicit enterprises, but, however inadvertently, the illicit element 
is diminished through the characterization of different actors seeking to impact the 
system as a whole, with each creating a result based on its relative power in a 
given set of relationships.
In another division of OC models, Williams and Godson organize them into 
political, economic, social, strategic or risk management model, and hybrid or
307 Ibid 13.
308 Ibid 7.
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composite models.309 These models are examined with respect to their predictive 
value and how they can be applied in anticipating OC. Political models 
conceptualize OC in terms of strong and weak states, i.e., states that have always 
been strong or weak as well as states in transition which are either increasing of 
decreasing in their strength. An example of a weak state model was seen in the 
literature review chapter through the work of Thoumi who argued that the strength 
of the Latin American cocaine trade was rooted in the weak governments that 
presided over countries like Colombia.
The low level of effectiveness and legitimacy of the state meant that drug 
trafficking organizations could operate with a high level of impunity. 
During the 1990s, in particular, the lack of financial support for election 
campaigns provided a perfect way for drug trafficking and organized 
crime groups to obtain access to the political elite and to develop and
<11 A
perpetuate political-criminal symbiotic relationships.
Conversely, strong states such as the United States are perceived as less 
susceptible to OC activity while states in transition such as the former Soviet 
Union have varying degrees of potential to develop OC activity depending on the 
fluidity of transition into the new governmental structure.
Williams and Godson divide economic models into the supply-demand model
< j i  1
(market model) and the enterprise model. Quite naturally these economic 
models highlight profit motivation and market conditions over political motives 
and conditions.
The critical dimension in this view is not criminal organizations, but the 
dynamics of illegal markets. Prohibition regimes (which simply reduce 
supply but not demand and therefore push up price) generally encourage
1^ A
an influx of suppliers, varying greatly in size and power.
The enterprise model locates OC on a continuum of business activity from 
business engaging in licit activity with licit products and services to businesses
309 Phil Williams and Roy Godson (2002).
310 Ibid 316.
311 Ibid 322-325.
312 Ibid 324.
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engaging in illicit activity with illicit products and services while encompassing 
the various combinations of activities and degrees of illegality in between.
Social models as examined by Williams and Godson, represent the grass-roots 
elements of OC. Social models such as ethnic, social network and cultural models 
seek to examine personal relationships, cultural ties, diasporas, historical attitudes, 
and so forth, that sustain OC activities on a basic level. Here questions of legality 
enter only in terms of examining opportunities for certain ethnic groups to access 
work or earn profits.
Strategic or risk management model places OC in an adversarial relationship with 
governments and law enforcement officials—bringing back in, at its core, the old 
dichotomy of good and bad. This model is however more sophisticated than 
previous conceptualizations of the adversarial relationship between “cops and 
criminals”. Risk management takes into account that both sides are aware of the 
other and are engaged in a process of minimizing risk to themselves and 
maximizing risk to the adversary. In this there is an effort on both sides to 
“anticipate the behavior of the other and act accordingly”, that is to create
313strategies.
The final set of models are termed hybrid or composite models which take 
combinations of the elements described above in order to provide a more 
comprehensive representation of OC. Hybrid models can also be said to be models 
which capture the position of OC in the post 1990s because they attempt to 
include the dynamism often attributed to this time frame. Two examples of hybrid 
models are transnational and transshipment models. The transnational model 
takes into account the national and the international focusing on three categories: 
opportunities, motivations and resources.314 These categories are broad and 
therefore allow for a variety of social, political and economic factors to be 
included. For example,
[opportunities at the global level...stem from long term secular trends in 
global politics and economics that have encouraged the development
313 Ibid 336.
314 Ibid 340.
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of...transnational organizations. The emergence of a “global village” has 
fundamentally altered the environment in which both legitimate and 
illegitimate businesses operate. The global financial system, the free trade 
system, and the emphasis on open borders, global communications and 
information systems have opened up unprecedented opportunities for 
transnational crime. At the national level, criminal organizations with the 
capacity for cross border activities have flourished where the state has 
been weak, acquiescent, corrupt or collusive. 315
The transshipment model aims to explain a particular aspect of OC in the 
contemporary context by aiming to explain why certain states become 
transshipment points. As interaction between states has become more fluid, so 
have the opportunities for transshipment. This model is based on the work of 
Australian Intelligence Analyst Shona Morrison who argued that there are two 
types of states susceptible to illicit transshipment: vulnerable and sensitive 
states. Vulnerable states tend to be more corrupt while sensitive states are in 
need of more economic stimulation, therefore providing two different conditions 
which can be utilized by OC for transshipment.
Key Thoughts and Ideas
Having briefly described some of the main models and perceptions from 
Criminology and provided a general context from which to work; now we can 
begin to address in more detail some of the useful lines of thought from this 
discipline. These come primarily from the works of Walter Lippmann and Dwight 
Smith, whose critiques of certain aspects of the mainstream line of criminology 
offer us valuable ideas for conceptualizing drugs in IR. Lippmann is chosen 
because his work figures significantly into many of the models of organized crime 
described above, whether or not their respective authors agree with him or not. 
Thus Lippmann’s assertions are a kind of baseline which any study of OC has to 
contend with. Smith’s work is key in terms of the concept of enterprise which he
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid 342.
155
promotes. Smith’s research in particular is apt at laying out various aspects of
• • •  • • •  ' XMenterprise which are pertinent to the perceptions IR has on illicit activities.
In the 1920s thriving criminal activity was spurred by alcohol prohibition in the 
United States. From the study of this activity, several conclusions were reached by 
some observers that did not manage to take hold in the general understanding of 
the public.318 The most notable were observations by political columnist and 
author Walter Lippmann. Lippmann observed that
The fact racketeering seems to infest the small, unstable, disorganized 
industries suggests rather strongly that...the underworld through its 
very crude devices serves that need for social organization which
1 IQ
reputable society has not yet learned to satisfy.
American industrialization had developed rapidly and brought with it several 
problems associated with industries and their employees. Employers tended to be 
brutish and coercive in order to maintain control over costs while workers, 
naturally, increasingly resisted such treatment. Since government had yet to catch 
up with the needs of society, alternative forces stepped in to fill the gap. For 
example, companies would hire gangs as strikebreakers while unions would hire 
gangs to protect themselves against company tactics.
The issue with the crime which Lippmann witnessed was that it was not like 
ordinary crime; it could not be placed in the same category as robbery for 
example. He noted that,
The distinction turns upon this fact: that the criminal as such is wholly 
predatory, whereas the underworld offers something in return to the 
respectable members of society... racketeers have a social function and
317 In some sense it is not important whether Lippmann and Smith were ‘correct’ in their own 
right, but that what they propose in the context of the models and history discussed above opens up 
new perspective which IR or ir has not yet begun to address in a meaningful way.
318 During the time of Lippmann, there already existed the sentiment or inclination towards alien 
conspiracy. As we saw previously this alien conspiracy was very much tied to the prohibition of 
drugs. This is only to say that there were not clear and decisive lines where some ideas were bom 
and where others vanish. Particularly there was a large body o f fiction and pseudo non-fiction 
literature throughout the entirety of the last century that thrived of the insidious and dark nature of 
crime: mixing in notions of white slavery, prostitution, notorious blacks, Chinese, Italians to name 
a few. The most popular of these books were the Lait and Mortimer Confidential series.
319 Walter Lippmann in Gus Tyler (1977) 61.
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• 320perform services for which there is some kind of public demand.
Thus Lippmann brings in two key factors. The first is that contrary to common 
belief (also modem day belief) crime as discussed here need not necessarily be 
predatory. In fact Lippmann is clear that in this case there is an exchange, perhaps 
not so different that exchange of services provided in legitimate commerce. 
Second Lippmann brings in the role of the respectable citizen thereby implicating 
not just the ethnically based foreign groups often associated with criminal activity 
such as the Italians and Irish.
The implication of crime from this point of view was profound. As with predatory 
crimes the reaction to underworld activity had been to address it with law 
enforcement tactics. However, Lippmann posits that,
Because of the scale and character of its operation, the underworld is 
not comprehensible in the ordinary categories of crime. It is 
impossible to deal with it [sic] on the premise that it can be abolished 
by enforcing the law...it is a creature of our laws and conventions, and 
it is entangled with our strongest appetites and our most cherished 
ideals.321 
Furthermore, he notes that,
The underworld, as I am using the term, lives by performing the services 
which convention may condemn and the law may prohibit, but which, 
nevertheless, human appetites crave. The most obvious example, and at the 
present time the most insistent, is of course, the supplying of liquor. Here 
we have a vast industry, engaging, it is said, the direct services of a million 
individuals...The business is controlled by the underworld...It is outlawed 
by our statues. It is patronized by our citizens.
Again the point is made that this crime is not only different from what might 
normally be consider a criminal act, but that, in fact, it is itself a product of our 
own laws, ideas desires etc. Therefore it not merely that the respectable citizen is 
involved, but so are the most inner desires and cravings of humankind. From this
320 Ibid 59.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid 60.
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point of view it is much clearer why law enforcement is much more problematic 
as a solution to regulating human appetites.
If we think back then to the alien conspiracy model, the reason the law was 
ineffective lay in the characteristic of OC as serving a social function. This is 
beyond mere supply and demand, though economics are certainly considered an 
important aspect. The expanded view of OC as the servicing of human desires 
rendered much of law enforcement strategies ineffective since ultimately such 
laws would have to locate a means to stop members of the public from having 
certain ideas.323 Furthermore, the existence of OC can only be a path to 
introspection within a society rather than an indication of alien conspiracy. In this 
sense the focus is not on law enforcement, but on understanding what society has 
not been able to address vis-a-vis the public.
Given this view, it is not then surprising that Lippmann arrives at two simple yet
  •
telling observations about the alcohol prohibition. They are that,
1. criminalizing alcohol made more criminals
2 . there is a concurrent need for introspection while looking to curtail 
damaging vices. The introspection is manifested through two questions:
a. how is respectable society implicated in OC through collusion of 
politics and law enforcement?
b. what causes “our young men” to fall into the vices of drinking, 
gambling and fornication? 324
The first point is how criminalizing of alcohol created more criminals and more 
crime. Prohibition gave a market opportunity to criminal elements which proved 
to be lucrative. As the profits from illegal alcohol sales grew, so did, quite 
naturally, the associated criminal “industry”. These people could be called the 
supply-side criminals. Simultaneously, the patrons who were consuming alcohol 
also came under the purview of the law, creating demand-side criminals. This is 
the simplest level at which prohibition created more criminals.
323 It has been argued that the function of law is in fact to regulate morality through behavior. See 
for example Patrick Devlin (1965) 1-25. Delvin argues that there is a common and knowable 
morality which should be evidenced in the law and to some extent is already.
324 Walter Lippmann in Gus Tyler (1977) 59-65.
158
Lippmann is cautious not to appear to be glorifying the criminal endeavors. He 
delicately moves his discussion towards the underworld as performing a viable 
function, even if it is a function without honor.325 This shifts at least part of the 
' attention away from the morality of the criminals towards the morality of 
American society. This is where Lippmann brings in the idea of introspection 
alongside the very real concern of indulgence in vice by young men and women. 
The desire for freedom from the insecurity of destructive competition is 
not only not a vicious desire, but the essence of social order. This desire is 
frustrated for large numbers of men, and thus perverted to dangerous 
devices, is due at last not to wickedness of men, but to laws and social 
policies which run counter to the invincible necessities. We are, thus, 
forced to examine the very premises of our social morality (emphasis 
added).326
More than introspection, Lippmann points out specific attitudes backed by 
policies which take away the essence of social order. In this case, it is not only 
criminals who corrupt society. Society is a threat to itself via such policies and 
criminality is a byproduct. A similar theme is echoed later by Dwight C Smith in 
his work on the spectrum of enterprise.327
From here the legal aspects of crime become secondary in two ways even though 
law enforcement remains important as a tool. First, the desire to escape an 
unpredictable world and search for security is in fact the basis of the American 
dream. The fruit of the great experiment was all men were created equal with 
certain inalienable rights. Therefore all were to have equal opportunity in the new 
land. As Arthur Schlesinger put it in 1949, when men were freed from the 
European conception of class “instead of everybody being nobody, they found 
that anybody might become somebody.” This meant that if authorities, far or 
near, attempted to encroach on new-found identities, whether through legislation 
or force, they were rendered ineffective. Whether this rendering was a result of 
defiance by brave individuals standing up to oppressive forces, or the debilitated
325 Ibid 62.
326 Ibid 62-64.
327 Dwight C Smith (1980).
328 Arthur M Schlesinger (1943) 237.
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individuals forced into squalid circumstances as a result of oppressive forces was 
inconsequential since in either case the responsibility lay at the foot of 
government.
Second, the primacy of law enforcement is subordinated to larger questions about 
the role of society in criminality. Lippmann, even in discussing political collusion, 
urges the recognition of the blurred distinction between respectable people in 
general and those respectable people who have gone bad through their 
involvement with OC.329 On the one side there is the pure licit world albeit a 
world containing a few ‘good people gone bad’ as the cliche goes. On the other 
hand there is the illicit world containing only the wicked and degenerate who 
quite intentionally seek to entice and corrupt the pure. Even Lippmann manifests 
tinges of this attitude when he states that the underworld products are “consumed 
by the flower of American manhood and womanhood.”
As noted by Lippmann, the high level of lawlessness is maintained by the fact that 
some Americans desire to do so many things that other Americans desire to
^  i
prohibit. The struggle comes not just from without—the pure against the 
impure, but also from within, the desire to be good and to be evil. Smith wrote 
that behind all assertions of legality and illegality as well as which businesses 
were legitimate or not “lie[s] a fundamental issue that cannot be ignored: the 
relationship between Good and Evil.”332 The legality or illegality of a substance or 
act then is a rather arbitrary manifestation of morality at a given point in history. 
Professor John Adams, in an unpublished paper entitled “A1 Capone and I, and 
Prohibition”, hinted at the arbitrariness of existing conceptions of drugs and crime 
where the alcohol industry is seen as a legitimate actor that may perhaps need to 
focus on acting more responsibly where traders in the illicit drug industry are seen 
as beyond contempt, where alcohol consumers are viewed as respectable citizens 
who sometimes may behave badly, whereas drug consumers are seen as morally 
depraved. Ironically, if we made an adjustment in time and location, for example
329 Walter Lippmann, 66-67.
330 Ibid 62.
331 Ibid 67.
332 Dwight C Smith (1980) 371.
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the early 1900s in the United States, the positions of alcohol and drugs would be 
reversed, with alcohol seen as the greatest threat to society and morality.
Dwight Smith deepens the discussion around relationship between crime and 
legitimate economic activity. Starting from sociologist Edwin Sutherland’s 
critique of the distinction between white-collar and lower-class crime, Smith 
argues for the removal of distinctions between white-collar and organized crime, 
thereby extending Sutherland’s assertion for the removal of moral distinctions 
between white-collar and lower-class crime to encompass organized crime as 
well. It was Sutherland took crime out of the “ghettos” and brought it to the 
nation’s doorstep by showing how crime was not a function of poverty, that is, 
there was no difference between white-collar crime and ordinary crime and that 
respectable people also committed crimes in high levels of society. Sutherland 
noted that just as the white-collar criminal justifies his or her activities through 
peer group references, so do lower class criminals.334 Sutherland showed in fact 
that peer groups provide the ethical justifications needed for committing crimes. A 
corporate criminal would learn his behavior in certain kinds of social groups who 
would give him the justifications he would need in order to commit the crime. 
Therefore crime was not reserved for the poor and included higher levels of 
society as well. Neither set of individuals were ethically or morally lacking since 
in their own minds the moral justifications were in place.
Smith then argues that joining white-collar crime and organized crime theories 
under the banner of enterprise can remove much of the complications associated 
with both lines of research. For organized crime research this complication 
included the problematic alien conspiracy model. Instead he proposed that all 
criminal activity should be viewed as another aspect of the economy.335 As a 
result, he argued that there was not a legal or illegal, moral or immoral, simply 
economic activity that addressed customer demands. For Smith, enterprise serves 
as the way to view this set of relationships.
333 Vincenzo Ruggiero (2000) 2-3.
334 Ibid 358.
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Specifically, Smith presented a spectrum of economic activity that ranges from 
legitimate to illegitimate businesses activities. In this taxonomy, two elements 
were brought forth. First, the economy, which had always been assumed to mean 
the legitimate economy, was combined with the criminal economy. Thus, ‘The 
Economy’ now included licit and illicit activities. Second, the moral element of 
crime was taken out. Criminal actors were now traders in a market with much the 
same desires and motivations as other, ‘respectable’ market actors.
Which Enterprise?
Enterprise can be seen in two facets. One is to take enterprise crime, particularly 
organized crime, as a business acted upon by market forces and subject, most 
importantly, to the mechanisms of supply and demand as well as organizational 
theories. The first tendency is to focus strictly on the organizational analogy as 
noted in Halsted’s analysis above. This means there is a tendency to show how 
crime is organized like a corporation with a president, executive heads, line 
managers and lower level employees. The second is to look at the larger context, 
the market, in which crime functions, considering drugs as a commodity, 
criminals as rational actors, and various processes as manifestations of economic 
laws. The most common example is the supply-demand argument where willing 
consumers and willing businessmen are engaged in a “natural” transaction. The 
problem arises from the interference of governments in the private lives of 
individuals. The ultimate conclusion of this interpretation of enterprise is that 
criminalization is the problem and therefore drugs should be legalized.
Enterprise interpreted in this way is useful not necessarily because of what it 
express in the analogy of crime as a business. Of course if such an analogy could 
be shown as credible, then a business model of crime would be a powerful 
predictive tool for law enforcement and this has certainly been the intention 
among some scholars and policy makers—a search for the formula to unlock the 
mysteries of crime. Such a formula has not been forthcoming and most attempts at 
the business-crime analogy have concluded with a flat note, having run into some 
key barriers. First is that the type of information needed to make such analogies 
simply is not available, i.e., stock values, quarterly profits, overhead, employee
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turnover, mergers and acquisitions, and a series of other indicators used to 
understand the functioning of businesses do not exist when considering illicit 
activities. Additionally, the information needed to apply organizational theories 
also would require a certain quality of information about the internal relationships 
within a given crime structure—an element that is often unknown even to many of 
the participants within the structure itself.
Second, is that, where successful analogies have been made, there has been little 
comprehension of the value or non-value of such analogies. For example, it seems 
that at least there might have been a correct analogy in the 1950’s to say that 
certain organized crime structures within the United States functioned like a 
business (even though this view has been heavily critiqued). The conclusion 
drawn from this was that Americans should be scared and law enforcement should 
be increased to tackle the problem. Therefore, as has been seen repeatedly, ideas 
and conceptions are reduced to legalize or criminalize, drawing the least 
interesting conclusion from an otherwise potentially valuable endeavour. Thus 
the value of enterprise remains, as Smith noted in the 1970s, that a shift from 
organized crime to illicit enterprise would, “direct our attention away from the 
stereotypes of crime”.
Enterprise served to divert attention away from legal considerations. In this 
regard, Smith noted three key points about organized crime. First, that OC forces 
do not compromise societal values, but, in fact, it is the already compromised 
societal values that lead to crime in the first place; second, that taking OC out of 
the context of illegality allows us to escape stereotypes of crime which make for 
good stories and news broadcasts, but serve little else; and third, that legality or 
illegality is an arbitrary expression of common values that have only a secondary 
bearing on the enterprise of crime: recalling here that Smith envisioned a 
spectrum of enterprise in which actors engage in a market, buying and selling 
goods.337 At one point on this spectrum, due to an arbitrary set of events, this 
enterprise falls into the illicit realm. Though Smith does not emphasize the point 
of history, he also suggests that this line of tolerance between licit and illicit shifts
336 Dwight C Smith (1975) 335.
337 Ibid 335-336.
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according to changing values, and thus what is an illegal enterprise today may or 
may not be one tomorrow.338
In this way Smith brings in several valuable aspects to the debate on crime. The 
most important aspect being the movement out of the legalize-criminalize debate. 
This is done by removing the supporting pillar of criminalization through a 
neutralization of the argument on compromised societal values. Values remain a 
central matter, answering the concerns of morally driven argument on crime. 
However, the responsibility of values is shifted back onto the licit world—the 
world of respectable citizens and away from the generic conceptions of depraved 
criminals. By implication, legalization can also not be a “cure all” answer since 
the values of respectable society still must be analyzed—a point which proponents 
of legalization are always careful to avoid outside of superficial blame strategies 
which entail accusing governments for the apparent morally depravity of certain 
members of its society. Certainly legalization proponents, not unlike their 
counterparts, take their values and morality to be pure and just, a priori, and 
therefore not subject to analytical questioning.
Next Smith includes factors of legality, which, in any case and however arbitrary, 
do have an impact on the environment in which actors function. Thus, it could be 
said that on a very practical level the legality issue does make a tactical difference 
on how crime functions. For example, GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals makes a 
new drug. Because they have access to patents and legitimization as a legal entity, 
they are able to pursue within courts another entity copying their product, suing 
them for damages and loss of profit. Whereas if a new drug or method of 
processing illegal/illicit drugs is invented, there is little option in the way of 
recourse for illicit entities to protect themselves. The most common way this 
occurs is through violence. Thus, the law is not dismissed outright but placed in 
its “right” position as a modifier of the market in which actors function, rendering 
possible some actions and not others. Here it should be noted that even when 
arguments called for an outright dismissal of legal concerns they proved 
unconvincing in any case because it was evident that law enforcement did have an
338 Dwight C Smith (1980) 371.
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impact on the criminal environment, at least in part, and also because there was 
and is a large structure of law enforcement oriented proponents that were not 
going to accept being so easily cancelled out. The correct placement of legal 
concerns then forces questions about the correct functioning of the law.
Finally, Smith implies the need to address history through his concept spectrum 
and the moving line of the law. Here enterprise remains constant—there is a 
spectrum of activity that takes place in a market structure that is not subject to 
time, relatively speaking; that is relative to the changing common values 
expressed in the law. Here then history becomes an important area of investigation 
because there is a double question that arises: what is the time of the market and 
what is the time of the moving line of the law? Where does the current market 
come from and what does it allow in defining the possibilities on the spectrum of 
enterprise? (This is represented by the shift towards globalization and changing 
the possibilities that it afforded thus altering the spectrum of illicit activity). Then, 
if the law is an expression of common values, what are the historical 
circumstances that cause it to change? (This being the incorporation of history 
seen in Chapter Four).
The assertion here is that enterprise makes its most valuable contributions outside 
of the behavioral modeling as applied in legitimate businesses. It is the context 
within which enterprise is bom and the nuances and implications it gives rise to 
which are most interesting for this research. The following sections engage with 
these aspects of enterprise rather than focusing on whether crime is a business or 
not. If enterprise is engaged on this level, then the result is to fall back into the 
pendulum-like debate. Concepts such as the spectrum of enterprise are valuable in 
what they imply and where they point our attention rather than containing an 
intrinsic value in and of themselves. As demonstrated in part through Smith’s 
work as discussed above, it is through this line of questioning and analysis that the 
traps of the drug problem can be avoided and a new space for thought can be 
opened on the dmg issue. Then perhaps in such a space a more objective view on 
drugs and crime could be achieved, though this is, for now, still speculation.
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The Contribution o f Enterprise
The contributions of enterprise are several. They begin with the movement away 
from the law as an a priori context for solution finding. Since the law is seen as an 
arbitrary expression of societal values in a given moment in time, there is no 
objective morality that obliges us to counteract drugs. With this said there is a 
more sober point of departure where drugs are assessed not out of fear and frenzy, 
but from a more distanced and certainly calmer view. The law can be considered 
as a policy tool or it can be studied as a disciplining structure to be analyzed as 
one of many factors that impact drug trafficking.
Next enterprise focuses on processes and not just actors. Here we could ask, what 
are the conditions which facilitate the growth of drug trafficking outside of the 
superficial explanations of poverty and globalization? Here the question becomes 
what policies, domestic and international, could be facilitating the growth of the 
drug trade? When the question of who is participating in the drug trade arises, it is 
then only to complete a picture of the drug trade and not to scapegoat certain 
groups as culprits or out of desperation to locate criminals. In looking at processes 
there is the inherent implication of influences which are internal and external to a 
given trade. A simple illustration clarifies this latter point. Currently there is a 
strong emphasis on the explosion of drugs flowing out of Afghanistan. This is 
echoed in media and in academia alike and the standard response has been the 
expected response: either we need to become tougher on traffickers or we need to 
understand that tough measures only deprive poor farmers of their only source of 
income (a variation of the legalization theme). Both arguments touch upon a piece 
of the drug situation in Afghanistan—the first because it does demand to know if 
the outflow of drugs is indeed creating social decay in domestic and international 
markets and the second because it raises the issue of economic stability. With 
enterprise we would take these points in a wider context and ask, as well, what 
policies and action are contributing to the drug situation in Afghanistan now. In a 
simple example we know that US military action created regional instability. We 
also know that drug trade patterns follow regions of instability. Therefore we 
know that US action may have, at least in part, contributed to the drug explosion 
currently in progress. Of course we would also have to assess whether there is in 
fact a drug explosion, going back to the problem of statistics and drug surveys.
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Nonetheless Lippmann’s introspection leads to a kind of self-reckoning where all 
actions taken vis-a-vis a region are potentially relevant where drugs are concerned 
and falsely maintained divides in policy realms are broken down. What is the 
implication of introspection? Practically, it hints towards a different policy action: 
it explains first and foremost why law enforcement does not work as a self- 
contained solution. There are operational limits to law enforcement but this point 
has never been placed within a larger explanatory context which would then point 
towards other policy actions and thus has always remained as a kind of slight on 
law enforcement measures, i.e. a way to argue, ultimately, for legalization.
Then, enterprise could ask for the relevance of history especially by pointing out 
the arbitrary nature of laws. But this is not a history drawn for the sake of 
including history, but a history that acts as a second step because after 
introspection the question becomes, “but how did we get here?” The answer may 
also show that history is irrelevant or at least certain histories are irrelevant—an 
option rarely considered with respect to the use of history in analysis. Continuing 
with the example of Afghanistan it is often noted that the region has a long history 
of opium production. In the contemporary context and from an enterprise point of 
view this knowledge adds little to the discussion other than to say that local labor 
is skilled in opium cultivation and that opium is perhaps more culturally 
acceptable than in the West—both minor points that while interesting yield little 
understanding of the current trade. On the other hand the history of tribal or clan 
relations provides a useful understanding to the progression and current process of 
drug production where it can be seen that certain regional groupings have used 
drugs to retain a certain level of autonomy, both political and military. This in turn 
explains why for example certain drug trade routes manifest as they do.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
Drugs and IR Theory
The aim of this concluding chapter is to review the arguments of previous 
chapters and to locate them in the context of key issues within the discipline of IR. 
The intention is to understand clearly what the significance of the preceding 
research holds for the way we study and present the issue of drugs in International 
Relations. We therefore begin with a review of the previous chapters as a prelude 
to a deeper examination of IR. This chapter closes with some brief 
recommendations for future research in this area.339
Chapter One began with an introduction to the basis on which the current research 
was conducted. First, we saw that there is a general recognition that drugs, their 
production, trade and consumption, are important to IR even though serious IR 
research on drugs is still rare. Next we saw that in the age of globalization drugs 
have taken on new characteristics. Therefore if we knew anything about drugs at 
all, which we established was already rather sparse research, we would recognize 
that globalization has changed the drug landscape in specific ways. These changes 
had, or should have had a direct impact on how we address drugs in policy 
making and even before this should have had an impact on how we study drugs. 
Finally, we also saw how it is that drugs have an impact on topics which*are 
already central to IR such as military force and security and therefore warrant 
being studied in the discipline of IR as well as in more traditional disciplines such 
as criminology.
This led to a presentation of areas where IR has tried to engage drugs and some of 
the possible, general theoretical frameworks which have initial relevance to the 
drug issue. This was conducted via an analysis of Burger’s work on theoretical 
approaches to what are termed illicit sectors in IR. Burger began by dividing IR 
into Realism and Security Studies, Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Institutionalism, 
Economic Liberalism, Mercantilism and Dependencia or Structural World
339 For the purpose of this chapter and the last chapter, Criminology, organized crime are used 
interchangeably.
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Systems Theory. Burger’s primary argument was that Realist were the main 
determinant of perceptions of IR in the study of drugs: this usually meant treating 
drugs as a security threat and suggesting therefore they must be dealt with via 
force. Burger concluded that there was not yet an appropriate framework to 
address illicit narcotics in IR and that further study was needed.
Chapter One concluded with a discussion of the role of non-state actors as a 
possible filter through which IR could better understand illicit drugs. This 
involved consideration of the role of non-state actors in IR and how this role can 
be expanded to the illicit actor. Chapter One also examined the role of history and 
of the past debate in our perception of the drugs issue. The latter point was of 
particular importance because as historian Mike Jay had noted in his work on 
opium in the Victorian Era, drugs are usually presented as a subject without 
history with only piecemeal references to stereotypical phenomena such as 
Chinese opium dens and American mobsters. These masquerade as substantial 
historical representation in drug discourses, yet they obscure the very real and 
enduring influence of the past debate over drugs on contemporary perceptions and 
policy.
Chapter Two conducted a survey of literature within IR and of the literature often 
used in IR from neighboring fields when addressing illicit sectors. After a 
discussion of several categories of literature which included non-state actors, IPE 
and crime/terrorism, the chapter produced five main arguments. Firstly that the 
debate in IR on drugs is fragmented and incoherent: it provides little to serve as a 
basis how drugs are to be treated by the discipline. Secondly, if there was going to 
be a guiding thread as to how drugs should be treated in IR literature, it would 
have to draw on the literature of non-state actors and transnational relations, even 
if these concepts were often only implicit in arguments on drugs and rarely dealt 
with substantially in this context. Thirdly, drugs are often presented in a one­
dimensional and caricatured manner with allusions to Mafia style organizations, 
mysterious and hidden modem criminal networks and other “made in Hollywood” 
images. These fail to provide a substantial engagement with the question of drugs, 
therefore preventing the emergence of alternative views (and responses) to drugs. 
Fourthly, there is a general confusion in the IR literature about the discussion
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between drugs, organized crime, terrorism, corruption, and illicit sectors. The lack 
of distinction blurs the subject under analysis: instead discussion shifts back and 
forth between terms and in so doing imply sets of relations that are not necessarily 
validated; for example, speaking about dfugs, terrorism and crime as synonyms 
and so implying that terrorists and drug traffickers are more of less the same. That 
the latter is a fallacy which came to light when it was shown that most terrorist 
organizations received their money from private or political contributions, not 
necessarily the drug trade while one of the largest drug producers of the 1990s, the 
Taleban, were not considered a terrorist organization at all. Chapter Two 
concluded with the notion that drugs by nature are considered a negative factor to 
be “dealt with” as a criminal phenomenon, a view that was challenged by a few 
authors who showed that drugs can add value to the economy and society and are 
not entirely parasitic.
Chapter Three examined the discussion of narcotics in international organizations. 
It took the UN World Drug and FATF Reports as a means of showing how drugs 
are conceptualized in the international and policy making realms. These 
documents were chosen mostly because they are the most frequently referred to 
documents of non-academic origin. As such they are influential in the way they 
shape the debate on drugs, particularly in policy responses. Analysis of the 
documents showed three main results. The first is a misleading impression where 
the reports treat drugs as a subject that is capable of being studied with reports 
written in a confident and reassuring tone. This attitude however is only a veneer 
that again hides the complexities of the drug issue. Such actions are at least in part 
related to the nature of international organizations themselves, whereby with an 
apparently authentic discussion of statistics and trends, they have a need to present 
a solid image, according to which, whatever the situation at hand, it is under 
control. Part of this attitude is the report’s use of measurements, particularly 
statistics, to quantify the drug trade, and so reinforce again the appearance of 
being capable of managing the situation. It follows then that since drugs are 
addressable and measurable, drugs are wholly controllable. These three points, we 
saw rest side by side with contradictory depictions of drugs according to which 
drugs are a hidden enemy, difficult to research, and therefore difficult to measure 
and control.
170
In Chapter Four we saw how perceptions of drugs, how they are characterized and 
the solutions proposed, are not, as is often portrayed, a subject without history. 
Drugs and drug policies have a rich and long history, often complex and 
associated with other developments in politics and society. This latter point may 
seem evident, yet drugs are too often portrayed as existing in a historical vacuum, 
Hobden and Hobson had accused IR of being chronofetishistc and 
temprocentric.340 Of course this does not preclude the many long historical 
accounts of drugs that evoke images of rich Imperial courts in China or 
romanticized images of damp wooden docks on the Barbary Coast. These images 
however were rarely incorporated into serious analysis when discussing 
contemporary drug issues: they seemed to exist in a vacuum—having appeared 
quite spontaneously, as it were, in the last week, year or ten years depending on 
the audience. Chapter Four sought to correct this history by showing, at least in 
summary form, how the legalize versus criminalize debate developed. This led to 
the understanding of how there had always been a licit-illicit overlap.
Given the conclusions of the previous chapters, Chapter Five made some initial 
steps to provide an alternative way of addressing drugs in IR. It took as its starting 
point the concept of organized crime (OC). This served first to show that drugs 
and OC often ran parallel in history but also that OC as an actor-based approach 
had diminished the focus on drugs per se and had instead focused on the people 
involved, presumably because the law enforcement oriented approach to drugs 
necessitated such a focus. In criminology there was however a strand that called 
for viewing crime as not the mere failure to repress or comply with laws but as 
enterprise. Though not taken as a pure model, the foundations and general ideas 
of enterprise, it was argued, can form a more appropriate basis for analyzing drugs 
in International Relations and can in any event also inform ir as well.
Contributions from OC
OC brought in the concept and ideas from Smith and Lippmann. Enterprise 
focused on processes as well as actors and commodities in a comprehensive
340 Stephen Hobden and John M Hobson (2002) 5-41.
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processes. It highlights intangible factors which enable these processes by raising 
inclusive questions, for want of a better term, such as what in a society generates 
those who wish to participate in the consumption of drugs. This latter point is 
delicate. There is no lacking in the study of why people take drugs. These studies 
often though presuppose an ‘Us versus Them’ situation where the drug user is 
‘Them’, a subject to be studied separated from us—presumably the researchers 
and observers who are a part of “normal” society. Inclusive questioning raises 
different issues altogether. It would ask what attitudes and beliefs within a society 
as a whole permit within it the existence of drug use? Not as a deviance, but as a 
natural outcome? In the extreme we could ask how the individual, any individual, 
in the course of their daily beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, social, economic or 
otherwise creates the conditions for the drug trade to ensue. Here of course 
emerges into view a broader set of questions about modem consumer societies 
and globalization seen in the general demand by young people in developed states 
for narcotics which urges us to again look inwardly to our own societies as 
Lippmann suggested, beyond mere supply and demand dynamics. Here when we 
refer back to the IR literature and to the drug reports we see that the view 
presented is unable to address or even encompass this latter point.
Both Lippmann and Smith seem to move away from the legal-illegal 
characterizations thus offering a view which, while not excluding legal concerns, 
seeks to place such factors on an equal footing with other elements which, as seen 
in the various models described above, also have a bearing on shaping illicit 
enterprises. This means that they allow us to see not just actors but also processes, 
suggesting that the non-state actors approach may be too facile and unable to 
encompass the complexities of illicit sectors. Furthermore, if the focus on actors is 
diminished, or at least if actors are seen as participants in a more dynamic system 
of competing interests and relationships, there is a natural move away from 
prosecution oriented perceptions. In essence, it becomes harder to find someone to 
blame.
More importantly, the study of OC opens up discussions that go beyond the 
legalize-criminalize dichotomy by allowing for alternative viewpoints on drug 
trafficking to include a different historical accounts of the genesis of the drug
172
issue. Furthermore, enterprise addresses soft topics such as values and ethics 
within criminal organization. All this has implications for IR in a shift away from 
a focus on the actors, both state and non-state, and towards analysis in terms of a 
flow of services that has global production, distribution and sales channels in 
which actors participate. Here Lippmann’s element of introspection can be added 
to the discussion of international norms, i.e., what is it that we are doing that 
creates the problems we are attempting to extinguish. Practically this means 
examining what the different states’ foreign policies are which serve to create or 
at least facilitate the drug trade.
Here we could take the example of the recent intervention in Iraq. In 2004 the 
author published an article titled Forecasting Narcobusiness where it was argued 
that the next new artery for trafficking was likely to be established through Iraq: 
the situation there contained the correct convergence of elements that give rise to 
narcobusiness.341 This was verified a few months later in a conversation with an 
Iraqi professor visiting London who recounted how before the war there was little 
drug use in the region, however, now there was a drug explosion and even new 
drugs such as cocaine had entered the opium dominated region.342 What was not 
emphasized in the article was that foreign policy choices such as going to war in 
Iraq have a direct implication on the drug trade and narcotics consumption. 
Therefore if states are concerned about stopping drugs, the narcotics aspect of the 
action in Iraq should have been considered. It has indeed now recently come to 
light that in fact there is an increasing drug problem in Iraq caused by fear, 
desperation and instability as well as increased narcotics trade through the 
country.343 It is too late to stop this trade from ensuing yet again. While the UN 
has only recently decided to formulate a response, the trade, as always many steps 
ahead of even the best organizations, is already established and rooted. Using the 
arguments from previous chapters, and as the Forecasting Narcobusiness article 
argues, it would have been possible to foresee the current situation, taking into 
account historical experience in the region with the drug trade, patterns of opium 
trafficking from Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as local and regional
341 Padideh Tosti (2004).
342 Saad Jawad (2004).
343 Global Policy Forum (2005).
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propensities towards consuming a certain drug versus another. Keeping in mind 
that what we do in the so called licit world has a drug facet, the conclusion that 
drug trafficking in Iraq was likely after the intervention was not mere speculation, 
but a clear and relatively predictable consequence.
Themes in IR
The next section examines the relationship of themes discussed so far and IR 
itself. Again, the aim is not to posit Lippmann, Smith or enterprise as the final 
word on drugs. In all, as with the aim of this research herein, is to open further 
points of view and possibilities on the drug debate rather than establishing finite 
conclusions.
The State
The state in IR can generally be organized into the following two categories: state 
as primary actor with the main focus of contending with security concerns and 
states as fragmented entities comprised of competing interests. The former is a 
realist and the latter a pluralist approach. In the first case we can recall from 
previous chapters the views of Presidents Nixon and Reagan: for them drugs and 
crime are security matters and in the purview of the state—a point further 
demonstrated by early drug warriors such as Anslinger as discussed in previous 
chapters. We can surmise then that, in this case, drugs are a natural part of 
international politics and high diplomacy—appropriate as a topic for treaties and 
transnational negotiations in the most traditional sense. Yet drugs challenge this 
realist view of the state in two ways. First drugs show that the state in question is 
itself often a part of the drug process, particularly in producing countries. The 
assertion that the state ultimately speaks with one voice regarding a topic is indeed 
based on an assumption that the state is not itself a part of or compromised by that 
topic itself. Second, realism assumes the official government also by definition 
holds power, however, and especially in drug producing nations, drug traffickers 
often exercise more power than the recognized government.
Drugs highlight several aspects of the fragmentation of states with regard to illicit 
behaviors. Simplistic models of legal/illegal, licit/illicit are inadequate here.
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Competing interests interact in a realm of conflict and even conspiracy. This 
aspect of the drug trade has not been examined deeply in this research, partially 
because conspiracy by its nature is nearly impossible to engage in a reasonable 
manner. With respect to competing interests Alfred McCoy has written 
extensively on the role of the CIA in trafficking opium, particularly in Southeast 
Asia. McCoy argues that in pursuit of winning the Cold War the CIA worked 
against official US and international policy to sustain the opium trade in Southeast 
Asia. Illustrating competing interests he describes one instance involving a DEA 
Agent in Thailand:
Mike Levine said that he wanted to go up country to Chiangmai, the 
heroin capital of Southeast Asia at that point, the finance and processing 
center and hub of an enterprise. He wanted to make some major seizures. 
Through a veiled series of cut outs in the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, 
instructions were passed to his superiors in the DEA, who told him he 
couldn’t go up and make the bust. He was pulled off the case.344
Other writers such as Cockbum and St. Clair argue that the CIA particularly is a 
small, independent government which acts outside or above the normal 
parameters of the US government.345 In this conception of competing state 
interests processes of democracy are bypassed and the rights of citizen violated.
As noted from previous chapters and specifically from the work of Galeotti, the 
presence of drugs in a country impacts that state in several ways. The first way is 
that the presence of drugs in a state alters its relations with other states. Usually 
states that host trafficking and production lose international leverage as they are 
continually under pressure to control the illicit activities within their territory. 
Between the US and Columbia for example the drug issue occupies a significant 
portion of the foreign policy agenda and consumes aid dollars that could be 
otherwise utilized. Second, the presence of drugs in a society is perceived as 
compromising legitimate state mechanisms of law enforcement, taxation and the 
state’s economic legitimacy. Whether this is in fact true is to some degree
344 ‘Interview with Alfred McCoy’ (1991).
345 Alexander Cockbum and Jeffrey St Clair (1999). Also see Alexander Cockbum (1998).
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irrelevant: the very belief of it effects behavior. Businesses and tourists alike are 
weary of the corruption and lawlessness that is associated with drugs. An example 
would be the Jamaican tourist resorts where visitors are ushered into enclosed 
tourist havens while wandering outside of designated tourist zones is considered 
extremely dangerous for them. For business relations, local economic institutions 
and mechanisms are seen as corrupt or compromised and therefore not suitable for 
investment activity. With the advent of asset forfeiture states have been pitted 
against their citizens where hawkish law enforcement agencies seeking to 
confiscate assets of drug traffickers and money launderers have ended up 
harassing ordinary citizens rather than catching criminals.346 This naturally has 
diminished relationships between citizens and the state.
Drug traffickers are, moreover, seen as impeding the natural growth and 
development of a state domestically. This is the third conclusion. Drugs are 
blamed for the slow growth of many states of the former Soviet Union as well as 
being a key impediment in the development of Mexico and Latin American states. 
This can be because already scarce state resources are diverted to combat drugs or 
because traffickers themselves interfere in state processes. Compromising the 
viability of the legitimate government domestically dis-empowers citizens and 
encourages individuals to seek their own solutions, usually solutions outside of 
legal systems. Fourth, domestic agencies and law enforcement authorities, 
particularly in western states, are drawn into interagency and interdepartmental 
budgetary rivalries where those agencies focus on drug interdiction. Fifth, drugs 
highlight the weaknesses of the state: in some instances drugs provide economic 
activity and services where the legitimate government has failed. In this way 
drugs help to finance a phantom government, at least in areas where the drug 
business has a significant presence.
In questioning the moral and philosophical basis of a society that allows drugs to 
persist, some facets of what we have drawn from the discussions of criminology 
seemingly support the role of the state as moral enforcer. Thus as a final point,
346 Asset forfeiture is a contentious issue because it adds a monetary incentive for law 
enforcement to confiscate money and property of criminals. See for example Jarret B Wollstein 
(1998).
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drugs can and do place the state in the role of moral arbitrator—expressing 
concern for the morality and general welfare of its citizens and the effects that 
drugs will have on them and larger social units such as the family, the community 
and society. The state does not see itself as imposing on citizens, but assisting 
them to maintain values common to all citizens. Instead what has been thus far 
discussed sheds light on how these elements actually constitute an environment 
that makes certain illicit actions possible. To clarify this point we can link the role 
of the state to the family values debate in America. As noted in her article on the 
role of the state and family values, Cooper Davis showed how America was 
caught in a constitutional bind whereby the US Constitution allowed for moral 
toleration, but not for moral standard-setting as an end in itself. The roots of this 
date back to the anti-slavery movement and concepts associated with allowing for 
a measure of individual autonomy for each individual.347 Since the state viewed 
slaves as inferior anyway, the possibility of slave participation in choosing their 
own families and therefore passing on their moral values was negated. In any 
event it was assumed that whatever interests slaves may have would be absorbed 
under the consideration of the slave master. The conclusion this led to was then to 
recognize that slaves can have a social and political voice: they are therefore 
capable, inherently capable, of morality. So as not to exchange the slave master 
for the state and to allow a level of self determination for slaves the state’s role 
was diminished. In relation to the drug agenda, the problem arises when the state 
wants a standard set in an environment constituted by moral tolerance. This 
explains in part why it is only rigid and intolerant state regimes that have managed 
to successfully stop drugs: they are, for one, not impeded by their philosophical 
foundations but rather aided by them. Centrally controlled states thus are not at 
odds with anti-drug policies, whereas more democratic forms of governance 
appear to be in a constitutional bind, much as Cooper illustrates for regulating 
morality in general.
Non-state Actors
The analysis of non-state actors in IR has normally focused on legitimate actors. 
Only recently has non-state actors come to incorporate in any serious basis illicit
347 Peggy Davis Cooper (1994).
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actors, save the long standing consideration of terrorists under this category. Non­
state actors have often been seen in terms of their ability to undermine state 
power, but this was not as a negative, but rather as a positive and natural 
progression of the state giving away to a peaceful global society. In this pluralist 
conception non-state actors were the good guys, international regimes and 
nongovernmental organizations, who would usher in an age of a new global civil 
society where resources were evenly distributed and old realist wars were replaced 
by mutual benefit and respect among cultures.
Approaching non-state actors from another direction, we now turn to how the drug 
issue influences international institutions, particularly where those institutions 
concern themselves with law making and conventions. The UN Security Council, 
the ODC and law enforcement bodies like Interpol and Europol remain largely the 
international supporters of the current anti-drug policies. Instruments such as UN 
Resolutions serve to apply pressure for compliance and to sustain the general 
international rhetoric of anti-drug policies.348 Much like state to state relations, 
drugs use up the resources of both agencies and states as well as occupying the 
policy agenda where other matters might otherwise be addressed.
Since the late decades of the 1900s (and certainly after September 11th), non-state 
actors have presented a different concern to the state. As always the issue remains 
state sovereignty, however this time sovereignty is compromised by terrorists, 
organized crime and black markets who become parasites that eat away at the 
integrity of state. Drugs here fit in somewhere between terrorists and black 
markets facilitating terrorism and commanding the illicit trade—a situation 
exacerbated all the more by the opportunities of globalism. The proliferation of 
international institutions, research institutes, NGOs, small business and new 
multinational conglomerates in globalization was also accompanied by a 
proliferation of illicit businesses, new trafficking opportunities and new markets 
such as human trafficking.
348 See for example United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000).
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The next question then becomes how the non-state actors influence the world of 
politics. In the case of terrorists this was a valid question since most movements 
were a means of implicitly seeking to influence one government or another as well 
as influencing public sympathies. So do drug traffickers seek to influence? Does 
the trade in general have an aim beyond profit motives, more precisely does the 
drug trade have an ideology? If the answer to these questions is no, then localizing 
the analysis of drugs in the context of non-state actors is perhaps misleading. Here 
we tread in delicate territory however. Taking into account new lines of inquiry 
gained from OC, we would have to analyze on a case by case basis whether there 
is a motive to influence beyond standard forms of activities required to grease the 
wheels of illicit trade. This means that the corruption of individuals at key access 
points such as at national borders is only carried out to facilitate the trafficking 
process and not necessarily because there is a larger intention to corrupt the state 
or compromise the government. As mentioned before, a tendency among drug 
traffickers is to seek to establish themselves within the community as legitimate 
citizens. Whether traffickers eventually seek legitimacy for business or personal 
reasons is unclear. In either case it does not necessarily imply they are seeking to 
implement a new ideology. In this case they can be seen as seeking to influence 
government, usually at the local levels.
In general we can look at six ways in which the presence of drugs can impact or 
influence political affairs (some of these have already been discussed in Chapter 
One). Here it is important to note that this presence works in a variety of ways, 
whereby sometimes the presence of drugs compromises the state and other times 
is used by the state. First states can seek the drug trade as a means to define new 
threats and thereby justify budgets of agencies tasked with counter drug efforts. 
This argument is often applied to the US, particularly to the CIA, FBI and DEA. 
Second the presence of drugs in a state can at times create its own territorial 
confines and service structures which can become a breakaway territory or a mini­
state within the formally recognized state. The warlords of Afghanistan who 
control the opium trade for example are said to be outside of the control of Kabul, 
even with the presence of the US military there. As a corollary, the state-within-a- 
state can be further supported by local populations which see the presence of 
drugs as either a “rebellious” challenge to an existing structure that has failed
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them or a source of economic stability—here we could think of the case of the 
Aymara Indians in Bolivia mentioned in the first chapter or the peasant farmers in 
Laos who have lost their income source due to crop eradication programs put forth 
by the UN.349
Next, the presence of drugs can inadvertently create challenges the state outside of 
any direct intention of participants in the drug trade. For example, as populations 
increase the number of people using drugs also increases. This can put additional 
strain on state resources to meet the results of increased drug use without it being 
a necessary intention of the drug trade to create such a condition. Fourth, 
conversely the state can inadvertently provide opportunities for drugs to reach 
consumers in the pursuit of legitimate business practices and the facilitation of 
global trade. As Kal Raustiala from UCLA noted regarding NAFTA,
Free trade agreements trigger infrastructure changes in the way licit trade 
is carried out, and these changes, in turn, help drug traffickers. Larger, 
more modem ports, lower airfares and more border-crossing stations all 
assist traffickers at the margin. And major innovations, like the use of 
standardized containers in international shipping, help even more [even if] 
these changes don’t flow directly from free trade agreements....
Fifth, predatory practices instigated by the presence of drugs, particularly along 
trade routes and in laundering finances can lead to corruption and bribery. This 
compromises a state’s legitimacy and can bring into question its economic 
' viability both domestically and internationally. In some cases these predatory 
practices become militarized, escalating into a direct security challenge to the 
state. Finally, the perception by states and their populations alike about the prior 
points ultimately shapes national and international agendas even if the drug trade 
does not seek influence these agendas at all.
Globalization
David Held noted that, “few areas of social life escape the reach of processes of 
globalization. These processes are reflected in social domains from the cultural to
349 ‘Southeast Asia: Drug War Success Means Poverty for Laotian Farmers’ (2006)
350 Kal Raustalia (2006). Also see David R. Brewley-Taylor (1998).
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the political, the legal, the military and the environmental.” Held could have 
also added the illegal to this list. As often noted throughout this work there is no 
separation between the licit and the illicit. Therefore it is of little surprise that the 
phenomenon of globalization has facilitated as many illegitimate activities as 
legitimate ones.
Globalization is defined here as the expansion and interlinking of politics, trade, 
finance, business and culture in a manner more intense than previously witnessed 
historically. For example, while certainly there were international businesses and 
commodities before, in globalization the access to diverse markets and the choice 
of business opportunities for manufacturing and delivery are at a higher quantity 
than before. The increased business opportunities and new and efficient processes 
also facilitated the expansion of the drug trade. Drugs were able to enter into new 
markets alongside licit goods in the states of the former Soviet Union while new 
forms of international finance allowed for new ways to launder funds from the 
increased trade. This predicament is not unlike the discussion on morality and the 
state. The belief in economic liberalism constructs an environment in which 
corporations grow side by side with the illicit trade using the same mechanisms 
afforded by the context of free trade for example. There is no secret or 
underground process that traffickers benefit from, but rather the same institutions, 
policies and mechanisms used by TNCs.
The contribution of ideas from enterprise is precisely to focus on these processes 
and to examine a series of factors such as free trade zones and relaxed financial 
regulations. Therefore, what is important to understand is how products are moved 
and not necessarily the nature of the product itself. Experts in business processes 
for black market and illicit goods follow the same business model, creating 
opportunities to move whatever commodities need transportation. Here enterprise 
could highlight the influence of drugs policy as we have it today since the main 
focus should be on processes that allow these products to move. There have been 
several authors who have already highlighted the links between globalization and
351 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999) 27.
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increased illicit activity.352 However most fall short of making the connection that 
enterprise would highlight, which is that there is no viable distinction between 
licit and illicit, and furthermore, licit attitudes, beliefs and actions actually bear the 
responsibility for the continued trade. Here notions of conspiracy can be turned 
upside down since there need not necessarily be veiled activities by anonymous 
actors that lead to the promotion of the drugs trade, but rather quite visible choices 
in foreign policy, internet technologies, economic practices, etc. that in 
themselves are overt and legal but which in practice assist the drugs trade and the 
disposal of the income it generates.
Global Norms
Globalization here includes also the globalization of norms. Global norms, which 
can best be described as “collective understandings of proper behavior of actors”, 
are seen in two issue areas related to the drug trade. The first relates to previous 
discussions on the export of US domestic prohibitionary norms to the international 
policy agenda. The second relates to the difference in drug attitudes in different 
regions, whether this is related to cultural practices or to the drug of choice in a 
particular locality. The export of domestic norms is a longstanding topic in IR and 
is related closely to hegemonic power and socialization in the international arena. 
According to Ikenberry and Kupchan hegemonic power can be expressed in two 
forms: material incentives and substantive incentives.354 Primarily discussed 
through a realist conception of norms, material incentives refer to the ability of 
powerful states to use threats in order to gain compliance to norms, while 
substantive incentives involve the internalization of norms by other political
• i c e
elites. In the latter case norms are not so much forced upon other states by the 
hegemon, rather the elites of those states choose to adopt the norms expressed by 
the hegemon, presumably because they find it to be in their own best interest to do 
so or there is a natural convergence of attitudes regarding a particular issue. The 
hegemon is recognized by other states as a leader and its norms are accorded 
primacy.
352 Mark Galeotti (2001) 203-217.
353 Jeffrey W Legro (1997) 31-63.
354 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan (1990) 283.
355 Ibid.
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By bringing into consideration individuals and their choices concepts associated 
with Lippmann and Smith also highlight local or regional level differences in 
norms. One way this can be shown is through attitudes towards drug and drug use. 
On the supply side, the Aymaran Indians in Bolivia consider the coca leaf an 
innocent commodity possibly more comparable to coffee than to opium. 
Inquiring why this is the case, it becomes clear that the Aymaran’s approach coca 
from a history and tradition that contains images and understandings far different 
than those we saw illustrated in earlier chapters. In brief they do not have the 
same sets of associations to drugs as a cancer and drugs as evil that consumer 
states have developed. Therefore it is not unusual that they find US drug 
intervention responses, especially via military action, out of context and tend to 
assume that such actions are a veil to conceal the promotion of other interests the 
US may have in the region.
From the consumption side there are different attitudes towards which drugs are 
acceptable and preferred. In the US, cocaine is considered a drug for the wealthy 
classes while crack is associated with ghettos and poverty. Therefore crack use 
among elites is low while cocaine use among marginalized classes is low. These 
are banal points that any local policeman would know. However when taken with 
new perceptions as laid out in this research, they become important in that they 
demystify the reach of drugs as an epidemic. In the 1980’s many believed there 
was a cocaine epidemic across America. While there was certainly increased 
cocaine use, the alarm that 50 American states, covering more than 3,500,000 
square miles, were inundated with cocaine is not credible. At the time cocaine was 
an expensive drug used by people with notable sums of disposable cash (as most 
dealers did not take credit cards). In such enclaves there was an increase use of 
cocaine, especially in New York, Los Angeles, Hollywood and other large areas 
where the cash rich would gather. This does not necessarily constitute a national 
epidemic.
Conclusions
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Though the question of policy recommendations has been avoided through out 
this work, it is ultimately in policy that this research could render its greatest 
value. Given the condition of research and analysis both in IR and in the 
international policy making arena, given the history of drugs and other illicit 
activities, and given the degree to which our current policies reflect these 
conditions, not even a moratorium on drug policies can be a sufficient policy 
response. For now policy will continue to oscillate between legalization and 
criminalization with increased law enforcement in certain regions and alternative 
programs for others.
As far as we are concerned here, however, the real work lies not in changing 
policy but in increasing research. As such this thesis concludes with three simple 
research recommendations which could serve as the basis for better future 
policies. First, we can pursue a critical analysis of the statistics used in drug 
research, particularly those used to call for policy action. Specifically, we can 
examine how data is gathered and develop a means to measure how likely it is that 
such statistics are a reflection of drug realities. Such research should reveal 
whether such statistics are, in whole or in part, suitable for analyzing a sector 
whose data are by nature hidden and unreliable at best. That said, it should also be 
considered whether current statistical methods can be altered to render results for 
illicit sectors more reliable. Second, such research must be conducted on the 
images of drugs created by both legalization and criminalization debates across 
nations. This would involve an extension of the research already conducted in the 
first chapters of this thesis. Again the purpose is to try to establish the realities of 
the narcotics trade as opposed to rehashing past arguments which have been long 
standing in the drug debate. The last research avenue is to apply concepts from 
the study of OC in several different regions of the world, taking them as case 
studies not only to test the viability of enterprise itself and particularly inclusive 
questions, as a research tool, but also through applying enterprise as a means of 
gaining a better understanding of the drugs trade in each of the regions under 
examination. This research must, as argued above, engage the process of drugs 
from cultivation to consumption and not just the role of producing nations.
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It may be that the final solution to the ‘mess’ of the drug issue will not be gained 
through any amount of research or clever policy making. Such a solution may 
reside instead in the ultimate removal of high morality from drug debates. As 
Lippmann point out over 70 years ago,
The [sic] people will have to make up their minds either to bring their 
legislation ideals down to the point where they square with prevailing 
human nature or they will have to establish an administrative despotism 
strong enough to begin enforcing their moral ideals.
The process of reckoning needed to make such a reconciliation may be, after all, 
the single most meaningful step towards lasting solution to the international drug 
trade.
356 Walter Lippmann (1931) 69
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Appendix A
FATF Recommendations 1-10
Scope of the criminal offence of money laundering 
Recommendation 1
Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
1988 (the Vienna Convention) and United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 (the Palermo Convention).
Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, 
with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences 
may be described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a 
category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the 
predicate offence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences, or a 
combination of these approaches.
Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a 
minimum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences 
under their national law or should include offences which are punishable by a 
maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment or for those countries 
that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate 
offences should comprise all offences, which are punished by a minimum penalty 
of more than six months imprisonment.
Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a 
range of offences within each of the designated categories of offences.
Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in 
another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would 
have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may 
provide that the only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a 
predicate offence had it occurred domestically.
Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to 
persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by 
fundamental principles of their domestic law.
Recommendation 2
Countries should ensure that:
a)The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering is 
consistent with the standards set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, 
including the concept that such mental state may be inferred from objective 
factual circumstances.
b)Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or administrative 
liability, should apply to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, 
civil or administrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in 
which such forms of liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be 
without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals.
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Provisional measures and confiscation 
Recommendation 3
Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna and 
Palermo Conventions, including legislative measures, to enable their competent 
authorities to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or 
predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission 
of these offences, or property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the 
rights of bona fide third parties.
Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate 
property which is subject to confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such 
as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such 
property; (c) take steps that will prevent or void actions that prejudice the State’s 
ability to recover property that is subject to confiscation; and (d) take any 
appropriate investigative measures.
Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or 
instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or 
which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged 
to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with 
the principles of their domestic law.
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NON- 
FINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS TO PREVENT MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
Recommendation 4
Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations.
Customer due diligence and record-keeping
Recommendation 5
Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in 
obviously fictitious names.
Financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures, 
including identifying and verifying the identity of their customers, when:
• establishing business relations;
• carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated 
threshold; or (ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the 
Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII;
• there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or
• the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer identification data.
The customer due diligence (CDD) measures to be taken are as follows:
a)Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, 
independent source documents, data or information.
b)Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the 
identity of the beneficial owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it 
knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this 
should include financial institutions taking reasonable measures to understand the
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ownership and control structure of the customer.
c)Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship.
d)Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of 
transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that 
the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of 
the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the 
source of funds.
Financial institutions should apply each of the GDD measures under (a) to (d) 
above, but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis 
depending on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction. The 
measures that are taken should be consistent with any guidelines issued by 
competent authorities. For higher risk categories, financial institutions should 
perform enhanced due diligence. In certain circumstances, where there are low 
risks, countries may decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or 
simplified measures.
Financial institutions should verify the identity of the customer and beneficial 
owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or 
conducting transactions for occasional customers. Countries may permit financial 
institutions to complete the verification as soon as reasonably practicable 
following the establishment of the relationship, where the money laundering risks 
are effectively managed and where this is essential not to interrupt the normal 
conduct of business.
Where the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs (a) to (c) 
above, it should not open the account, commence business relations or perform 
the transaction; or should terminate the business relationship; and should consider 
making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer.
These requirements should apply to all new customers, though financial 
institutions should also apply this Recommendation to existing customers on the 
basis of materiality and risk, and should conduct due diligence on such existing 
relationships at appropriate times.
Recommendation 6
Financial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed persons, in addition 
to performing normal due diligence measures:
a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer 
is a politically exposed person.
b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with 
such customers.
c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds.
d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. 
Recommendation 7
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Financial institutions should, in relation to cross-border correspondent banking 
and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence 
measures:
a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully 
the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available 
information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, 
including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing 
investigation or regulatory action.
b) Assess the respondent institution’s anti-money laundering and terrorist 
financing controls.
c) Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new 
correspondent relationships.
d) Document the respective responsibilities of each institution.
e) With respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that the respondent 
bank has verified the identity of and performed on-going due diligence on the 
customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent and that it is able 
to provide relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent 
bank.
Recommendation 8
Financial institutions should pay special attention to any money laundering threats 
that may arise from new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity, 
and take measures, if  needed, to prevent their use in money laundering schemes.
In particular, financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to 
address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business relationships 
or transactions.
Recommendation 9
Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other third 
parties to perform elements (a) -  (c) of the CDD process or to introduce business, 
provided that the criteria set out below are met. Where such reliance is permitted, 
the ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains 
with the financial institution relying on the third party.
The criteria that should be met are as follows:
a) A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain 
the necessary information concerning elements (a) -  (c) of the CDD process. 
Financial institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies 
of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD 
requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without 
delay.
b) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and 
supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in 
line with Recommendations 5 and 10.
It is left to each country to determine in which countries the third party that meets 
the conditions can be based, having regard to information available on countries
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that do not or do not adequately apply the FATF Recommendations. 
Recommendation 10
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records 
on transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply swiftly 
with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be 
sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the 
amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, 
evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.
Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained 
through the customer due diligence process (e.g. copies or records of official 
identification documents like passports, identity cards, driving licenses or similar 
documents), account files and business correspondence for at least five years after 
the business relationship is ended.
The identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic 
competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
Source: Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1996).
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Appendix B 
Table 3
Timeline of Major Reports on the Drug Debate
Year Country Title
1894 India Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report
1905 USA Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine
Commission to Investigate The Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein...Bureau of 
Insular Affairs, War Dept., Philippines
1926 UK Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction 
Report, Rolleston report
1928 USA The Opium Problem by Charles E. Terry and Mildred Pellens
1929 USA Panama Canal Zone Military Investigations 
(US Military, 1916-29)
1930 USA Wickersham Commission Report on Alcohol Prohibition
1944 USA The LaGuardia Committee Report (New York City)
1961 UK Interdepartmental Committee, Drug Addiction, 
(The First Brain Report)
1961 USA Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease? Joint Committee of the 
American Bar Association and the American Medical 
Association on Narcotic Drugs, Interim and Final Reports, 
1961:
1965 UK Interdepartmental Committee, Drug Addiction, 
Second Report, (The Second Brain Report)
1968 UK Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, Cannabis, 
(The Wootton Report)
1970 Canada Canadian Government Commission of Inquiry into the 
Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Interim Report,
(The Le Dain Report)
1970 USA The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History 
of American Marihuana Prohibition by Professors Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. 
Whitebread, II, Virginia Law Review, Volume 56, October 1970 Number 6
1971 NL Ruimte in het Drugbeleid. (Space in Drug Policy) The Hulsman report stands at the 
basis of the later Baan report and dutch drug policy.
1972 USA The Consumers Union Report on Licit and Illicit Drugs, by Edward M. Brecher and 
the Editors o f Consumer Reports Magazine
1972 USA The Koemer Commission Report, State of Ohio
1972 US Dealing With Drug Abuse: A Report to the Ford Foundation, by the Drug Abuse 
Survey Project.
1972 US Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, National Commission on Marihuana and 
Drug Abuse
1972 NL Achtergronden en Risico’s van Druggebruik. The Baan Report stood at the basis of 
the Dutch drug law of 1976 (Opiumwet) decriminalizing cannabis
1973 USA Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective, National Commission on Marihuana 
and Drug Abuse
1977 USA The Nation’s Toughest Drug Law: Evaluating the New York
Experience, by the Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation, o f the
Association of the Bar o f the City of New York
1980 USA The Facts About Drug Abuse, The Drug Abuse Council
Source: D rugText Li )rary (2005)
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Appendix C
Tables 4 and 5
Outline of Arguments for Criminalization and Legalization
Contemporary Example of the Case for Criminalization
1. The use of illicit drugs is illegal because of their intoxicating effects on the brain, damaging 
impact on the body, adverse impact on behavior, and potential for abuse. Their use threatens 
the health, welfare, and safety of all people, of users and non-users alike.
2. Legalization would decrease price and increase availability. Availability is a leading factor 
associated with increased drug use. Increased use of addictive substances leads to increased 
addiction. As a public health measure, statistics show that prohibition was a tremendous 
success.
3. Many drug users commit murder, child and spouse abuse, rape, property damage, assault and 
other violent crimes under the influence of drugs. Drug users, many of whom are unable to 
hold jobs, commit robberies not only to obtain drugs, but also to purchase food, shelter, 
clothing and other goods and services. Increased violent crime and increased numbers of 
criminals will result in even larger prison populations.
4. Legalizing drugs will not eliminate illegal trafficking of drugs, nor the violence associated 
with the illegal drug trade. A black market would still exist unless all psychoactive and 
addictive drugs in all strengths were made available to all ages in unlimited quantity.
5. Drug laws deter people from using drugs. Surveys indicate that the fear of getting in trouble 
with the law constitutes a major reason not to use drugs. Fear of the American legal system 
is a major concern of foreign drug lords. Drug laws have turned drug users to a drug-free 
lifestyle through mandatory treatment. 40%-50% are in treatment as a result of the criminal 
justice system.
6. A study of international drug policy and its effects on countries has shown that countries 
with lax drug law enforcement have had an increase in drug addiction and crime. 
Conversely, those with strong drug policies have reduced drug use and enjoy low crime 
rates.
7. The United States and many countries would be in violation of international treaty if they 
created a legal market in cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs. The U.S. is a signatory to the 
Single Convention on Narcotics & the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and has 
agreed with other members of the United Nations to control and penalize drug 
manufacturing, trafficking, and use. 112 nations recently reaffirmed their commitment to 
strong drug laws.
. . . .  -----------'tf, mgm
Source: Drug Watch International
Contemporary Example of the Case for Legalization____________________
1. Regulate and control the drugs trade______________________________________________
Drug laws that seek to criminalize production, supply and use of drugs have never been 
successful in achieving their stated aims, however harshly they are enforced. The illegal market
remains unregulated and out of our control.____________________________________________
There are a number of legal regulatory frameworks that exist for currently licensed drugs and 
medicines which allow control over production, price, quality, packaging and age of purchase. 
Given these legal options we must ask: Is there any benefit to giving monopoly control of this 
lucrative and dangerous market to organized crime and unregulated dealers?________________
2. Reduce drug related ill health____________________________________________________
Many of the health problems associated with illegal drugs are made far worse by their 
prohibition. Unknown strength and purity, poor information, and under funded drug treatment 
all contribute to the dangers faced by drug users. Whilst rates of addiction, HIV and Hepatitis 
continue to rise, the demonising and alienation of drug users means many are afraid to seek 
help. Moving towards a health rather than criminal justice focus for drug policy would allow us
357 Drug Watch International (2001) (This piece was reproduced here with permission. 
Numeration added).
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to help those in need and make all drug use safer.________________________________________
3. Reduce drug related crime_______________________________________________________
It is clear that the criminal drugs market the direct consequence of prohibitionist lawsis the root 
o f most of the crime associated with drugs. Unregulated dealers, gang violence and addicts 
committing property crime to fund their habits are just some of the problems attributable to the 
criminal market. Taking the trade out of the hands of criminals and putting it within a legal 
framework would help to eliminate the criminal market and its associated problems.__________
4. Maximise revenue and optimise expenditure________________________________________
Government research shows that every pound spent on drug treatment saves three pounds on 
criminal justice expenditure. Moving money away from policing and punishment and into care
and rehabilitation is both compassionate and effective.___________________________________
The global illegal drugs market is worth £300 billion a year and rising—an astonishing 10% of 
international trade— by far the biggest earner for modem day A1 Capones. A legally regulated 
market would keep profits within the legitimate economy and generate significant revenues for 
the treasury rather than for organized crime.____________________________________________
5. Extend the provision of honest and effective drugs education__________________________
Inadequate education is a major factor contributing to the dangers of drug use (legal and illegal). 
Taboos around illegal drugs in particular have meant most education programmes have been 
misleading and ineffective. An expansion of drugs information services combined with a more 
realistic and balanced approach could address these shortcomings._____________ ____________
6. Protect civil rights______________________________________________________________
For historical reasons some drugs are strictly prohibited whilst others are legally available. This 
illogical distinction criminalizes millions in a way that is unjust and indiscriminate. Our basic 
rights to privacy and freedom of belief and practice are routinely infringed. In a modem society 
committed to civil rights we must accept all drug users have the same rights. With these rights 
come responsibilities, but when an individual’s drug use is responsible and does not interfere 
with the rights of others, there is no justification for legal sanctions to be applied._____________
7. Deal with the underlying causes of drug misuse_____________________________________
The drng problem has historically been dealt with symptomatically with little attention paid to 
the underlying social problems that lead people to misuse drugs. Only by focusing on these 
underlying problems (unemployment, bad housing, lack of opportunity, poverty, physical and 
emotional abuse) can we hope to significantly reduce the number of drng misusers.___________
8. Encourage involvement of communities____________________________________________
The negative impacts of prohibitionist chug policy are felt most heavily in deprived 
communities, where the prevalence of chug misuse is highest. These same communities are also 
the most excluded from die decision making process, meaning policy rarely reflects their needs 
and aspirations. If we are serious about social inclusion we must allow people from all the
affected communities, including drug users, a place at the policy making table._______________
Source: Transform International http://www.transform-drugs.org.uk/
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Appendix D 
Table 6
Timeline of Major Substance Control (1868-1988)
Date Name of Act
1868 Pharmacy Act of 1868 required registration of those dispensing drugs.
1906 Pure Food and Drug Act prohibited adulteration and mislabeling; lead to decline of patent medicines
1909 Opium Exclusion Act
1909 Shanghai Opium Convention
1911 International Conference on Opium
1913 International Opium Convention ratified by U.S. Senate.
1914 Harrison Narcotics Act taxed and regulated distribution and sale of narcotics
1919 Supreme Court sustained the Harrison Act in U.S. v. Doremus.
1920 Volsted Act, National alcohol prohibition.
1922 Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act
1924 Heroin Act-Makes it illegal to manufacture heroin
1929 Porter Narcotic Farm Act established two narcotics hospitals for addicts in Federal prisons in response to addicts crowding.
1932 Uniform State Narcotics Act endorsed by Federal Bureau of Narcotics as an alternative to Federal laws; by 1937 every State prohibits marijuana use.
1935/1936 First Federal hospitals/prisons open in Lexington/Fort Worth; Porter Act.
1938
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
FDA given control over drug safety, Drugs redefined: effect body even in 
absence of disease, Establishes class of drugs available by Prescription 
(Company determines status)
1937 Marijuana Tax Act
1942 Opium Poppy Control Act
1951 Durham-Humphrey Amendment Established more specific guidelines for prescription drugs: habit forming, safety, and evaluation of new drugs
1951 Boggs Act imposed harsher penalties
1965 Drug Abuse Control Amendments (DACA) Strict controls over amphetamines, barbiturates, LSD, etc.
1966 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) Allows treatment as alternative
1968 DACA Amendments Provides that sentence may be suspended and record expunged if no further violations within 1 year
1970
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act Replaces and updates all 
previous laws concerning narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Empasis on 
law enforcement.
1972 Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act Establishes federally funded programs for prevention and treatment
1973 Methadone Control Act Regulates methadone licensing
1973 Heroin Trafficking Act Increases penalties for distribution
1973 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) Consolidates NIMH, NIDA, and NLAAA under umbrella organization
1973 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Remodels Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs into DEA
1974/1978 Drug Abuse Treatment and Control Amendments Extends 1972 act
1978 Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education Amendments Sets up education programs within Department of Education
1980 Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Amendments Extends prevention education and treatment programs
1984 Drug Offenders Act Sets up special programs for offenders and treatment
1986 Analogue (Designer Drug) Act Makes use of substances with similar effects and structure to existing illicit drug illegal
1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act Establishes oversight office: National Drug Control
Source: Robert Keel, ‘Significant Events in the History of Our Drug Laws’ and George Mason 
University http://www.gwu.edu/
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